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J ustificational Narratives: 
What is the role of fear in Israeli narratives of war? 
El Inocente stood before the table and gestured for silence. He preached a long sermon, of which I cannot 
recall a single word, but I can tell you that it was full of vileness, decorated and embellished to the point 
where one might almost believe that it was a noble speech.'l 
1 De Bernieres, 1998. P32 1. 
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What is the role of fear in Israeli narratives of war? 
By Sasha Evans, May 2004 
Abstract 
The body of this thesis contains two main parts. The first (section 3) is a critical 
linguistic analysis of a selection of political speeches (which I have called 'policy 
narratives') delivered by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in the period February 
2002 - October 2003. I have sought, with reference to Aristotle and other writers on 
persuasion, to delineate the rhetorical devices employed by Sharon and his 
speechwriters, and to demonstrate that one of their most important functions is to 
contribute to and enhance the overall climate of fear among the Israeli people, for the 
furtherance of Sharon's own political goals. I focus primarily on the speeches 
surrounding and leading up to the March 2002 announcement of 'Operation 
Defensive Shield', which was described by Palestinians and international aid workers 
as the harshest military assault on the WBGS since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 
After examining the policy narratives I provide another representation of the 'reality 
on the ground' experienced by the Palestinian population at the receiving end of 
Sharon's 'operations'. 
The second (section 4) is a linguistic analysis of the 'narrative of personal experience' 
of a civilian reservist - Moshe Nissim - who was recruited in April 2002, at the 
height of 'Defensive Shield', to drive a D-9 bulldozer through the West Bank's Jenin 
refugee camp. Nissim, who seems motivated by his own personal fears and failures, 
apparently sees in Jenin the long-awaited opportunity to redeem himself. Although 
he does not appear to have been inspired by the arguments and themes of Sharon's 
narratives, the overall atmosphere of fear and hatred that is legitimised and given 
weight by Sharon in his speeches, sets the stage for Nissim to act on his darkest urges 
and later to be considered by himself and others as a hero for having done so. 
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This thesis approaches the question what is the role of fear in Israeli narrath'es of war? - hy 
analysing two forms of war narratives: political and personal. The political narratives are a 
selection of speeches and one article delivered by the current prime minister of Israel, Ariel 
Sharon, in the period February 2002 - October 2003,1 I \'Vill be examining some of the 
persuasive and mythmaking techniques they exemplify in their production and presentation 
of a particular ideological \ision. Neither the vision nor the themes identified here are limited 
to this period, or to Sharon, but political ideologies are most focused and therefore easily 
identifiable at times of heightened conflict and of politically far-right leadership, both of 
\\'hich are fulfilled at this tinh'. The analysis also refers more hroadly to the polici,':-> I !lese 
speeches seek to legitimise, and to their effects on the physical and emotional reality of the 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories,2 I contend that policy narratives such as these are 
generated by and for the Israeli (and American:l ) domination of the Palestinian people and 
their environment, and that these purposes, and the means of achieving them, can be clearly 
identified from the texts. 
The term 'policy narratives' is defined by Roe as "the stories - scenarios and arguments -
that are taken ... as underwriting (that is, establishing or certifying) and stabilising (that is, 
fixing or making steady) the assumptions for policymaking in the face of the issue's 
uncertainty, complexity or polarisation."4 For the sake of this discussion I use the term 
specifically to mean the "stories, scenarios and arguments" narrated by the current Israeli 
prime minister, which are replicated throughout society but in particular by the spokespeople 
of the Israeli army (IDF), that underwTite and stabilise the assumptions upon which are 
based the country's militaristic policy towards the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip (WBGS). 
Insofar as 'propaganda' is defined as "an association or scheme for propagating a doctrine or 
practice,"s 'policy narrath'es' can also be seen as a form of propaganda. According to 
Pratkanis and Aronson, 
l The full texts of these narratives can be found in Annex Pl: Ariel Sharon speeches infllll; pp AI-A::q. 
-' Physical and emotional realities include: unemployment, poverty, malnutrition: the spread of diseases such as 
TB due to the denial of medical treatment in times of curfew, the shared reality of an environment rendered 'war-
torn' and the trauma resulting from this and from exposure to repeated and p~olonged periods of shelling, 
shooting, curfews and incursions, as experienced by the vast majority of the WBGS Palestinian population. In this 
context, 'reality' might be said to be that which has no (verbal) presentation. 
:l The US contributes over USSsbillion per year to Israel's national budget. Around S4-4 billion of this is military 
aid, approximately 80% of which is used to buy weapons from American manufacturers. See for example Francis, 
9 December 2002. 
~ Roe. 1994, P3· 











Justificatimw/ ,Varratiucs illtrudw:tioll 
[t]he word propaganda has evolved to mean mass 'suggestion' or influence through the 
manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual. Propaganda is the 
communication of a point of view vvith the ultimate goal of having the recipient of the appeal 
come to 'voluntarily' accept this position as if it were his or her own.6 
The 'personal experience' narrative is that of an Israeli army bulldozer driver after the 
contentious April 2002 IDF operation in Jenin refugee camp.? Although he defines himself 
politically as "heavily on the right," his narrative and the actions it describes seem largely 
unmotivated by political or religious concerns - perhaps surprisingly so, for such an 
intensely 'political' environment as Israel/Palestine, It seems from this that the motivational 
power of policy narrati\'es and other forms of political discourse is multilayered. On nne le\'el, 
they reinforce the ideolog~' of t',( ,\('!'nment authority, which allows for certain demands hy iI 
government on its people (you must serve in the army, you must defend your country). In 
doing so, they also simultaneously establish the societal spectrum of 'acceptable b~haviour' 
through an ideological framework to justify violent behaviour that is perhaps motivated by 
more personal concerns. The policies and their narratives provide the stage and script for an 
indhidual to "sanction social practices through reference to collective interests and systems 
of values."8 In other societies and circumstances, the actions and motivations implied by the 
bulldozer driver's narrative might be differently interpreted, but in times of 'war' he can be 
constructed by himself and by others as a 'hero'. 
Although both acting and then constructing his narrative of his own free will, influenced as 
we shall see by a catalogue of personal failures and frustrations, the bulldozer driver's 72 
whisky-fuelled hours of destruction are staged, sanctioned and rewarded by Sharon's 
government and military agents, who themselves also act vvithin the atmosphere of the 
prevailing narratives. From analysing these texts, I have come to believe that the values set 
on certain forms of behmiour within a society are not just directed from the 'top-down', in 
spite of the demonstrably persuasive power of the policy narratives themselves. In fact, in 
times of war, government discourse is most motivational (and therefore able to harness 
popular energy, which is clearly an important political aim) when it legitimises, and even 
provokes, the sustained and exaggerated expression of people's deepest fears and 
insecurities. While problematising the concept that propaganda is unidirectional, it seems 
clear that the policy narratives ofleading politicians can playa vital role in fanning the flames 
of hatred and fear, whatever their source, and in redirecting and focusing their energy for the 
fulfilment of political purposes. I contend that Israeli right-\ving hegemony both feeds and is 
fed by fear. 
--_ .. _-,-------
h Pratkanis and Aronson. 1992, D9. 












1.1. Why Analyse Policy Narratives? 
In general, the aim of policy narrative analysis, which is also conducted under the name of 
critical discourse analysis or critical linguistics, wherever these confront policy presentations, 
is to "analyse issues of social relevance" while attempting to expose "inequality and 
injustice,"9 or to find and expose the 'myths', conveyed and built upon by these narratives, 
which actively contribute to human suffering by helping to construct and then 'naturalise' 
oppressive circumstances and the attitudes necessary to perpetuate them. Wodak defines 
"critical linguistics" as "an interdisciplinary approach to language study with a critical point 
ob'iew" for studying "language heh<'1\'iour in natural speech situations of social rclc\'ance."lo 
It is often underestimated just hmv much ditference to our perception of a person or thing 
can be made simply by altering its framing terminology, and the narratives which help to 
, 
construct a policy are to some degree responsible for its consequences, which can include 
war, destruction and death, According to Chomsky, 
For those who stubbornly seek freedom around the world, there can be no more urgent task 
than to come to understand the mechanisms and practices of indoctrination, These are easy to 
perceive in the totalitarian societies, much less so in the propaganda system to which we are 
subjected and in which all too often we serve as unwilling or unwitting instruments. II 
Furthermore, as Chomsky notes in a December 2001 interview 'with Norman Solomon, 
"understanding the world doesn't help anyone else, or oneself ,'ery much either for that 
matter, unless it leads to action,"12 
1.2. The Mythology Of The Mythologist 
Since "writing about the politicisation of language is in itself politicised, "13 the analyst should 
acknowledge what Barthes calls the "mythology of the m)1:hologist"Q - the int1uence of his or 
her own perspective on the analysis. According to Simpson: 
Although the main aim of a critical linguistic analysis is to examine the ideologies which 
underlie texts... [w ]hat is needed is explicit recognition that the diagnostic readings may 
themselves be ideologically motivated and that the analyst has a particular stance which 
informs their particular interpretation. 15 
R Duszak, 2002, P7. 
q Wodak, 1989, introduction. 
10 Woclak, 1989, introduction. 
11 Chomsky, Winter 1987-88. 
12 Solomon, 6 December 200l. 
1] Simpson, 1993, pns. 











Justijicatimwl Xorrutiues introductill1l 
Pursuing a similar point in Orientalism, Said cites Gramsci: 
"The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 
'knowing thyself as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an 
infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory ... therefore it is imperative at the outset to 
compile such an inventory."16 
Although it would be impossible to compile afull inventory of the "infinity of traces" that led 
me to this research, it (and the ideological standpoint that governs it) was predominantly 
inspired by the outrage of four years (1997 - 2001) spent in the West Bank, monitoring and 
recording a range of human rights violations '7 against the Palestinian population by Israeli 
government apparatuses su<.:h as the army, police <lI1d civil administration. Based in 
Ramallah, I frequently travelled bet,veen the towns and cities of the West Bank, and 
sometimes into the Gaza Strip, to speak "vith victims of human rights violations and their 
families, and to photograph and record video footage of the destruction wreaketi by the 
incursion of heavy military equipment into densely-populated civilian areas. In the process, 
and particularly in the year follo\\>ing the outbreak of the current 'Intifada','1l I \\>itnessed and 
experienced some of the harshest realities of life under Israeli occupation. 
Afforded some degree of protection by my foreign nationality, I nonetheless experienced 
severe travel restrictions at checkpoints, although eventually allowed through the blockades 
that ordinary Palestinians were not permitted to cross under any circumstances. 19 I also 
witnessed countless violations of the right to life and safety of person, and at each of the 
demonstrations I attended, mostly on the outskirts of Ramallah or .Jerusalem, unarmed 
15 Simpson, 1993, PP1l4-5. 
16 Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks, cited in Said, 1978, P25. According to Said, the phrase "therefore ... inventory" is 
not included in the English translation but exists in the original Italian. 
17 By 'human rights violations' I mean violations of the rights laid down in the 1947 UN Declaration of Human 
Rights, as well as of the International Geneva Convention concerning the rights of civilians in times of war. 
18 It is useful to compare the official narratives of 'both sides' (that is, the narrative that has taken prevalence to be 
accepted more or less as 'truth' by each nation) of the conflict concerning the 'outbreak' of this period. Palestinians 
agree that it began when Ariel Sharon entered the Al Aqsa courtyard flanked by over 1000 soldiers, who 
responded to the inevitable protests Vlfith live ammunition. The next day, the soldiers returned to the mosque, 
without Sharon, killing six in the mosque courtyard. In the two weeks that followed over 80 Palestinian protesters 
were shot and killed before retaliatory strikes began. Israelis, on the other hand, say that the Palestinian Authority 
had long planned an uprising; that to blame the 'Sharon trigger' was merely PA opportunism, that the Palestinians 
in the mosque courtyard had been throwing missiles at the Jewish worshippers on the other side of the Western 
Wall, and that Sharon had every right, as a Jew, to 'visit' the 'Temple Mount' (even if it is currently overlaid by Al 
Aqsa mosque and administrated by the Islamic Waqf). 
Iq In the period September 2000 to December 2002, 7.5 Palestinians died at checkpoints, due to lack of access to 
hospital/medical treatment, including 17 babies at birth. The Electronic Intifada, 
electronicintifu"la.llet/v> hll1jcleq1H3,shtml. According to press releases and other communications from 
Palestinian, Israeli and international human rights workers, the situation has deteriorated still further in the two 
years that followed, since many towns and villages have been comprehensively sealed off from the outside world 
with no access to medical resources whatsoever. According to 'Moshe', one of the hundreds of Israeli army 
dissidents (or 'refuseniks') to make their views public in the past 40 months, "What struck me was that all the 
roads from the Palestinian villages were blocked. As a medical student, my first thought was: 'What if someone 
has a heart attack or a woman needs to give biltb'?' Moshe, who declined to have his full name published for fear 












people (including children) were shot and either killed or maimed by Israeli soldiers. The 
firing of live ammunition, "rubber" bullets:w and tear gas into crovvds was and remains 
common, often provoked by stone-throv,ing at soldiers but sometimes without apparent 
provocation, and I video-recorded many such incidents. Driving was dangerous because 
soldiers would frequently shoot from roadside high points over the top of queues of traffic at 
stone-thrmving youngsters on the other side; towards the end of 2001 it became all but 
impossible to drive in any case because of the destroyed roads and frequent checkpoints. In 
Ramallah, as throughout the WBGS, there was the terror of frequent nightly shelling of the 
town from helicopters or tanks. Curfews are announced suddenly and leave tens of thousands 
of people locked for indefInite periods inside \\'hichcvcr buildings they happen to be in at tbat 
moment.:: l People's homes, husinesses and li\'estock sheds are routinely demolished w1th 
their contents inside; these have been known to include animals and in some cases, as 
reported in Jenin refugee camp, Gaza and Nablus, humans. 22 Thousands of acres,of fields, 
olive groves and orchards have been uprooted by Israeli army bulldozers, for "security 
reasons; ":23 tens of thousands of Palestinians have had their homes demolished for the same 
reason. 
LiYing so intensively v.ithin 'the news' while closely folluwing its presentation in the 
international media, it became clear that a different world was being described from the one I 
inhabited, even if the televised images looked familiar. The American international news 
network CNN, according to (Palestinian) popular assessment, is "more accurate if you turn 
the sound off."o4 Having held numerous discussions (and arguments) vvith the young Israeli 
soldiers charged with enforcing the restrictive measures on the Palestinian population, I 
became intrigued by the mechanism that had produced their certainty of the need for the 
army's actions, and their own as its soldiers. 
Sunday Independent (South Africa), 15 February 2004, pIS. 
"0 "Rubber" bullets are in fact steel bullets encased in rubber. At close range they can easily kill, and in the course 
of a year I spoke to seven children and/or their parents (two aged 16, one 14, one 13, two 12 and one just 9 years 
old) who lost an eye after being hit 'with these bullets, There have been countless other such cases; see for instance 
reports by Defence for Children International (DCI -Pal) and Amnesty International, among others, 
21 In 2002, Palestinian residents of the city of Hebron had to stay inside their homes for almost 270 days. See 
LAW Society press releases, bttp:/Iwww,hmsociet\,()I'g,. 
cc See Annex BIl, p A43: Once upon a time in Jenin, by Huggler and Reeves, 25 April 2002. AJso see the analysis 
of Moshe Nissim's narrative in section 4. 
21 "As of April 2002. the [agricultural] sector has suffered at least a 70% decline due to the siege and total losses 
were estimated to have reached USS392 million, including the destruction of crops and agricultural lands through 
bulldozing, burning and tree uprooting, preventing work on cultivated land, settler attacks on farmers working in 
their fields. damaging greenhouses, irrigation networks and agricultural equipment, death of livestock due to 
shelling or lack of food, export bans of agricultural products." P ASSIA 2003. 
"1 Karma Abu-Sharif. author of the daily newsletter Hear Palestine, is a Palestinian commentator li\'ing in 











.} IIstific.:Cltional Sa rratives 
1.3. Propaganda In Nation-Building And War 
Policy narratives, everywhere "the armature of everyday life in government,"25 are 
particularly important when popular motivation must be maintained for intensive long-term 
war and/or nation-building projects. 
Nation-Building 
The ideological framework within which Sharon operates is Political Zionism/6 a nationalist 
movement with its roots in the latter part of the 19th century. The creation of the state of 
Israel on the land of Palestine necessitated (and its expansion today still necessitates) the 
forced remova1 of many of the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants. 
It is the duty of Israeli leaders to explain to public opinion, clearly and courageously, a certain 
number of facts that are forgotten with time. The first of these is that there is no Zionism, 
colonialisation or Jewish State without the eviction of the Arabs and the expropriation of their 
lands.27 
The early Zionist pioneers and today the state of Israel sought to establish and maintain a 
demographic balance of no more than 20% non-Jews in Israe1. 28 Currently the 'Arab-Israeli' 
population stands at approximately one million, a1though several thousand more are not 
registered and live in 'unrecognised villages' inside Israel. 29 The founder of the World Zionist 
Organisation, Theodore Herzl, suggested in 1895: "Spirit the penniless population across the 
frontier by denying it employment... Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the 
poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.":w Neither discreet nor circumspect, 
the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, which Israel refers to as the 'War of Independence', caused 
2:; Roe, 1994, P34 
26 It is important to indicate a difference between political and religious Zionism. The former is an expansionist 
colonialist ideology whose pursuit necessitates the removal of the indigenous population to make way for a 
uniquely Jewish state. The latter is translated as the dream of the .Jewish people for a homeland over the millennia 
since their diaspora. Due to a blurring of this distinction in political Zionist discourse, 'anti-Zionism', in the sense 
of resisting the uprooting of the Palestinian population, is very often described as anti-semitism, or the deliberate 
thwarting of a sacred Jewish dream, as well as the Jewish right to self-determination and security. As a result, 
according to Robert Fisk, "Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines 'anti-Semitism' as 'opposition to 
Zionism: sympathy with opponents of the state of IsraeL'" Fisk, A. Warnillg to Those Who Dare to Criticize Israel, 
The Independent Weekend Edition, 24/ 25 April 2004. 
~7Yoram Bar Porath, in Yediot Aharonot, Israel, 14 July 1972. 
"8 See Annex BI2, p A48: Fears of the demographic balance at the Zionist Conference, by Amiram Barkat and 
Jonathan Lis, Ha'aretz, 11 November 2003. 
29 Because they are not recognised, these villages receive no infrastructure support or other services. See for 
example 1n\'\\'.alJlber-()nline.COlll/;all('n)exhibiti(!!l164fnot~JJ),J.iltml: "Within the state of Israel today are some 
70 Arab villages, which officially do not exist at all and do 110t appear on any maps. Successive Israeli governments 
have left them out of official plans and branded them illegal, zoning the land for agricultural use only, even though 
these communities have resided on it for generations. The inhabitants are Palestinian Arabs. In order to persuade 
the inhabitants to move, the Israeli government pursues the following policies: basic services such as electricity, 
drinking water and access to roads are withheld - the villages are forbidden to be connected to national networks; 
existing schools and clinics have been closed: all new constructions, including improving as well as building new 
homes, is strictly forbidden." 











./Ilstljimtionai Narratives Illtroductioll 
approximately 726,00031 Palestinians to leave their homes and seek refuge in Egypt, 
Lebanon, SYTia and the West Bank (then a part of Trans-Jordan), while some 531 Palestinian 
\illages in the land that became Israel were either destroyed or resettled by the new IsraelisY 
Since then the refugees have been consistently denied the right to return,:l:! for the simple 
demographic reason articulated by Sharon: "the return of Arab refugees ... to [Israel's] 
territory ... would effectively terminate the existence of the State ofIsrael as a Jewish state.":l4 
US President George Bush recently validated this claim by declaring the return of the 
refugees to be "unrealistic.":~5 
:'vJeLlnwhile, more than three and a half million;6 inhahitants of the \YBGS now live under 
\ <lrying degrees of Israeli military occupation: for the same demographic reasons the state 
will not simply annex the land it occupied in 1967 and accord them rights as citizens, but it 
continues to govern the wealth of the WBGS's environmental resources, such as 'Yater and 
arable land, for the benefit of its own population. To the inevitable expressions of 
dissatisfaction by Palestinians, the Israeli military responds with military force, while the 
'demographic threat' posed by Palestinians is presented to the Israeli public in dehumanising 
narratives of fear (because "dehumanisation succeeds in resohing any dissonance that may 
be aroused by our cruelty towards our enemies.":~7) Prominent Israeli politicians have long 
referred to Palestinians, for example, as "beasts walking on two legs,":l8 "drugged cockroaches 
\1 UN Conciliation Commission estimate. 1948. Cited in PASSIA 2003. P269. The war in 1967 caused a further 
300.000 refugees. Today. the number of UNRWA (United Nations Relief Works Agency)-registered Palestinian 
refugees lies at 3,973,360, and according to PASSIA, "some .50% of refugees in the Diaspora are not registered 
with UNRWA because of its narrow definition ... the definition does not include refugees who tled elsewhere, those 
displaced in 1967 (at least 325,000) ... also not included are the WBGS Palestinians who overstayed their permits 
while abroad, and thus have not been allowed to return. There are over 50,000 such cases." PASSIA 2003, P269. 
PASSIA 2003, P269. See http://\Vww.ierusalel11ite~.org/cl'ill1e5 (destroyed \illagesllist.htI11 for a list of 419 
villages destroyed in 1947-1949. In 1969, Israeli war hero Moshe Davan addressed the Haifa Technicon: "Jewish 
\ ill ages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even kno~v the names of these Arab villages, and I do 
not blame you because geography books no longer exist, not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not 
there either. Nahlal arose in the place of Mahlul; Kibbutz Gvat in the place of Jibta [ ... ]. There is not one single 
place built in this country that did not have a former Arab Population." Moshe Dayan, cited in Ha'aretz, 4 April 
1969. 
l:l This right is enshrined in UN General Assembly resolution 194 of December 1948: "The refugees wishing to 
return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date ... compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return." On 14 April 
:::!004, George Bush "made it explicitly clear that any final deal would not provide for refugee families displaced by 
the 1948 war to return to Israel." Donald MacIntyre, Sharon and Blish reach their own settlement on Israel, the 
Independent Online; http://ncws.indcpe:ndcnt.c;).uk/woridlnliddle east /ston:j~p?stor\'=51159I, 15/04/04 . 
. 11 Sharon, 08-04-02, §43k-o. As will be explained in due course, the notation svstem applied to Sharon's speeches 
is as follows: 08-04-02 is the date the speech was delivered, the symbol § refers to thc stanza number, and the 
letters refer to the lines within a stanza. The full texts of all Sharon's speeches, broken down in this manner, is 
a\'ailable in Annex PI; pp AI-A24. 
1; George Bush, 14 April 2004, BBC World News. 
I" According to The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, the total Palestinian 
population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2003 was 3,634,495. PASSIA. 2003. p267. 
:- Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, P38. 
,~ Menachim Begin. Prime Minister ofIsraeI1977-1982, in a speech to the Knesset. Cited in Alllnon Kapeliouk. 











JlIstijimtiolwl Sarratives Introduction 
in a bottle,"l9 "grasshoppers,"4o "crocodiles, "4 I and H[akin to] the rock.,> of Judea, as obstacles 
that had to be cleared on a difficult path. "4:.! Today, "Israeli right wing hegemony is fed by 
terror. "43 Terrorism itself bears only partial responsibility for radicalising Israeli society; it 
works in harmony with the terror of terrorism, and by extension, of Palestinians, that is 
generated not least through stereotypical representations of them in policy narratives and the 
media. Current Israeli state discourse seeks to instil terror of terrorism in its target audience 
perhaps, as Chomsky writes, because "[eJngendering fear and hatred is a standard method 
of population control."44 By analysing the arguments treated as fact at the 'top' that is, by 
governmental rhetoricians - we can easily see how similar attitudes achieve an aura of 
acceptability at alllc\'e!s of society. 
1.3.2. War 
War, 'a continuation of political activity by other means,"45 is a state of affairs that is most 
often rationally chosen by politicians, but because of its huge human and financial cost it 
must seem to the population to have been 'forced upon' them by 'the enemy'. It happens that 
warfare is high on Sharon's policy agenda, as revealed by the most cursory glance at his 
speeches or at the amounts of money and effort invested in military actions under his tenure. 
For this military approach he has acquired a large follmving, since his infamously long and 
bloody military career and 'hard-line' approach to the Palestinians46 are seen by his followers 
as manifestations of his devotion to Zionism and the Israeli people. 
Brown sees propaganda as "a weapon in the total \varfare of modern times, beginning \vith 
the First World War, when lies, political subterfuge and atrocity stories were unscrupulously 
employed in an attempt to influence the final result,"47 The 'final result' must to some extent 
depend on the motivation and morale of the population, and although modern warfare has 
evolved to the point where those living in the most pmverful countries no longer feel its 
devastation,48 they \vill to some extent be affected by the financial and moral constraints of 
14 Raphael Eitan, then IDF Chief of Staff: "When we have settled the land, all the Arabs will be able to do about it 
will be to scurry around like drugged cockroaches in a bottle.", cited in New York Times, 14 April 1983. 
~o Yitzhak Shamir, then Prime Minister of Israel: "The Palestinians would be crushed like grasshoppers ... heads 
smashed against the boulders and walls." Speech to Jewish settlers, cited in New York Times, 1 April 1988. 
~l Ehud Barak, then Prime Minister of Israel: "The Palestinians are like crocodiles. the more you give them meat, 
they want more," August 28, 2000. Reported in the Jerusalem Post, 30 August :2000. 
~"Chaim Weizmann, first President ofIsrael, 1948-1952. Cited in Masalha. 1992. p17. 
~l Atzmon, Assassinating Sheikh Yassill, 22 March 2004. See Annex BI3, p A49. 
~~ Chomsky, 1996, p124. 
~> Karl von Clausevitz, On War, 1976. 
jh See Allnex BI4, p A.50: Ariel Sharon Biography, produced by the Israeli ivlinistry for Foreign Affairs, with 
annotations by the Electronic Intifada. 
F Brown, 1979, pll. 
~H Modern technology means that frequently even the soldiers in\'olved ill 'combat' can be immune to its effects, 
since bombs can be dropped at the touch of a distant button. as America boasted with the mountain-levelling 
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sustained military action against another population: 
One of the most pernicious functions of war propaganda is to make it easier for members of 
one nation to destroy members of another nation with psychological impunity ... The cognition 
"I and my country are decent, fair and reasonable" is dissonant \"ith the cognition, "I and my 
country have hurt innocent people." In this situation the most effective way to reduce 
dissonance is to minimise the humanity or maximise the CUlpability of the victims of your 
action to comince yourself the victims deserved what they goL19 
The 'us' and 'them' distinction is necessarily heightened in times of warfare, since it resolves a 
fundamental moral dilemma - soldiers must kill some people ('them'), they are told, in order 
to defend others ('us'). The more a soldier 'defends' 'us' (and, by implication, kills 'them'), the 
more heroically s/he can be portrayed. Propaganda pla)'s a powerful role in polarising 
perspectives, and not least, in perpetuating a feeling of fear ill the people supposedly 'being 
defended', to underline the importance of defending them. The provision of "psychological 
, 
impunity" referred to by Pratkanis and Aronson50 is important, because it suggests that while 
people are ultimately motivated by their own concerns, in case of 'cognitive dissonance' they 
will often seek a logical justification from an authoritative overarching ideological framework. 
This seems similar to the way in which a narrator might attempt to make his or her own 
'evaluation' of something more convincing to an audience, by inserting a 'heteroglossic' 
("where the source of an attitude is other than the narrator"Sl) affirmation of that evaluation 
into the narrative. The more 'official' the imported source (and here the government ranks 
high), the more credibility lent to the narrator's own position. This is perhaps one of the most 
important elements of the intertextual dynamic between the policy narratives and the 
narrative of personal experience analysed in sections 3 and 4. 
1.4. The Ideological Pill 
The mass media "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but 
it is stunningly successful in telling its readers [or viewers, or listeners] what to think 
about ... "~;t Even \vithout successfully imposing a 'ready-made' ideological framework in the 
mind of the individual, mere repetition of a theme constitutes a form of propaganda known 
as 'naturalisation.' According to Barthes, "The essential function of myth is to naturalise a 
concept. This is why myth is experienced as innocent speech: not because its intentions are 
hidden, but because they are naturalised."s:l Once a phenomenon has been 'naturalised' in 
popular awareness it begins to constitute a part of the status quo and to resemble the natural 
49 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, P38. 
,0 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, P38. 
~I Martin and Rose, September 2001. Sources of Attitudes . 
. ,2 Political scientist Bernard Cohen cited in Pratkanis and Aronson. 199~. pPSS-6. [Emphasis added] 
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order of things: thus the West Bank would surprise us if it \Vere not presented by the media as 
'war torn.' 
According to Wilkin, "[tJhe effects of propaganda are the most contentious area of 
communication research," and it is therefore imperative in any discussion of propaganda and 
persuasion techniques to indicate awareness that "'[s]ubordinate groups'" - i.e., the 'target 
audience' - "do rIot simply swallow an ideological pill,":>4 as otherwise the analyst may seem 
to be making "assumptions about how the language of mass communication is 'received' by 
its 'addressees'."·~5 As we shall see, the 'personal experience' narrator whose account is 
analysed below is only marginally concerned with the specific doctrines propagated by 
Sharon and his government. He is, hQ\\'ever, intluenced hy the prcnliling atmosphere of 
'might is right' that these doctrines have established. The study of Sharon's policy narratives 
is concerned with how this atmosphere is created, and with the general effects of pr9paganda 
based on human response theories, but it does not claim that propaganda will necessarily 
work on its audiences exactly as intended: "studies in the way the media is received by 
audiences show that people can sometimes be immune to the efforts of the ideologies 
supposedly in the texts."56 
It is important to note that among the Israeli people are a considerable number who pit 
themselves in varying degrees of opposition to their state's treatment of the Palestinians, 
including, significantly, hundreds of army 'refuseniks' who have been imprisoned for their 
dissent,57 while, in spite of Sharon's repeated assertion that "Israel is not only an Israeli 
project. Israel is a Je\\1sh, worldwide project,"s8 scores of Jewish-run organisations outside 
Israel seek recognition that they also do not endorse Israeli policies and, moreover, that these 
policies trigger anger and hatred against Israelis and Jews.59 Ronnie Kasrils, former South 
African minister of water and forestry, frequently speaks out against Israel's behaviour "not 
just as a human being who should cry out against this injustice, [but also] because I am 
.Jewish and the Israeli government purports to talk and act on behalf of Jews everyvvhere, and 
I believe Jews like myself should say, 'No, not in my name. '''Go 
~-I Wilkin, 1997, P130. [Emphosis in the origina[J 
.io Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert and Leap, 2000. p :3:33. 
~b Mesthrie. Swann, Deumert and Leap, :2000, P:327 
See Annex BIS, p 1\5S: We're Air Force Pilots, Not Mafia. concerning Israeli arm\' and air force dissidents. 
ig Sharon 13-08-03, §4d-e. 
;9 Prominent examples include: Not In My Name; Jews Not Zionists; Jews in Defence of Palestinian Rights, etc. 
Gideon Le\'y, Amira Hass, Tanya Reinhart, Jeff Halper, Ran HaCohen. Uri A\nerv, Uri Davis and many others are 
Israeli writers and activists committed to exposing and addressing the injustices committed by Israel. 













Bourdieu's contention that "there are no longer any innocent 'vvords"61 is particularly 
appropriate to discussion of Israel/Palestine, where "the gun and the dictionary march hand 
in hand."62 As Suleiman points out, "[iJn both the short and the long term, the conf1ict of 
labels in the Middle East is a deadly serious one. It concerns claims of legality and counter-
legality as well as which version of history will formulate, rather than just articulate, 
reality."6:l To illustrate, the media (primarily the English-language media) throughout the 
world are often bombarded \'lith complaints following their reports on this issue, depending, 
for example, on whether the same areas of land have been referred to as the 'Occupied 
Territories' or 'Aza, Judea and Samaria.' US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other 
administration members have recently taken to side-stepping this problem (and 
international legality) by referring to them as "the so-called Occupied Territories." 
There is a growing number of organisations on both sides of the dispute (although the Israeli 
side is undeniably better-organised and more effective) dedicated to 'media activism', which 
invokes recruiting 'media patrollers' to analyse presentations of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict for "terminological bias," and triggering email and other response campaigns against 
offending media outlets. The Israeli 'HonestReporting.com' website, for example, provides 
detailed advice on how to analyse media texts for 'bias', how to compile an inventory of the 
instances of bias that occur over a specific period, and how to compose letters of complaint 
and prompt as many others as possible to do the same,6'1 pressurising media outlets to change 
their framing terminology. 
Even the UN is not free from accusations of bias,65 with more than a hundred resolutions 
condemning Israel for its treatment of the Palestinian people passed since 194866 confirming 
to many that it "operates an anti-Israel agenda."67 However, in the absence of other 
01 Bourdieu, 1994. P40 
02 Suleiman, 1999, pll. 
0:) Suleirnan, 1999., pll (emphasis in original). 
64 According to HonestReporting.com; "You will never be able to convince the media to do things 100% your way. 
Refrain from nit-picking little points. Instead, pick one point that is the key to many others. For example, 
demanding that suicide bombers be labelled "terrorists" frames the conflict in completely different terms. Another 
example is contrasting Palestinian cormption and incitement with Israeli democracy. Choose your main battle 
and hammer away until your point is heard." See Annex BI6, p AS7: Become a media patroller. 
!lt1vd:'.lY\\ \\'.llOn<;~trepOiting.(,oJl!. See also CAMERA; http://w\\\\.ca1l1cfa.oq;. 
6~ According to one organisation, "The United Nations [is] An Enemy ofIsrael" because ''The Arab world blames 
Israel for the violence. The United Nations agrees and has passed literally hundreds of resolutions condemning 
the Jewish state since 1948. The U.N. has passed more resolutions condemning Israel than it has all other nations 
com bined. i nel uding Iraq. "I Ittp: f! Is ral' I-a rab~plltl iet .tri pod.com/ UN rc~ol u tions .Il!;m) 
66 See Annex BI7, p A60: UN Resolutions concerning /sraeI1955-1992, for a list fro111 the period 1955-1992. 
67 When visiting Jenin after the IDF's April 2002 operation, Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN's special envoy to the 
Palestinian territories, described what he saw there as "horrific beyond belief' and "morally repugnant." Israeli 
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internationally recognised definitions, I shall use the UN-sanctioned terms 'Occupied 
Territories' or 'West Bank and Gaza Strip,' abbreviated to 'WBGS'. 'Israel' indicates that state 
and the land within its internationally recognised, post-1948 boundaries68 ; prior to 1948 the 
whole of Israel and the WBGS were referred to as 'Palestine'. Other terms will be clarified 
during the course of the discussion. 
morally ineligible to participate in the fact-finding mission to Jenin (itself already a watered-down concept, since 
Israel was accused of war crimes during this operation and the UN is responsible for launching an investigation 
into allegations of war crimes.) Former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir expressed (and reinforced) the 
popular Israeli feeling of international misunderstanding by stating that "The UN, the world court, international 
arbitration. or international conference - it's always against us." (Yitzhak Shamir, 1988, cited ill Dowty, March 
1999). The view of UN bias and even "anti-semitism" is widely accepted in Israeli discourse, while some 
organisations accuse the UN of being "anti-godly," since Israel is the nation of 'God's chosen people' and to 
criticise its behaviour is therefore "to criticise God himself." See for example Further Anti-Godly UN Resolutions 
Against Israel alld Jerusalem, IS\\\\· telllpkI11<HllltfaLtll£uI.org/:\b\slt·Jlt'eJ~oo 1 !:::>=<.u:::..dlJm. 
hi! International law does not recognise the boundaries ofIsrael as having legally changed since the 1967 
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2. Methodology And Literature Review 
2.1. Methodology 
As outlined in the introduction, this thesis incorporates a critical linguistic analysis of two 
types of what I call 'narratives of war'; the first is a selection of the policy narratives ofIsraeli 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and the second is the 'narrative of personal experience' of an 
IDF reserve soldier. Both describe and justify the prevailing situation of warfare, the first 
from a mainly ideological perspective, and the second from the personal perspective of 
experience in combat. I will also conduct a brief semiotic analysis of two \ isual images 
produced at the time of the events discussed in this thesis. 
The analysis of Sharon's narratives is built with reference to six of his televised speeches 
( 
delivered between February 2002 and October 2003 and one article authored by him for 
publication on 9 June 2002/'9 vvith particular focus on those delivered around the time of the 
announcement of 'Operation Defensive Shield'. My reasons for selecting narratives from this 
time period have been dealt \vith in Section 1. Unlike more spontaneous forms of speech, the 
selection (of information) process can be deliberately and carefully considered prior to 
delivery, usually by trained speechwriters and rarely by the speaker him/herself. However, on 
delivering a speech the politician, in this case Sharon, claims ownership, and the speeches 
can thus be analysed as if they contained his own words. Moreover, if we compare the 
speeches with the article he did write (09-06-02), we find them to be ideologically identical, 
with no obvious difference in linguistic style. This points to the conclusion that the texts are 
so ideologically imbued that individual authorship is not relevant; in a sense the ideology 
itself has authored them. To paraphrase Roe,70 'the ideology we are talking about has many 
narrators, but few, if any, authors.' 
Although many of the texts were originally produced in Hebrew, their English translations 
are provided by the Israeli Prime Minister's office, and so are assumed to relay precisely the 
message he \,\lshes to send to 'the world'. As with any block of text, it is useful to organise 
them according to Dell Hymes' 'ethno-poetics' model in order to gain better access to "the 
proportions and weighting of the material."71 The 'poeticised' texts are hroken into 'theme 
oQ Ariel Sharon addresses the Israeli nation on 1) 21-02-02 and 2) 31-03-02: the Israeli parliament (Knesset) on 3) 
08-04-02; his article entitled The Way Forward in the Middle East was published on 4) 09-06-02; he addresses 
the Weizmann institute 011 5) 22-01-03; George Bush and the cameras at the White House on 6) 29-07-03; and 
the veterans of the 1973 Yom Kippur war on 7) 07-10-03, For full texts of these speeches see Annex Pl. PP 1\1-A24: 
A. riel Sharon speeches inJull. 
-0 Roe's original words are: "the budgets we are talking about, in other words, have many narrators. but few, if 
any, authors," Roe. 2001. P24, 
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blocks', which tend to conform to the 'paragraphs' of the transcriptions. These might be 
detlned by Gee as 'stanzas' - "the basic building blocks of extended pieces of discursive 
language"72 ; I shall use this term and the symbol [§] to denote it. The full texts of all speeches 
referred to can be found in Annex P1 on ppA1-A24. 
The reserve soldier's narrative forms the backbone of an article that appeared in the Israeli 
Yediot Aharanot newspaper entitled I created for them a Teddy stadium in the middle of the 
camp.T3 The article and transcript appeared originally in Hebrew, but were translated into 
English and disseminated in both languages by several organisations, including the Israeli 
pea<.:e organlsation Gush Shalom, Both the Hebre\\' and English \-ersions of this trans<.:ript are 
available on Gush Shalom's website; from where this translation was 
taken. While the translation of this narrative comes from a reliable source and closely 
resembles another available translation, it is important to bear in mind that the text(has been 
separated twice from its original delivery; first in the transcription and second in the 
translation. As a result certain key elements of the narrative are unavailable to us for analysis 
- it is impossible, for example, to study aspects of Moshe's delivery such as his intonation, 
pauses and physical gestures, since no videotape of the interview is available. Also, it would 
be problematic to attach too much meaning to the lexical nuances of each or any word that 
may, after all that, hm'e been slightly distorted in translation. The full text of Moshe's 
narrative is available in Annex P2, PpA25-i\34; for analysis it is broken down in the same 
'stanzas and lines' manner outlined above for Sharon's narratives. In both cases, the details of 
what is focused on and how the data are laid out and analysed will be given in the chapters of 
data analysis. 
Linguistic analysis is necessarily at the root of all analysis, since "the scientist, the historian, 
even the philosopher, li\'es with his objects only as language presents them to him,"74 The 
linguistic analyses presented in this thesis draw extensively on the work of, among others, 
Cameron, Hymes, Ochs, Ochs and Capps, Kress, and Martin and Rose, as well as on the 
writers discussed below, some of whom contribute to the "interdisciplinary approach" 
required by Wodak (1989. See Section 1.1. above), 
2.2. Analytical Approaches To Policy Narratives 
Research in the name of 'policy narrative analysis' seems thus far to have been conducted 
mainly within the fields of the cmironmental sciences and economics. The emerging fIeld of 
-c Gee, 1991, P23. 
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'environmental justice' marries modern environmentalism to the social SCIences, and 
particularly linguistics, By looking at the effects of the environment on individuals alongside 
the power structures which impose particular ('just' or 'unjust') environments upon them,75 it 
draws attention to the grovl'ing need for an interdisciplinary approach to examining the 
linguistic webs (or 'policy narratives') woven around the actions or policies of power. 
Although the environmentalist Emery Roe (2001) focuses on the texts of budgets and policy 
narratives on environmental issues such as pesticide use and animal rights, his explanations 
on the immutability of policy narratives - once created and deposited into public 
consciollsness they are difficult to retract or contradict help us to understand \\"hy e\"en the 
most audacious narrati\"es scem to spin out of words into reality, e\"entual1y mallc palpable in 
the manner of the "self-fult1lling prophesy."76 It is interesting that environmentalism would 
be among the first disciplines to apply the title 'policy narratives' to government dis<;ourses -
what discourages the more traditionally 'people-orientated' social sciences from seeing 
governments as producing 'narratives'? Perhaps it is a matter of perception: the word 
'narrative' is laden from literary analysis "\lith the concept of fictional perspective, such that 
'policy' would seem almost to contradict it. A 'narrative' would traditionally require a 
'narrator', and most governments are too full of "loosely coupled officials contributing at 
different times and in completely unpredictable ways to an outcome or decision"77 for the 
deliberate composition of narratives. 
But this reasonmg goes in the opposite direction to my own (and to that of Roe, who 
discusses '''no-author' national budgeting."78) A 'policy narrator' might be one speech"vriter, a 
whole gO\'ernment, or every individual who is to any degree aware of (or affected by) public 
policy. ,Just as Bakhtin "considered readers to be authors and the act of reading to be a 
dialogue between a text already produced and a reactive text created by a reader,"79 policy 
narratives are 'out there', and each individual can extract from them, if they so choose, 
certain justifications for their understanding of the world. Equally, they can extract other 
justifications from other discourses, such as those surrounding and defining religious 
ideologies, and so on. In this way, those who draw upon the narratives contribute to their 
existence as independent, almost organic, forces. The absence of a single author, then, need 
------ ----------------------_._---------
74 Cassirer, 1946. p28. 
75 This is achieved, for example. by the channelling of certain natural resources (such as water) for the benefit of 
one sector of society over the others, or by providing certain education, health, refuse, etc sen-ices in more 
quantity and quality to one sector than to others_ 
76 'Self-fulfilling prophesy' hthe tendency for a definition of a situation to e\'oke behaviour that makes the 
definition come true" - Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, P47. 
T7 Roe, 1994. p129. 
7H Roe. 1994, P24, 
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not prevent us from seeing politics and its actors in terms of stories and even dramas vvith 
'plot' and 'structure'. This imposition of a sense of sequential continuity on othenvise random 
events is after all an effect that is demonstrably sought after by propagandists, \Nith the aim of 
transforming "the 'rhapsody of perceptions', by which the ,vorld of sense is actually presented 
to us, into a system, a coherent epitome of laws."80 Thus, for example, it is now 'common 
knowledge' that the United States went to war with Afghanistan and Iraq 'because of 
September 11, and so on. 
2.3. Policy Narratives, Propaganda And Democracy 
While democratic nations allow freedom of speech and opinion, democracy as an ideology is 
based on the premise of popular consent to the actions of those who govern. Since consent is 
a product of opinion, and opinions are not formed ,vithout information, any power within a 
I 
democratic structure will seek to present itself and its actions the most favourable way 
possible. Aristotle tells us that "rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the 
modes of persuasion,"81 and it makes sense to assume that the goal of political public 
speaking in this context is to persuade as many individuals as possible to entrust their 
mandate to the speaking politician (and the party that s/he represents). 
According to Aristotle, "the political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the 
harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the 
grounds that it will do good; ifhe urges its rejection he does so on the grounds that it will do 
harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or 
dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration."82 The 
politician must convince the electorate that his/her policies will best fulfil their interests, and 
later, that they are indeed going according to plan. If the audience is broader - perhaps a 
policy has attracted international attention - the politician also seeks the support of those, 
such as the leaders (and by extension their electorates, where this applies) of more powerful 
nations, who may choose to facilitate or impede the policy's implementation. 
In any case, the political (or policy) narrator seeks to create a logical framework, into which 
events and their outcomes may be comfortably inserted, for the purpose of furthering 
political interests, since "[p]olicy, to haw meaning, must be continuously re-made by its own 
7q Ochs and Capps, 2001, P3. 
~() Cassirer. 1946, p 27. 
HI Aristotle. Rhetoric. Book I Chapter L @ :32:3BC. 
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consequences. "R:l 
2.4. Truth And Myth In The Pursuit Of Power 
Wilkin, \\lth Chomsky, sees narrative domination as achieved through the exercise, and for 
the benefit, of power: "If we want to know why social and political events are described in the 
way they are then we have to trace the lineage, intentions and interests of these actors, 
institutions and authorities who dominate these official pronouncements and histories."84 
Chomsky's "Principle of Universality" calls into question "the way things are," by looking at 
policy and policy narratives through the tenet that "if an action is right (or wrong) for others, 
it is right (or wrong) for US."8~ The "history of attempts at control and manipulation in 
democratic politics"R6 - which Chomsky calls the 'manufacture of consent'R7 - relies on 
harnessing and building popular narratives and myths to surround and distort the motives , 
and aims behind potentially unpopular courses of action. Echoing Onvell, who claimed that 
H[i]n our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible,"88 
Chomsky argues that "the propaganda system works that way [because] it recognises that the 
public \\ill not support the actual policies. Therefore it is important to prevent any actual 
knowledge or understanding of them."89 
In a democracy it is difficult to prevent 'knowledge or understanding' of policies by 
suppressing information or relying on direct falsehood, so the information must be distorted 
in the manner most favourable to the politicians and their policies: in other words, it must be 
"tamed."9o According to Barthes, "[m]yth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts. Myth 
is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion."9 1 To be successful, the kind of myth 
employed in policy narratives, like the narratives themselves, must be persuasive; it must 
approximate an identifiable reality, which is then "frozen,"92 distorted, and "impoverished,"9:\ 
83 GLS Shackle, An Economic Querist, cited in Roe, 1994, P131. 
84 Wilkin, 1997, PI07. See also Chomsky and Herman, 1988. The authors discuss a 'propaganda model' made lip of 
five filters through which information must pass, and they observe that jointly these filters help shape media 
choices without any conscious conspiracy required. The "filters" are: Ownership; Advertising; Sourcing; Flak; and 
Ideology, and propaganda campaigns can only occur when consistent with the interests of those controlling and 
managing these five filters. 
85 Chomsky, 10 July 2002. Also see Chomsky, November 1998: ''The adoption ofthe Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights ... constituted a step forward in the slow progress towards protection of human rights. The 
overarching principle of the UD is universality. Its provisions have equal standing. There are no moral grounds for 
self-serving 'relativism,' which selects for convenience; still less for the particularly ugly form of relativism that 
converts the UD into a weapon to wield selectively against designated enemies." 
86 Wilkin, 1997, P4. . 
87 Chomsky and Herman, 1988. 
~8 George Orwell, Politics alld the Ellglish LallYlwge, 1946, cited in Brekle, 1989, p87. 
89 Chomsky, 1987, cited in Wilkin, 1997, p120. 
90 Bal'thes, 1993, pu8. 
91 Barthes, 1993, p129. 
92 "[M;.th·s] intention is somehow purified. frozen, eternalised, lIlade absellt... .. Barthes. 1993, p124. 











.!lIstifieationaJ ,\'arratives JJethod%yy And Literature Review 
or emptied of its own meaning or history. Thus "the meaning will be for the form like an 
instantaneous reserve of history, a tamed richness."9-l Taylor elaborates, 
To assume that propaganda is about lying, or at best half-truths, is to fundamentally 
misunderstand the nature of propaganda ... Propaganda, like any other process of persuasion, 
is about communicating 'our truth' to a particular target audience ... if the content is to be 
credible to a target audience it needs to be based on facts and information that can be believed 
because they are patently true rather than false.'!5 
For Said, the issue is not so much whether propagandists deliberately employ falsehood: 
The real issue is whether indeed thcre can be a truc represcntation of anything, or whether any 
and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the langlla~e 
and then in the culture, institutions and political ambience of the representer... a 
representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwi.ned, embedded, interwoven with a great many 
other things beside the "truth," which is in itself a representation.'!6 
In any case, argues Bourdieu, the issue of truth is irrelevant, because political assertions are 
unverifiable by nature: 
Political propositions, programmes, promises, predictions or prognostications are never 
logically verifiable or falsifiable. They are true only insofar as the person who utters them is 
capable of making them historically true, by making them corne about in history; and this is 
inextricably bound up \\rith his aptitude for judging realistically the chances of success, and 
with his capacities for mobilising the forces necessary to achieve that end, by managing to 
inspire confidence in his own truthfulness, and thus his chances of success.97 
In other words, with sufficient power, the person who utters a political promise or prophesy 
is able to make it 'come true', if not in reality then at least historically, because history is 
chronologised through the subjective narratives of the powerful. As for inspiring "confidence 
in his own truthfulness," Sornig says that "it is not the verifiable truth of a message which is 
relevant and likely to impress an audience and make it act upon a certain impulse; it is the 
way things are said, irrespective of the amount of genuine information carried by an 
utterance."98 The way things are said, in this case, is the presentation by the politician of his 
or her policy narrative. 
2.5. The Modes Of Persuasion In Political Rhetoric 
Barthes insists that the "very principle of myth [is toJ transform history into nature"99 - in 
"1 Barthes. 1993, pU8. 
0'; Taylor, January 2003. 
"h Said, 1978, P272. 
'17 Bourdieu, 1994. P191. 
qH Sornig. 1989. P95. [emphasis in original) 
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other words, to benefit the powerful by defining the status quo as 'natural' and therefore 
somehow 'right' and inevitable. Barthes' "second-order semiological system," which outlines 
the relationship between language and myth (see Annex BAl), seems conceptually akin to 
Cassirer's "upper stratum of 10gic"lOO - the 'stratum' of theoretical rather than physical 
knowledge as well as to Freeman's idea that narrative, whether policy or personal, spoken 
or written, "gives us a language for exploring a third realm, namely that of culture itself."Hli 
Aristotle provides, in his Rhetoric, what is considered the oldest model of persuasive 
technique in the Western canon to which we can still refer today. Of the modes of persuasion 
"such as v\'e can construct ollrseh·cs by' means of the principles of rhetoric," Aristotle 
idcntities 'ethos' ("the speakcr's pO\\'cr of c\'incing a personal character which will make his 
speech credible"); 'logos' ("[the speaker's] power of proving a truth, or an apparent truth, by 
means of persuasive arguments,") and 'pathos' ("[the speaker's] power of stir;ring the 
emotions of his hearers.")102 For Aristotle, persuasion is achieved by these three modes, 
respectively, through the speaker's evinced personal character, through the message of the 
speech itself, and through the listeners via their own emotional responses. For our purposes 
they can be labelled, also respectively, as the 'source', the 'message', and 'emotion', and in the 
follO\\ing section I shall follow Aristotle's model and examine the use made by Sharon and 
his speechwriters of all three elements separately, while emphasising their necessary 
in terrelation. 
JOO "All the concepts of theoretical knowledge constitute merely an upper stratum oflogic which is founded upon a 
lower stratum; that ofthe logic oflanguage ... the work of naming must have preceded it... for it is this process 
which transforms the world of sense impression ... into a mental world. a world of ideas and meanings." Cassirer. 
1946. p28. 
101 Freeman, 1997. Pl7L 












3. Ariel Sharon's Policy Narratives 
In spite of appearing at the centre of several recent corruption scandals, Israeli Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon has maintained a high public approval rating over the course of his 
tenure. Initially elected in February 2002, he called a second election in ,January 2003 and 
his party increased its presence in the 120-member Israeli parliament from 19 to 37 seats. 103 
Sharon's success cannot simply reflect a natural popular satisfaction ,vith his performance, as 
he has not yet fulfilled the promises of his election campaigns - to improve Israeli security 
and protect the public from the threat of terrorism. Instead, while the Palestinians report IDF 
incursions and other acthities of unprecedented brutality, the number of attacks and 
attempted attacks against Israelis hoth at home ~ltlc1 abroad rises exponentially. Sharon's 
'Iron Fist' policy would seem to be exacerbating, rather than reducing, the problem he was 
elected to solve. 
However, this apparent contradiction dissolves when approached from ,vithin the political 
and broader social discourse that has been constructed around Sharon and his policies by his 
government and speechwriters and repeated, replicated and othernise reinforced by his 
supporters (and opponents, since by arguing with a discourse they are also feeding it) at all 
levels of society. According to this discourse, the increased dangers today facing Israel are not 
a reaction to the physical and psychological effects of Sharon's oppressive and expansionist 
policies, but rather, proof of their necessity (since without Sharon's 'security' measures the 
threat, it is believed, would be far worse). In the words of Israeli military historian Martin 
Van Creveld, 
Look, we in Israel are feeling increasingly desperate, We are being bombed to pieces every day. 
As you know, desperate times lead to desperate measures. If we feel desperate enough, then 
you can be 100 per cent certain that the entire Israeli cabinet, the entire Israeli parliament and 
the entire Israeli people will unite around Sharon, just as indeed back in 1967.104 
If Professor Van Creveld is right, it may well be in Sharon's political interest since the 
interest of an elected politician, by detinition, lies in causing the "entire" electorate to unite 
around him or her to enhance the existing tensions between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. Thus he is able to instigate regular military incursions into Palestinian areas, 
shelling, 'targeted assassinations', curfews and closures of Palestinian population centres, 
destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure and economy, accelerated settlement building on 
Palestinian land, the unilateral definition of borders by means of the so-called 'security 
tol CNN.com, Sharoll claims 'great victory' at polls 
Llttn:i !W\':'ov,('!1Il,col!lL:2003L\\·()RLDjlll(';]~I01L.llijisr;:ddQ; Wednesday, January 29, 2003, 
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fence', and so on, all in the name of 'Israeli security' and all incurring the need for more 
'security' . 
The \videspread feeling of 'desperation' referred to by Van Creveld cannot be attributed only 
to the actual incidence of Palestinian attacks, which, although shocking, have directly affected 
only a minute proportion of the Israeli population, lOS and there are no Palestinian tanks in 
the streets or fighter jets overhead to frighten those not otherwise personally affected. 
Indeed, "security cannot be measured simply by the objective threats that a nation faces; in 
the end it is a subjective feeling of safety in the minds of individuals."106 According to Israeli 
journalist and academic Ran HaCohen, that subjcctiH' feeling of safety (or the lack of it) has 
much to do \\ith the way the att<lcks are presented tu the Israeli public by their politicians 
and media: 
If there is a Palestinian terror attack, all programmes are immediately suppressed in favour of 
reports and commentary on that, broadcasted for hours in an endless loop. A retired army 
general is interviewed: "Don't you think Israel is showing much too much restraint?" A 
commercial television channel that once stuck to its normal schedule after a suicide attack was 
punished by the state regulator. 107 
Through constant repetition and exposure in the mass media, intricate myths, arguments and 
counter-arguments, embedded with layers of complex historical debate, can be evoked from 
the simplest of sound-bites: "A few snappy words are sufficient when they harmonise \\>ith 
the conventional wisdom in a matter of seconds."108 Said remarks that "Israeli security is now 
a fabled beast. Like a unicorn it is endlessly hunted and never found, remaining, 
everlastingly, the goal of future action. That over time Israel has become less secure and more 
unacceptable to its neighbours scarcely merits a moment's notice." 109 In the words of Levi 
Strauss, "the purpose of a myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a 
contradiction."llo The ability of Israel's policy narratives to overcome any apparent internal 
contradiction, such as that noted by Said above, lies in their manipulation of causality 
through the construction of myths, and the force of these myths is that they - along \\>ith the 
policies themselves - both address and reinforce public fear. 
Apr 2002. Transcript: http://w\\.w.ab(.lli.J.au.L7~3Qj253Q59~1l1lli. Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio. 
10" According to Israeli human rights organisation B'tselem. a total of 838 Israelis were killed by Palestinians in 
thew period 29/09/00 to 21/01/04. as follows: 198 Israeli civilians and 183 soldiers in the Occupied Territories, 
and 377 civilians and 80 soldiers in Israel.lJ1tu;.L /www.btst.It.Il1.on; This represents less than a quarter of the 
number killed by road accidents over the same period Cllt1QJ Ibd.lllOt. 1;0\:, ill em;l ish! statistic.h t f11'L5). In contrast, 
South Africa, a popular holiday destination perceived throughout the world as a paragon of peace and 
reconciliation. produced 7081 deaths by firearms in 2003 alone. of which 89% (or 6302 deaths) were homicide, 
32% accidental and 10% suicide. '~C~"'C!1C"'-'~C'."J-1"","'~C.l.;."-.,,-,'L,,,".,,,~J.c~L'-'.~-',~i:.!.!~"-'-' 
IO/; Dowty. March 1999. 
we HaCohen. III Times of War Crimes: The Banality of Evil, 19 April 2002. See Annex BI8, p A63 
10K Solomon, 6 December 2001 
1<.10 Said. Pllnishment by Detail. Al Abram, April 2002. 
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3.1. The Modes Of Persuasion In Sharon's Policy Narratives 
The modes of persuasion, in this case, persuasion to conflict, can be summarised m 
diagrammatical form as follows: 
The Source 
* Presentation (not necessarily authorship) 
* Sincerity 
• Self-placement 
• Ret~rence to authority; 'Friends in high places' 
Emotion 
. * Emotional orientation 
1* Disguising emotion as logic 
iThe Message 
- Definition of situation 
i' Definition of key players 
I- Coherence and logic 
'. l':uphemisll1 
* Repetition 
Fig. 3.1: The Modes of Persuasion in Sharon's Policy Narratives 
While the elements are interrelated, emotion takes its rightful position at the centre of the 
process. Sharon's aim is not only to convince his people that the policies of the state are 
legally or logically justified; he must also persuade them to implement those policies. There 
must be people to wear uniforms and carry guns, to make and distribute weapons, to design 
and build the 'security fence', to live in settlements, to interrogate Palestinians, to humiliate 
them at checkpoints and turn their environment to rubble. Much can be achieved through the 
payment of salaries, III but 
3·1.1. 
[alII the basic motives in man are emotionally-conditioned. The expert win make use of love, 
anger, fear, hope, guilt, and any other feelings, emotions. and sentiments useful to the purpose 
in hand.ll2 
The Source 
In terms of being a persuasive 'source', Sharon renders himself, and therefore his message, 
credible by: asserting common ground with his listeners (including, of course, emotional 
common ground), placing himself within the events he describes, and reinforcing his 
arguments ,,,ith reference to authority (religious, moral, intellectual, etc). His credibility as 
.Il For example, most of the construction work on settlements has historically been performed by Palestinian 
labourers unable to find employment elsewhere. Today much manual labour in both Israel and its settlements is 
awarded to immigrant workers instead. due to the closures, cUlfe\\s and other constraints on Palestinian 
movement. and to the perceived danger of hiring Palestinians during heightened conflict. 
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source does not so much rely on his character per se, but his 'hard-line' reputation is certainly 
helpful at a time when 'hard-line' policies seem (or are made to seem) necessary, and it is 
primarily on the basis of this reputation ll:l that he was elected Prime Minister of Israel in 
February 2001. 
3·1.2. The Message 
Meam\'hile, "the institutional authority to categorise people is frequently inseparable from 
the authority to do things to them,"114 and Sharon's 'message' comprises both a vehement 
categorisation of the Palestinians and a logical conclusion of the necessity of military action 
against them. According to Foucault, discourses are "practice:::. \\hich systematically form the 
objccb or \\'hich they speak,"ll) and Sharon's discourse is no eXl:cption: its internal cohesion 
depends on characterising the situation as a 'war', which indeed the situation increasingly 
resembles. In war, as we are frequently told by Israeli governmental and ( military 
spokespeople, there is a different set of rules. In his speeches Sharon speaks of being in the 
midst of "a war for our homes," and even "a war for the survival of the Jewish people," while 
referring to and reinforcing certain mythologised stereotypes of Palestinians and Israelis. 
While the weight and positioning of Sharon's topics differ according to his audience, the 
content and (sometimes contradictory) themes remain consistent: 'Israel is vulnerable, its 
existence threatened by inherently hostile and murderous Palestinians/Arabs. As a result it 
has been forced into conflict, although its true desire is peace. Fortunately it has a host of 
advantages - technological, military, moral etc, as well as the courage and dedication of its 
people. The Palestinian leadership is "infested v'lith terror,"110 so there are no political 
solutions. Anyway Israel cannot negotiate under fire. A complete ceasefire, with no 
Palestinian attacks or attempted attacks, must precede any negotiations. In the meantime, 
the free world should understand Israel's duty to protect its citizens by any means possible: 
There is nothing new about these arguments, which have appeared in vaflOUS context-
dependent manifestations since before the establishment of the state of Israel; I am 
interested in examining how they are conveyed (Sornig's "the way things are said"ll7). 
Emotion 
It is widely agreed by writers on persuasion and rhetoric that these cannot exist in any 
effective form without the manipulation of emotion, which, like so many rhetoricians, Ariel 
ll3 See Annex B14, pAso: Ariel Sharon Biography. 
114 Cameron. 2001, p16. 
lle; Michel Foucault. 1972, cited in Cameron, 2001. plS. 
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Sharon makes full and careful use of to underpin his arguments. Emotion is not so much a 
category in its own right as the underlying force behind the whole persuasive process, and 
both the source and the message are governed and made credible by the presentation and 
evocation of emotions. Ha'wthorn notes that "persuaders of all times have recognised that 
action is triggered off more quickly and completely by emotional pressure than by rational 
agreement - especially when the emotional pressure masquerades as rational agreement."118 
The successful triggering of emotions induces an audience towards 'self-persuasion', as 
people are most likely to be convinced by an argument when they feel it to be true. But 
feelings can be deceptive, particularly when deliberately evoked by means of tried and tested 
persuasion techniques, and 
the propagandist is not always doing anything so clear cut as attempting to spread a specific 
doctrine or practice; quite often, as in war propaganda, he is merely trying to arouse strong 
emotions of hatred or approval for or against another group from motives of expediency, 
strategy, or plain greed. But emotional pressure is fundamental to the whole proceSS,l19 
For Aristotle, anger, fear and its opposite, confidence, are the most important emotions that 
any political rhetoric on warfare should seek to evoke. A politician seeking warfare must 
"speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger, and to 
represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make 
people angry."120 He or she must also be able to speak so as to "prove people to be friends or 
enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be SO."121 Duszak reiterates, "[l]anguage 
gives us a most powerful tool for conveying social identities, for telling (and making) friends 
and foes. The construction and the management of social identities are done through 
discourse and by means of various linguistic mechanisms and strategies. " 122 
As for fear, "when it is advisable that the audience should be frightened, the orator must 
make them feel that they really are in danger of something."12 1 A reason for this, according to 
Pratkanis and Aronson, is that "fear appeals ... channel our thoughts away from careful 
consideration of the issue at hand and towards plans for ridding ourselves of the fear."124 In 
general terms, if a democratic government seeks popular mandate for belligerent activity 
against another nation, it must find ways of instilling in the populace a sense of fear, which 
inspires a natural desire to avoid whatever is threatening, and a tendency to trust the 
II" Sornig, 1989, P95. [emphasis in original] 
llH Ha\~thorn, 1987, Preface. 
!l<1 Brown, 1979. p12. 
'"0 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 2. (iZ' 323BC. 
121 Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book 2, Chapter 4. <IiI 323BC. 
122 Duszak. 2002. pI. 
12:l Aristotle, Rheto/'ic, Book 2, Chapter 5. @ 323BC. For some examples of the similarity between aspects of 
Sharon's narratives and Aristotle's prescriptions for evoking fear. anger and confidence. see Annex BA2, p A40. 











.Justijicutimw/ Sarratives Ariel Sharo/l's Policy Narratives 
decisions of those who are more powerful - such as the government, when it is perceived as 
acting in the best interests of its people - and who claim to know how to avert the threat. 
Fear is a disempowering emotion, and on its own does not provide sufficient motivation for 
fighting or war; it must be compounded with properly-directed anger, which creates a desire 
for retribution, and with the confidence that any action taken will succeed. Pratkanis and 
Aronson support this recommendation: 
A fear appeal is more successful when 1) it scares the hell out of people, 2) it offers a specific 
recommendation for overcoming the fear-arousing threat, 3) the recommended action is 
perceived as effective for reducing the threat, and 4) the message recipient believes that he or 
she ('(In perform the recommended action.l~.'j 
3.2. The Source 
As the one who shoulders the responsibility for the fate of this nation and its future, I have to 
weigh all the considerations and choose the thing that contains the least danger to Israel. J26 
The techniques used by Sharon and his speechwriters to reinforce his credibility as source 
can be examined in the following areas: presentation; 'friends in high places' and self-
placement. 
3.2 .1. Presentation 
Sharon's presentation of himself and his message varies according to the broader political 
context, the purpose for which a given speech has been produced, and the intended audience. 
So, for example, after a month of intensified military assault on Palestinian areas 127 and the 
suicide attack of 27 March on Jewish diners at a restaurant in Netanya,121l international 
media attention to 'the Middle East' had already risen sharply in anticipation of further 
developments. On 31 March there was another large suicide bombing, this time of a 
restaurant in Haifa,129 and Sharon appeared live on Israeli television amid national and 
international expectation that he would announce a new phase of escalated military action 
across the Palestinian territoriesYlo He did not disappoint; in fact, as he tells us, 'Operation 
Defensi\'e Shield'l:ll had already been decided upon: "In the Israel government session on 
[2,) Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, P165 
12h Ariel Sharon. interviewed by Aluf Benn for Ha'aretz, 4 April 2004. See Annex BI9, P A65: Ariel Sharon 
Interview. 
127 On March 3 Sharon had already told his ministers, "We must hit them (the Palestinians 1. and hit them again 
and again, until they understand." For a list of the events of March 2002 as compiled by PASSIA (the Palestinian 
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs), see Annex Bllo, p A70. 
[2H On 27 March 2002, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 29 and wounded O\'er 100 at the Park Hotel in Netanva. 
'24 On 31 March 2002, a suicide bomber killed 14 and wounded dozens more near Haifa's Matza restaurant. . 
[\0 Sharon :p -03-02. Annex PI, pp i\5-A6. 
'P This is sometimes translated from Hebrew as 'Operation Defensive Wall'. The wall (or 'security fence') currently 
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Thursday last, the decision was taken to uproot the infrastructure of terrorism directed by the 
Palestinian Authority," (31-03-02 §8a-c). 
Although addressed, in Hebrew, to the "Citizens of Israel," the speech was also broadcast live 
(with simultaneous interpretation) on international news networks such as CNN,132 as well as 
across the Arab world, highlighting the urgency of the situation. Significantly, Sharon does 
not acknowledge his broader audience: in spite of the efforts that have been made to present 
this speech to the world, non-Israelis are cast as 'overhearers' rather than addressees, and 
Sharon is not obliged to mince words. The networks' ovvn commentaries before and after the 
speech included inten-iews with government and military spokespeople and sunivors of the 
recent suicide attacks, as well as providing detailed information on the attacks themselves, 
footage of the chaos of their aftermath, the names and numbers of casualties, and analytical 
speculation of what Sharon and his cabinet might be planning (sometimes interspersed with 
scenes of Israeli soldiers at work in the occupied Palestinian warzone). 
Sharon both highlights and employs the resulting sense of urgency in the presentation of his 
message, which is essentially a declaration of war: "Citizens ofIsrael, the state ofIsrael is in a 
war..." (31-03-02 §1a-b). As ever, he appears sombre and serious, in line with his emphasis 
on the difficulties being faced by the state and by himself as its leader. As is often the case in 
televised addresses by leading politicians everywhere, the 
national flag and rows of leather-bound books are behind him, 
signalling both the breadth of his knowledge, for "knowledge [is] 
viewed as an entitlement to narrate,"I33 and its focus, the Israeli 
state and people. This 481-word speech is by far the shortest of 
those I analyse. While emphatically repeating key phrases ("The 
Fig. 3.1.1: Ariel Sharon 
addresses the nation; 31 
March 2002. CNN picture. 
only thing we've had in return for our efforts has been terrorism, 
terrorism and more terrorism," §sa-b), it is empty of the 
descriptive detail and poetic flourishes we see embellishing his speeches elsewhere. As well as 
underlining the emergency nature of the situation, this presentation reinforces Sharon's own 
credibility as a strong and decisive leader who would replace words with actions, leaving the 
details of the Palestinian attack and of his intended response to be communicated -
emphatically - through the media. 
By contrast, his speech to a special session of Knesset (the Israeli parliament) on 8 April 
'3" The transcript is provided by CNN at W\\\V .cnn .("Olll / "002/v\'0 RLD / ll1east/ o·, ( u / Sh,u·on . transcri ot. 
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2002134 presents its message in over 4,200 words, in 67 stanzas, with heavy use of poetic 
effect, imagery and rhythm, along with detailed evidence to support his argument, which in 
essence does not differ from that of 31 March, This time he acknowledges his wider audience, 
explicitly addressing not only the Knesset but also, in turn, "the Palestinian people" (§S3a); 
"the leaders of the Middle East" (§ssa); "the leaders of the Free World" (§s6a - this 
immediate contrast pointedly denoting that the Middle East is not considered to be a part of 
"the free world") and "the people of Israel" (§S7a). Operation Defensive Shield, to which this 
time he refers by name, is already over a week old, and its ferocity has provoked sharp 
criticism from journalists, politicians and NGOs in Israel and abroad, to which he must, in a 
fashion, respond, The speech's stated aim, which appears only at the very end, is to request, 
in accordance with the Basic Lay", parliamentary approval "to hring in additional Zionist 
elements" (§S9n) by making several new appointments to government. The unstated aim, 
which implicitly transpires during its course (and in view of the broader intended al,ldience), 
is to justify the nature of the IDF incursions and other activities taking place and to seek an 
end to any parliamentary, wider Israeli and international dissent on the matter: "I call upon 
each and every one of you to maintain this unity, not to stretch the boundaries of argument, 
rivalry and dispute," (§67f-g). 
3.2 •2 • 'Friends In High Places' 
In Sharon's policy narratives these are primarily members of the American administration, 
Fig. 3.2.2: Sharon and Bush, 
14-04-04. Reuters picture. 
whose president he describes as "the leader of the free world," 
(29-07-03, §9b). While the emphasis of shared suffering with 
America has only emerged as a rhetorical device in Israeli 
state discourse since the infamous 'September 11' attacks, the 
evocation of American friendship has long been a theme in 
Israeli state discourse. Since America provides Israel with aid 
- primarily military aid - to the tune of around US $S billion 
per year,135 and it regularly vetoes UN resolutions 
condemning Israel's treatment of the Palestinians,136 this friendship - or at least, political 
134 Sharon 08-04-02. Annex PI, pp A6-A15. 
135 Around $4-4 billion of this is military aid, approximately 80% of which is used to buy weapons from American 
manufacturers. See for example Francis, 9 December 2002. 
1:36 According to Donald Neff, former Time Magazine Bureau Chief to Israel , as reported in the Washington 
Report, "Had the U.S. never exercised its veto, the total number of UN resolutions condemning/criticising 
behaviour ofIsrael or in support of Palestinian rights would be 100 in the period 1972-1997. The total number of 
U.S. vetoes of UN resolutions condemning Israel between 1972 and 1997 was 32." The trend has not stopped in 
recent years. Over 60 resolutions to some degree confirm Palestinian rights, but no sanctions have been applied 
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support - is deep-rooted. m The reassurance of US understanding is repeatedly emphasised 
to his own people138 by Sharon, on 8 April 2002 as elsewhere: "The United States, which is 
spearheading the international anti-terrorism campaign, knows and understands that it is 
our duty to protect the lives of our citizens," (08-04-02, §13i-l). Here he underlines the 
message that Israeli military action against the Palestinians is perpetrated for the sale aim of 
protecting the Israeli people, "vith the reassurance that America at least knows and 
understands the necessity ("it is our dun)") of such action. 
Reciprocally, due to the well-documented strength of the Zionist lobby within America, 
support for Israel is requisite for the political success of any American leader."\<J On 14 April 
2004, George Bush (flanked hy Sharon) publicly announced that Israel could retain some of 
its biggest settlements on the West Bank in any final peace deal v,ith the Palestinians - a 
licence to build and expand on occupied land, as well, it will transpire, as to confi~cate and 
demolish Palestinian houses and land in the name of 'security zones' for the settlements. 
Much is made (in both countries) of America's support for Israeli policy, and in the public 
exchange of speeches by George Bush and Ariel Sharon at the White House on 29 July 
2003,t~o Sharon begins, "It is a great pri"ilege for me to be here, at the White House, for the 
eighth time. I am always pleased to visit and feel that I am among friends - true friends of the 
State and people ofIsrael," (29-07-03, §la-f). 
A more overt demonstration of friendship, or an example of what Cameron might describe as 
"synthetically personalised talk,"14 1 comes in the final stanza of the same speech. Until this 
point, Sharon has addressed Bush as "Mr. President," with the level of 'politeness' usually 
considered appropriate in the public interactions of politicians. However, in §13 he merges 
public with private, foregrounding the sincerity of his statements and connoting a higher 
degree of intimacy or solidarity than would normally be expected: "I ",;ish to thank you again, 
George, for your friendship and understanding towards the State and people of Israel." (§13a-
1:l7 According to Chomsky, "It's not surprising that Israel continues to pursue these policies, as long as the US 
provides the means and the support. The core of the problem has been in Washington, and remains there. At any 
point in the past 25 years, the US could have joined the international consensus it has been blocking and paved 
the way towards a meaningful political settlement. The longer the conflict goes on, the more fear and bitterness 
escalate, the harder it becomes to move towards sensible resolution." Chomsky, cited in Irish Times, 4 Dec. '02. 
l:l~ The emphasis of this friendship in Israeli political narratives perhaps offers some comfort to those Israelis 
disturbed by seeing their own government repeatedly castigated by other nations and by the UN. 
l:lQ See Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry's recent appeal for support from Jewish voters: '''1 have a 
100 percent record ... of supporting the special relationship and friendship that we have with Israel," Kerry said. "I 
can guarantee you that as president, I understand not just how we do that but also how we end this sweetheart 
relationship with a bunch of Arab countries that still allows mone\' to move to Hamas. Hezbollah and the AI Aqsa 
Brigade ... · The Associated Press, Kerry appeals for Jewish votes ill Florida. Ha'aretz, 20 April 2004. A similar 
dynamic operates in America's and Israel's other main ally, the UK. ;vIost recently see the public disgrace of UK 
Liberal Democrat MP Jenny Tonge, who was asked to resign by her palty after expressing understanding for the 
motivations of Palestinian suicide bombers. 
l.jO Sharon 29-07-03. Annex PI, pp A21-A23. 
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c, emphasis added.) Since "linguistic exchanges are also relations of symbolic power in which 
the power relations between speakers of their respective groups are actualised,"142 Sharon's 
break with convention within this staged linguistic exchange serves to highlight the symbolic 
equality between the two leaders, and therefore between their nations, reinforcing the 
message that Israel is powerful enough on a global scale to act - and justify its actions - as it 
pleases. The absence of rhetorical deference to the American leadership makes it clear that 
there will be no political deference either. 143 
Self-Placement 
During his speech of 31 March, 1,-1 Sharon's sincerity and common ground with his listeners, 
particularly the Israelis amung them, arc asserted through his presented air of fatigue and 
sadness, pre-evaluating the atrocity to which he will refer and which forms the basis of the 
argument he will deliver. He uses the words 'we' or 'our' 29 times in this 481-word speech, 
\',ith the effect of eroding individual identities and dravving his listeners - those included in 
the pronoun, at least - into "a cohesive entity sharing a collective past, similarities of outlook, 
a common language (metaphorically and otherwise), and common vision."145 The words T or 
'my' appear only twice, but these are close to the beginning (§2a and §2C), positioning Sharon 
as leader of the state and emphasising the personal efforts he has made to improve the 
situation: 
31-03-02 §2a The state of Israel, under my leadership, 
b has made every effort in order to achieve a cease-fire 
c Every single moment since I was elected 
d in the midst of the wave of Palestinian terrorism, 
e we have set for ourselves a goal of achieving peace and quiet 
f in order to be able to undertake political diplomatic negotiations. 
While casting his actions in the third person as those of 'the state ofIsrael', he em phasises his 
position as leader, contextualising his leadership with a backdrop of ferocity imposed by the 
Palestinians from which neither he nor the state have had a moment's rest. His perspective is 
a matter of good common sense and moral virtue; according to §7b-d, for example, it is 
shared by "everyone who has been educated in the values of liberty and democracy." 
The definitions of Sharon's own identity are interestingly flexible: In §2a, Sharon is first 
1-1" Bourdieu, 1994, P37. 
1-13 This point was already made pelfectly, unambiguously clear by Sharon in a meeting of Knesset almost two 
years earlier, in a remark to Shimon Peres: "Every time we do something, you [Peres] tell me America will do this 
and will do that... I want to tell you something very clear: Don't worry about American pressure on Israel. We, the 
Jewish people, control America, and the Alllericans know it." Ariel Sharon, Tel Aviv, 3 October 2001. 
1-1-1 Sharon 31-03-02. Annex PI, pp As-A6. 
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merged with the state as a single third person subject making "every effort to achieve a cease-
fire," before being immediately recast in §2C as its exclusive first person, or leader. While the 
passh'e action of 'being elected' places Sharon's "I" firmly at the deictic centre, it also implies 
the full consensus of the population in placing him there, By §2e he has rejoined a plural 
pronoun, although this time he appears to be referring to himself within government (as 
authority) instead of within the state (as institution), In the same v\lay as "a speaker uses 
modality to protect his utterances from criticism,"146 the reason for these deictic shifts might 
be that they represent the decisions of Ariel Sharon as those of the government and of the 
nation - a subtle yet effective imposition of popular consensus, which simultaneously 
det1ects any potential accusations or hlame from Sharon himself. 
In this excerpt the word 'every' is active, (§2b and §2C), providing an emphatic quality which 
interacts vvith that of the "wave of Palestinian terrorism" of §2d to create polarise4 contrast 
between the activities of the Israeli state (and of Sharon) and those of the Palestinians, If we 
consider the sequence ", . .1 was elected in the midst of the wave of Palestinian terrorism," 
(§2c-d), we see a connotative contrast between the two defined 'sides': while Israelis were 
engaging in the civilised and democratic practice of electing a new leader, the Palestinians 
were having a wave of terrorism. A 'v\lave' carries the sense of a natural disaster, like a tidal 
wave, and v\lith its definite article, "the wave of Palestinian terrorism" connotes an episode so 
ingrained in public awareness that it requires no further introduction. Sharon's election "in 
the midst of' this "wave" implies his function as a kind of flood barrier or other effective 
emergency measure, 
So far Sharon is cast as narrator, leader and protector, but in the lyrical epic of 8 April,147 
discussing the bombing in Netanya, he makes a brief 'cameo' appearance vvithin the narrative 
action, placing himself as emotionally as well as responsibly involved: 
08-04-02 §2a On the recent evening of the seder, 
b while I was sitting with my family at the table, 
c I received the terrible news 
d of the massacre in Netanya, 
Like the victims, Sharon was innocently sitting at a seder table \vith his family - and what 
greater sign of sincerity and high moral values is there than a family meal? when disaster 
struck (theirs was the attack, his was receiving its news), In this \yay he is presented as 
suffering alongside the families of the dctims and "ith every Israeli, but in the following 
stanza he builds on this impression to reassert his ele\"ated status: 
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08-04-02 §3a There is no more dreadful moment 
b in the term of a prime minister, 
c than that horrendous moment when the telephone rings, 
d or a note is passed during a meeting, 
e and carrying Job's tidings. 
These lines also have the effect of moving the effects of the attack, emotional and otherwise, 
from the personal to the general. While §2 describes a specific personal moment - Ariel 
Sharon receiving news of the Netanya bombing - §3 de-isolates the incident ("no more 
dreadful moment in the term of a prime minister,") retreating into generality. A 
demonstrative pronoun ("that horrendolls moment"), a present simple tense ("when the 
telephone rings"), and an altern<JtiH~ method of receiving the news ("or a note is passed,") 
combine to imply recurrent frequency. By these means it is made clear that this was no 
isolated incident, either in his tenure or in the history of the state as a whole, as 100 is the 
impression of inevitable recurrence in the future, The imposition of a sense of inevitability is 
important because it reinforces the mythmaking process, turning "history into nature"148 and 
replacing the question of 'why does this happen?' "vith 'this \vill inevitably happen, so what 
can we do to protect ourselves?' 
3.3. The Message 
One of the most important functions of these communications is their reference to and 
reinforcement of an overarching narrative 'frame', or "structure of expectation,"149 to which 
the premises they define "v:ill comfortably contribute. If "[nJarrative activity ... is at once a 
discursive medium for collective probing and problem-solving and a tool for instantiating 
social and personal identities,"lso in the context of these policy narratives, the speaker takes 
the role of guide, steering the minds of his audience towards particular collective findings 
about the natural identities of a situation and of its key players. 
Since politicians are elected primarily on the basis of credible authority and the appearance 
ofknov-.ing what to do (or at least, what to say), audiences reasonably expect a higher degree 
of logic or the appearance of it in their arguments. Where a politician makes persuasive 
use of emotional appeals and mythologies, even where these are easily identifiable as such, 
the overlying veneer of rationality lent by the credible political source reassures voters while 
contributing respectable authority to the emotions and myths themselves. Although the 
q' Sharon 08-04-02. Annex PI, pp A6-A15. 
qti BUlthes. 1993, p129. 
qQ Tannen, 1979, cited in Tolmach Lakoff. 2000. P47. 
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audience's expectations contribute to this veneer, linguistically it is reinforced \vith judicious 
use of conjunctions, anaphora, juxtaposition, exemplification, explanation, logical relations, 
ellipsis, highlighting, contrasting, comparison, semantic relation, and so on, all of which help 
'",ith the establishment of premises and the dravving of seemingly logical conclusions. 
For example, the premises of 31-03-02 §2 discussed in 3.2.3. above - that "we" have made 
"every effort", "every single moment", to work towards achieving peace and quiet- are built 
into logic with causative conjunction: 'e\'ery effort' has been made (by us) in order to achieve 
a ceasefire; the decisions and actions of 'every single moment' have been taken in order to 
undertake diplomatic negotiations. The (';.;act nature of these painstaking 'efforts' remain;; 
hidden, eclipsed by their purportcd yuu!" ~I "eeasefirc" and "diplomatic negotiations." Since 
the goals are morally righteous and desirable, we might be inclined to believe that the 'steps 
being taken' to achieve them are similarly so. 
By contrast, Sharon's "wave of Palestinian terrorism" of the same stanza could not take place 
without a sea of Palestinian terrorists to carry it. There can be no reasoning vvith such an 
unfathomable menace, and he makes frequent reference to the futility of even trying: 
31-03-02 §se You cannot make any compromise with terrorism 
f You cannot compromise Vrith people who are prepared, 
g like the suicide bombers in Israel's street, 
h or the TVrin Towers in the U,S., 
to die simply in order to kill innocent people 
j men, women and children 
k to die in order to sow terror and horror. 
If, in the presentation of Israeli actions, the aims both eclipse the means and are right co us 
and painstaking, the methods of Palestinian actors are highlighted and emphasised through 
repetition ("to die", §Si and k), while their aims are brutal and meaningless ("simply in order 
to kill ... " §si). 
Thus the situation, its key players (the Palestinians and the Israelis), and the logical 
conclusions ("You cannot make any compromise with terrorism,") have been simultaneously 
defined. These definitions are what constitute 'the message', 
3·3·1. Defining Situations 
There is inevitably a great deal of overlap bet'v\'een the definitions of the situation and those of 
the key players, and frequently the former are described to indirectly evaluate the latter and 
vice Yersa. Without human involyement there can be little 'situation' - for the politician at 
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referential framework 'within which to locate it. In some cases a single narrative will directly 
provide its own referential framework, perhaps by outlining the important features of its core 
ideology at the outset; that kind of narrative might be appropriate as an introduction or 
summary for outsiders wishing to 'find out' about an idea or ideology, Such an audience will 
probably not have encountered - or absorbed - many other texts on the subject, so the 
narrator is restricted in the use of intertextual references whose layers of meaning, if 
captured and correctly interpreted, can add subtextual flavour, depth and validity to the 
arguments presented. However, where a narrative has made the evolution into a discourse 
and beyond, into an ideological system (it has passed "from semiology to ideology"151), as has 
happened with Israeli state ideology, its ;ldherents - and critics can be relied on to possess 
a great deal of ideological reinforcement in the form of 'prior knO\vledge'. Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon has no place among text-book writers or journalists, and it is not his job to 
convert the uninitiated. He has at his referential disposal an intricately em,broidered 
ideological framework comprising the thoughts and ideas over a hundred years of the 
millions of people involved in this nation-building project, '.vhom he currently represents as 
their successor and leader. 
Contextual Framing 
Once we begin speaking in the configurational dimension, plot and so forth, we are speaking in 
large measure of a distinctly retrospective mode of interpretative activity: to be able to extract 
the plot of a story involves returning to earlier episodes, seeing how they relate to subsequent 
ones and to the evolving whole that is the narrative itself.IS2 
The 'situation' described within these speeches can be considered in three main categories: 
the situation today, the present context, and the general overview (the situation since the 
establishment of the state). These categories are ideologically identical, in that they present 
the same cohesive 'cause, effect, action and agency' structure; what differs is their historical 
scope. Diagrammatically, the growing contextual framing of 'situation' can be represented as 
follows: 
The situation today 
The present context 
The general overview 
Fig. 3.2.1: Contextual Framing 
In the speeches analysed here, the situation today is characterised as a period of heightened 
military assault against Israel, juxtaposed with the direct or implicit negation of Israeli 
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agency and assertion of Palestinian instigation. For example, "We are currently in the midst 
of a difficult campaign forced upon us - a brutal campaign of terrorism" (21-02-02, §2a-d) 
and "Citizens of Israel, the state of Israel is in a war, a war against terrorism. It's a war that 
has been imposed upon us. It's not one that we have chosen to undertake," (31-03-02, §1a-e). 
From Aristotle, we know that this formula can be used to provoke 'anger' in an audience ("the 
fact is that anger ... is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers but the 
wronged."'5:l) In this dimension, Israeli action is reactive only and based on immediate 
existential concerns ("it is a war for our home," §1t). 
The present context is defined by means of llarrati\'e 'potted histories', whose elements are 
selected from recent or longer-term history t() configure a simplified sub-narrative in support 
of the larger whole. In this frame, Israel is presented as striving to improve the (always 
undesirable) 'situation today', whether by seeking all possible solutions to the cpnflict or 
simply being thoroughly equipped, both socially (vvith the courage and unity of the people) 
and militarily (with the best army and weapons) to respond to it. The general overview is an 
achievement of broad intertextuality, drawing on the definitions provided by previous orators 
and their narratives to provide the foundational understandings that the present orator can 
'take for granted' in his audience and upon which is structured the overarching 'plot' of his 
narratives. 
To illustrate, on 21 February 2002'<H Sharon delivers the following stanza, wherein he makes 
use of a 'general overview' to illustrate his portrayal of the present context, which in turn 
provides the definitions needed to help us understand 'the situation today': 
21-02-02 §6a ,Just take a moment and ponder 
152 Freeman. 1997, Pl73. 
b the past year and a half of struggle 
c that has been forced upon us 
d I believe that we have endured this experience admirably 
e Soldiers and civilians, 
f new immigrants and veterans, 
g demonstrate resourcefulness and valour, 
h willingness to reach out to others 
and a spirit of volunteering 
j All these are a testimonv to a healthy societv, 
k full of vitality and v.-illp~wer, . . 
I a society whose sons and daughters 
m are no less qualified 
n than the generations which established the State, 
o broke the siege imposed upon us in 1967 
p and pulled themselves out of the depth of the abyss in 197:3 
153 Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book II Chapter 5. @ 32:3BC. 
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Here the 'present context' is both "the past year and a half of struggle that has been forced 
upon us," and the behaviour of those he includes in the 'we' pronoun: "we have endured [it] 
admirably ... " The 'general overview' provides broader evaluation of the 'present context' 
through implicit comparison \vith previous contexts, presupposing his audience's knowledge 
that the state was established through the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948;155 that the six-day 
war in 1967 is often described in Israeli discourse as a "siege";156 that "the depth of the abyss" 
refers to the 1973 'Yom Kippur' war; and finally, the eulogised character of the "sons and 
daughters" involved in all of the above. Through this growing contextual framing, the 
audience is led to understand that, in Sharon's definition, 'the situation today' constitutes an 
existential crisis comparable to the three regiollal \\'(\1'5 to \\'hich he refers, and further, that 
the Israeli military's activities in the Palestinian territories demonstrate the highest level of 
courage and dedication, in view of the presupposed intensity of the dangers they are facing 
there. 
Defining Key Players 
As we have seen, Sharon's speeches are striking for their evaluative polarities, which are 
arguably a feature of political discourse as a whole, but particularly so in cases where warfare 
ranks high on the policy agenda. In this discourse there is no room for moral ambiguity -
'they' are "murderous" while 'we' are "peace-loving," etc - and for this effect he draws heavily 
on myth to establish the natures of the key characters. As we shall see, if there is any 
variation from this general polarity, those it describes are linguistically 'marked', making 
them the exception rather than the rule. 
In his statement of 21-02-02 §Sd that "we have endured this situation admirably," along with 
defining the situation on the simplest level as 'something to be endured', Sharon 
simultaneously delivers a personal appraisal (or 'judgement') of 'we' (as 'admirable'), and 
implicitly, as we have just been told of "the past year and a half of struggle that has been 
forced upon us," (§Sb-c), a negative judgement of whoever is doing the forcing. Sharon, 
confident of his audience's prior exposure to this discourse, knows that we know who he 
means. He has already referred in the second stanza to "a brutal campaign of terrorism," 
(§2a-d); in stanza 8 to "our neighbours" (I discuss the implications of this term below), and in 
stanza 11 to "terrorism and terrorists." It is not until stanza 13 that he mentions the word 
'Palestinian', and even then only to state, "I \-vill continue to meet with Palestinian officials"-
it would almost be possible, thus far, for an uninitiated listener to miss the connection 
I"~ Referred to in Israeli discourse as the 'War ofIndependence', For Palestinians, it is the 'Naqba', or catastrophe, 
I.;n A 'siege' because all the Arab armies are said to have mobilised around Israel's borders, 'Breaking' that siege 
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between these innocuous 'officials' and the existential cnSlS at hand. That the two 
components of the phrase 'Palestinian terror/ism/ists' are in many circles interchangeable 
has been helped in no small part by the discourse of politicians like Sharon: 
§3a We have co-operated with the American emissary, Zinni, 
b and we've received terrorism in return 
c We've co-operated with Vice President Dick Cheney, 
d and we've received terrorism in return. 
§4a We gave our-in order to achieve a cease-fire, 
b our requirement of seven days of peace and quiet, 
c and we got terrorism in return 
d We removed our troops from the eities, 
e and we got terrorism in return. 
§sa The only thing we've had in return for our efforts 
b has been terrorism, terrorism and more terrorism 
c We have to combat this terrorism uncompromisingly 
d We have to uproot it. 
Israeli agency is presented in a detailed inventory of concessions and gestures, all responded 
to with archetypal Palestinian monomania. Even Israeli demands are presented as donations, 
such as in §4a-b's "vVe gave our- in order to achie\'e a cease-fire, our requirement of seven 
days of peace and quiet." Following Ochs and Capps (2001), the repeated formation of "we 
got terrorism in return" is an emphatic assertion of \ictimhood, because "the verb 'got' is 
typically used to make a protagonist look like a \ictim in a situation that calls for 
accountability."157 Not once does the word 'Palestinian' appear in the above extract, but still, 
'Palestinian' accountability is conveyed, According to Said, in Israel, the US and elsewhere, all 
indications of: 
the daily, minute occurrences of what Palestinians have to live through are hidden and, more 
important, covered over by a logic of self-defence and the pursuit of terrorism (terrorist 
infrastructure, terrorist nests, terrorist bomb factories, terrorist suspects-the list is infinite) ... 
Ideas about terrorism have thus taken on a life of their own, legitimised and re-Iegitimised 
without proof, logic or rational argumenLIS8 
One political consequence of casting the Palestinians as a single entity with the same 
incomprehensibly \iolent beha\iour is an implicit justification of their 'collective 
punishment'159 in IDF military operations and restrictive measures. 
Egypt, Syria's Golan annexed to Israel, and the WBGS remain under occupation to this day. 
1'17 Ochs and Capps, 2001, P49. 
15H Said, April 2002. 
1'i9 When a Palestinian commits an act of terrorism, the standard Israeli response is to invade his or her town or 
village, shelling and terrorising the neighbourhood and bulldozing the terrorist's family's home. Curfews are 
frequently called in 2002, some 300,000 Palestinian residents of Hebron spent a total of 286 days in their 
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3·3·2.1. Evaluation And Opposition 
A great deal of the evaluation of people within these texts also functions to impose, by 
contrast, the necessary 'opposite' characteristics on the polarised 'opposite' people: a slight 
variation on the theme of "we are what we are because they are not what we are."160 Since 
Sharon repeatedly defines the situation of Israel as 'at war' or 'in conflict' with the Palestinian 
(terrorists), the narrated activities and characteristics of the key players (wherein lies most of 
their evaluation) are also, as a matter of internal cohesion, understood to conflict even where 
this is not explicitly stated. In other words, by presenting the situation as a 'war', the polarity 
between the 'sides' is necessarily heightened, to the extent that any positive evaluation of 'us' 
carries within it, by contrast, an implicit condemnation of ' them', and vicc-wrsa. 
For instance, if 'we' are said to "demonstrate resourcefulness and valour," (21-02-02 §Sg), 
there is the underlying supposition "in the face of X" - X being the situation or persoJls which 
have provoked or necessitated our demonstration of those qualities (whose identities are 
clearly indicated elsewhere in the texts). If X was revealed as posing no threat, our "valour" 
would be seen as inappropriate and perhaps relabelled, The power of suppositional 
reciprocity is masterfully illustrated by De Cervantes in Don Quixote, whose eponymous 
protagonist confronts a lion but the lion, a circus animal "more courteous than arrogant," 
merely turns its back and yawns. Is Don Quixote brave, or a fool?161 What is interesting here 
is that the question only arises because the nature and (re-)actions of the lion-as-individual 
are described, distancing it from its mythological lion-ness, Had the author wished to impose 
on his readers the belief that in this instance Don Quixote was in fact heroic, he would have 
reduced his description of the lion, using language to reflect rather than alter the prevailing 
mythologised perception of lions as "",ild and dangerous beasts. Similarly, Ariel Sharon is 
careful not to over-describe the Palestinians, since he must maintain and perpetuate the 
m)thologised view (of wild and dangerous terrorists) rather than implying any individual 
\'ariation behveen them, which might call Israeli "valour" in this context into question. 
3.3.2 .2 . Addressing 'Them' 
In §20 of his 21 February 2002 speech, ,62 Sharon turns from speaking about the Palestinians 
to speaking to them, as follows: 
21-02-02 §20a I turn from here also to the Palestinian people 
b to say what I have said in the past-
Miftah; http://w\\\\'.miftah.llrg), with predictable impact 011 the economy, education and health situations. 
1"0 Forgas and Ta!feI1981, cited in Duszak, 2002. p2. 
161 This illustration is taken from Edith Grossman's translation of Miguci de Cervantes' DOll Quixote, reviewed by 
Andre Brink in the South African SU1lday Independellt on 1 February 2004. 
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c I know that it is not easy being a Palestinian. 
It is useful to compare the linguistic form and communicative function of the first line of this 
excerpt "I turn from here also to [address] the Palestinian people." Is Sharon really 
addressing the Palestinians? If so, the introductory statement of §20 would probably fit the 
narrowest definition of a 'speech act' or 'performative utterance',t6:l in the manner (but 
unfortunately not the form) of Searle's widely-cited 'I apologise'. Cameron notes that 
"utterances of this kind cannot be false ... If someone [says] 'I apologise' I cannot respond, 'no 
you don't', since the utterance itself constitutes an apology."164 Similarly, if someone says 'I 
turn to you to say', where the addressee is present, that statement describes the action it 
performs. and it would be difficult to lahel it false. But the spatial deixis of "I turnf1'017l her'e 
also to the Palestinian people" in fact implies their absence. Throughout this speech the only 
other stated addressees the "Citizens of Israel" - are considered (metaphorically at least) to 
be where Sharon is, and so they require no such deictic markers in their address. 
§21a I turn to those Palestinians who do not want war 
b and are not involved in terrorism 
c Those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families 
d and afford clothes for their children 
e You are observing us, Israelis, yearningly, 
f and see Israel's many achievements 
g In the last 53 years 
h Israel has developed flourishing industries and agriculture, 
among the most advanced in the world; 
j our hi-tech industry will prosper again 
k with the recovery of the world economy; 
lone of the most advanced food industries in the world; 
m modern cities with hundreds of thousands of citizens 
n and education and health systems 
o which are envied across the world 
p All this has been achieved in 53 years, 
Sharon continues to refer to the Palestinian people in the third person (as "what is being 
talked about"t6S) until §21e, whereafter they are shunted from the picture in favour of a 
catalogue of Israel's qualities, Although one cannot politely s\vitch addressee \\rithout first 
indicating that this will occur, and a noun or third person pronoun is necessary for a short 
transitional period, by continuing for so long with this pronominal arrangement Sharon 
indicates that "that third person is excluded from the interaction and relegated to the 
position of object. "t66 The statement is therefore not a 'speech act', and Sharon is not directly 
addressing the Palestinian people as he claims. 
16:1 I use the term 'speech act' here to mean utterances that perform a particular action ill and of themselves, rather 
than Cameron (2001, p69)'s broader notion that "when we say something we are always also doing something," 
164 Also according to Cameron, an apology remains an apology whether it is sincere or not Cameron, 2001, p69. 
1
65 Duszak. 2002. p2. 
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In all forms of speech there must always be consideration of the 'overhearers' as well as of 
the addressees, and the distinction is easily blurred. A self-conscious mother might 
reprimand her child in public for a misdemeanour that in private would pass vvithout 
comment, so although ostensibly addressing the child the reprimand is actually performed 
for the benefit of the overhearers, perhaps to convey to them the message that she is a 
'competent parent'. Similarly, Ariel Sharon may ostensibly address 'the Palestinians', but this 
seems to be more for the benefit of the national audience, as well as for potentially critical 
international' overhearers'. 
If, us 1 helic,'e, Sharon is not really aiming his speech at the P<t1cstinians, then what 
communicative function does his claim fulfil? To answer this question, it is necessary to look 
at what he says about them under the guise of speaking to them. At first, §20C'S "I know that 
it is not easy being a Palestinian;' amplified through predefinition as "what I have said in the 
past," (§2ob), might resemble an almost conciliatory acknowledgement of Palestinian 
hardship.167 But Sharon does not say anything along the lines of 'it is not an easy time for the 
Palestinian people' - in contrast, see §2e and §3a of the same speech, where he states, in 
relation to Israeli hardship, that "these are not easy times." The simple assertive structure of 
§20C conceals a realm of ideological implications: the difficulties faced by Palestinians are not 
circumstantial, and certainly not a result of Israeli policy, but relate to the essential, genetic 
fact of "being a Palestinian," being, in other words, someone whose hardship is caused by 
their O\vn existence. As Wilkin points out, 
to attribute essential qualities to human beings can serve to limit or curtail the possibilities of 
social change and to reinforce the established social order. This, it is often noted, is exactly 
what we would expect powerful social groups and forces to desire in order to maintain their 
own authority in society,168 
and by introducing this proposition with the cognitive verb "I know," Sharon frames his 
essential assessment of Palestinian-ness as fact. 
§21a I turn to those Palestinians who do not want war 
b and are not involved in terrorism. 
167 The conditions faced by those in the Occupied Territories could not by any standards be described as "easy" 
when military incursions, closures and curfews have devastated morale and resulted in unprecedented levels of 
unemployment and poverty. By February 2002, unemployment (by ILO standards) a'"eraged 41%: 64.3% in the 
Gaza Strip and :32.4% in the West Bank. PASSIA, 2003, In January February 2002 more than two-thirds of 
Palestinian hOllseholds were li\"ing below the poverty line on less than US S1.90jduy, Palestine Central Bureau of 
Statistics, figures released April 2002. httpJj~\\\"~y,p('hs,()rg. According to a joint press release issued on 23 
February 2003 by AI Mezan Centre for Human Rights and AI Haq, h'"O Palestinian advocacy groups, one year later 
in February 2003 the rates of poverty and unemployment in the OPTs had reached ~0-85% and 64% respectively, 
as a direct result of Israeli military action and human rights abuses, 
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In §21a-b Sharon refines the object of his address to "those Palestinians who do not want war 
and are not involved in terrorism." A polarity may seem to have been modified, since there 
now arises the possibility that there are 'good' Palestinians as well as 'bad.' However, the 
former are still described in terms of the latter, with the negative aspect immediately evoking 
those who do want war and who are involved in terrorism. Kress and Hodge illustrate how 
"negatives can create a universe of alternate meanings, which ... exist as a result of [the 
speaker's] renunciation," with the sentence "There isn't a tiger in that room." While we might 
not suppose the statement to be untrue, "that room immediately becomes one where a tiger 
-
might reasonably be, "16<) Similarly, the link between Palestinians, war and terrorism is here 
effecti\'cly (re-)emphasised, and with the insertion of a dell1()nstrati\L' pronoun, those 
Palestinians to whom Sharon refers are marked, and therefore, it is subtly implied, less 
typical than the unmarked 'normal' Palestinians who do want war and terrorism. 
§21C Those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families 
d and afford clothes for their children 
e You are observing us, Israelis, yearningly, 
f and see Israel's many achievements. 
In §21C, we receive a helpfully idealised definition of these non-belligerent Palestinians. They 
are "those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families and afford clothes for 
their children." Narrowly defined, the Palestinians and their essential misfortune sit in one of 
two constructed categories: they are either terrorists, or they have a 'sole purpose' that 
Sharon can comfortably identify to his supposed 'overhearers'. If there are Palestinians with 
more than one purpose, or who do not have families and children, or who do have children 
and yet still believe in the necessity of armed resistance, or any other of the infinitely complex 
combinations and motivations of human existence, they have no place within this discourse. 
The Palestinians who have made it this far through the definitional process are finally 
rewarded \\ith their own addressive pronoun, along with a stringent expectation of what they 
must be thinking: "You are observing us, Israelis, yearningly, and see Israel's many 
achievements," (§21e-f). In other words, 'good' Palestinians are emious of and "yearn" to 
emulate Israeli achievement. Here again Palestinians are defined in purely Israeli terms; they 
do not exist in and of themselves but only as enemies or acolytes of Israel. At last we have 
reached what seems to be the real intention behind this section - self-description 'through 
the eyes' of the 'other', in the form of a series of congratulatory statements about Israel's 
achie\'ements of the past 53 years: 
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§21g In the last 53 years 
h Israel has developed flourishing industries and agriculture, 
among the most advanced in the world; 
j our hi-tech industry will prosper again 
k with the recovery of the world economy; 
lone of the most advanced food industries in the world; 
m modern cities ""ith hundreds of thousands of citizens 
n and education and health systems 
o which are envied across the world 
p All this has been achieved in 53 years. 
It is interesting to consider that a Jungian interpretation might see the above stanza as a 
projection of Sharon's own desire to emulate the position of countries such as the US. 
Otherwise, the message of this stanza if directed at the Israeli people might he tailored to 
inspire the requisite 'confidence' component of warfare's emotional trilogy (fear, anger and 
confidence), since according to Aristotle, "We feel confidence if... we believe ourselves 
superior to our rivals in ... the possession of all, or the most important, appliances oLwar:'170 
Modes Of Judgement 
Martin and Rose present a useful system for analysing 'appraisal', which is concerned with 
Hthe kinds of attitudes that are negotiated in a text, the strength of the feelings involved, and 
the ways in which the values are sourced and readers [or listeners] aligned."171 The form of 
'appraisal' is defined by its object: the appraisal of things is 'appreciation'; that of their 
feelings is 'affect'; and that of people's characters is 'judgement': 
Fig. 3.3.2.3: Modes of Judgement (Martin & Rose) 
'Judgement' can be direct or implied, personal or moraL Personal judgements relate to 
personal characteristics to call someone 'intelligent', for example, is an example of direct 
personal admiration; if we say that he or she is 'sharply' or 'fairly' intelligent we thereby 
amplify or mute our positive personal appraisaL Similarly, and as the term suggests, moral 
judgement relates to moral character, and comes in the form of direct or implied praise or 
condemnation. Negative judgements can masquerade as mildly positive attitudes, as with 
Sharon's apparent modifIcation of polarities in 21-02-021~2 §21a-b above. Ha\ing refined his 
address to "those Palestinians who do not want war and are not involved in terrorism," he 
takes a benevolent ad\isory tone toward them, as follows: 
I~() Aristotle. Rhetoric. Book 2 Chapter 5. @ 323BC 
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21-02-02 §22a Today I suggest that you think long and hard 
b what you and your children 
c would want to achieve in the coming years 
d Will you continue to follow 
e those who lead you to ruin, destruction and despair? 
f Will you continue to be misled 
g by those who call upon your sons to commit suicide, 
h or will you follow those who choose to progress and to thrive? 
There appears to be some faint hope for the Palestinians, if only they would "follow those 
who choose to progress and to thrive," (§22h). The terminology of 'fonowing' and 'being led' 
is interesting, in that agency is at once accorded and denied; the only choice to be made by 
the Palestinians is who to follow. From Sharon's presentation the answer is clear, thanks to 
his repeated characterisation of the Palestinian leadership in terms like ",\rafat':; organised 
bureaucracy of murder," (08-04-02 §13k) which "is infested ,vith terror," (08-04-02 §2Sh). 
While on one level we mav interpret "those who lead to ruin, destruction and despair" as the . , 
small minority of Palestinians involved in an organisational aspect v\1th the "armed struggle 
against Israel," (22-01-03 §l1n), Sharon intends and manages to portray the whole of Arafat's 
Palestinian Authority CPA) as the "abettors and dispatchers" (22-01-03 §sx) of terrorism. 
Thus the leaders of terrorism and the leaders of the Palestinian people are the same; 
terrorism is another essential aspect of Palestinian-ness. According to Sharon's adv1ce, if the 
Palestinians are to improve their circumstances they must renounce their own leadership in 
favour of that of Israel, cease their resistance to Israeli oppression, overcome "the myth of 
bloodshed forced upon them by their current leaders" (08-04-02 §39g-h) and wholeheartedly 
embrace whatever decisions and actions, military and othe1'\\15e, that Israel takes in their 
regard, They must accept the status quo. 
A 'judgement' breakdown of 21-02-02 §22 reveals the existence within it of several negative 
judgements and one positive, directed at Palestinians and Israelis respectively, not including 
the initial positive personal and moral judgement of Sharon himself implied through his self-
positioning as advisor. In §22, the 'you' pronoun applies exclusively, as delineated above, to 
"those Palestinians who do not want war and are not involved in terrorism," the targets of 
Sharon's advice, while the other Palestinians (those who do want war) continue to be referred 
to in the third person. 
§22a Today I suggest that you think long and hard 
b \\ihat YOll and your children 
c would want to achieve in the coming years. 
In §22a-c, Sharon suggests "that you think long and hard what you and your children would 
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want to achieve in the coming years." The implicit judgement of someone who must be told to 
"think long and hard" on such an issue is that they are othenvise rash and impetuous; this 
judgement, in Martin and Rose's terminology, is negative, personal and implied. 
§22d Will you continue to follow 
e those who lead you to ruin, destruction and despair? 
Within the question of §22d-e are couched two more negative judgements; although 
apparently already defined as 'good' Palestinians, "you" are currently follmving those 
miscreants, as revealed by the verb "continue," and are thereby implicitly judged once again 
in negath'e personal terlll::-;. l\lcanwhile, those who "you" are following reccin ~\ stronger 
expression of disappnnal in the form of a negati\-e Ilwm[ judgement, implied through the 
immorality of their described behaviour, which itself is defined through the strong attitudinal 
lexis and emphatic tautology of "ruin, destruction and despair." Sornig tells us, with reference 
to Barthes, that "tautological expressions always have an aggressive effect... exercised by 
making somebody listen to one and the same argument over and over again."m In brief, a 
'judgement' breakdown of §22 might resemble the follmving: 
Judgement I Direct Implied 
1-- I Admire those (I~raelis) who progress 
I Personal --__ ~~d thn_v_e-,,(§=-2_2_h--'-)_~ ___ -t--:::-__ ~ 
I 
ICriticise1 I suggest that you (Palestinians) I 
I I PralSe those (Israelis) who choose to 
I 
think 10J1g and h,<!rd (§22tt) '.'1 
Moral_~ogress, etc. (§22h), ' 
Condemn I Those (Palestinians) who lead you to 
ruin, destruction and des air (§22e) 
Fig. 3.3.2.3b: Modes of Judgement in 08-04-02 §22 
Judging Behaviour 
According to Martin and Rose, and as we have seen above, one of the most effective methods 
for conveying implicit personal or moral judgement is through description of behaviour. To 
this end, exemplums, which "relate an incident in order to comment on the behaviour of the 
people involved,"174 are useful. To illustrate, §4t-cc of 08-04-02 175 contains the short 
exemplum of Zahava Wieder, providing an example of how mythologies gain credence 
through the appropriation of fact, and how an exemplum of one person's behaviour can be 
attached to the appraisal of a larger group. 
08-04-02 §4t the face of Zahava Wieder 
l~; So mig, 1989, P104. 
l~-l Martin and Rose, September 2001. P32. 












u a true heroine of the people of Israel 
v who lost her husband, 
w daughter and son-in-law at that seder, 
x and during the seven days of mourning 
y agreed to donate her husband's organs 
z to a Palestinian family in Shuafat 
aa She is living proof of the fact that, 
bb even at the most trying times, 
cc we remain humane, 
Ariel Sharon's Policy Narratives 
Wieder, who lost several close family members in the Netanya suicide attack, "agreed to 
donate her husband's organs to a Palestinian family in Shuafat," (§4Y). As a result, according 
to Sharon, she is "a true heroine of the people of Israel," (§4u), Although her heroism should 
not be denied, it is doubtful that he would have found it so worthy of public commenl had she 
donated those organs to an Israeli or other family, so within the direct moral and personal 
praise of Wieder is an implied, mildly negative judgement of the recipients "a Palestinian 
family" who, we infer, were really quite fortunate to receive this gesture, as they pointedly 
share the ethnicity of her husband, daughter and son-in-law's killers. Nonetheless, her action 
has become 'our' action (not only a true heroine, she is a true heroine of the people of Israel), 
and "she is living proof of the fact that, even at the most trying times, we remain humane," 
(§4aa-cc, emphases added). Aside from the flippant characterisation of thc devastation of 
Wieder's world as "trying," with this 'we' Sharon manages implicitly to insert himself, along 
with the entire nation, into his positive personal and moral 'heroic and humane' judgement of 
Wieder. There is some paradox in the fact that Wieder's altruistic dccision - to use death to 
sa\'c lives - has been appropriated for the justification of "intensified" military action, 
In the following stanza, Sharon confusingly merges his description of the Netanya attack with 
that of the attack in Haifa, and we learn that Wieder's family, who died in Netanya, were, 
along with the (Jevvish) Israelis killed in Haifa, "victims of coexistence" rather than of war, 
since the latter were killed "while eating at an Arab restaurant their blood mixing with the 
blood ofIsraeli Arabs who were sitting beside them" (§sd-e): 
§sa Victims of coexistence, 
b those whose worlds fell apart 
c while eating at an Arab restaurant in Haifa 
d their blood mixing .vith the blood of Israeli Arabs 
e who were sitting beside them 
f Entire families, Je\";sh and Arab, are destroyed 
g in the heat of the murderous insanity 
h which has taken hold of our Palestinian neighbors 
i And thus the killers and dispatchers intend to destroy the hope for peace, 
j hope for the future 
k and hope for a normal life. 
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affairs. Since we are concerned with the message carried in the labels of things as well as in 
their appraisal, it is worth noting in passing the terminology 'Israeli Arabs,' which provides a 
useful propaganda distinction between the Palestinians living in Israel as citizens and those 
in the Occupied Territories. 176 Sharon makes use of it to imply unity (as well as equality, 
which is not in fact the case) between Je,vish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, an implicit 
counter-argument to those who would accuse Israel of running an 'apartheid state'. 177 "Entire 
families, .Je,vish and Arab, are destroyed in the heat of the murderous insanity which has 
taken hold of our Palestinian neighbours" (§Sf-h): these "neighbours" are shared by Jev\'ish 
and Arab Israelis alike. In this account their actions abusing "coexistence" and killing even 
"Israeli Arabs" implicitly reinforce the direct moral condemnation carried in "the 
murderous insanity which has tuken hold of them," (§Sg-h). They (Palestinians) are 
'murderous' and 'insane' (which, by contrast, implies that we are not), Further, their 
"murderous insanity" (§sf) results from a "heat" which has "taken hold" of them: thf!Y do not 
have any rational control over it. In this way is implied still more personal (as opposed to 
moral) criticism. Arabs and Muslims, it is well 'known' from the intertextualisation of years of 
Orientalist discourse, are irrational, impulsive creatures, dangerous for the likelihood of their 
being seized at any time by the most alarming whims and passions. 178 
I 
Judgement Direct 
Admire A true heroine (§4u) 'not insane' (implied in contrast to I
· Implied 
r-----:::c-:-:-:---i--::----:----:c::---:---------1' Palestinian 'insanity') (§""Sg"")'-:--:-c:---;;---I 
Criticise I Insanity (§Sg) I The heat... which has taken hold of Personal 
I I our Palestinian nei hhours (§S -h) 
'--I'. ------+----P-r-a-c-is-e--!--W-e--re-m-a'in--:-'h-u-m-a-n-e-C-§-4c~c-:-)--': 'not murderous' (im plied in contrast 
Moral i--=---;---t--:--::--~--~---:------+I to Palestitlian 'murderousness'~sg) I 
I Condemn Murderous (§Sg) I ~ 
L__ I , I 
Fig. 3.3.2.4: Judgements 08-04-02 §4-§5 
176 In fact, apart from their status as citizens, the only difference between 'Israeli Arabs' and 'Palestinians' is that 
the former (who today number approximately 1.2 million) descend from those who managed to remain in place 
during the 1948 war, when most of Palestine became IsraeL Confusingly, this terminology is not used to refer to 
Arab Jews (Jews from Yemen, Iraq, North Africa etc who have since become Israelis). Most 'Israeli Arabs' still 
define themselves as 'Palestinians' and have close relatives in the OPTs. Until very recently, 'Palestinians' did not 
exist at all in Israeli discourse - there were only 'Israeli Arabs' and other 'Arabs', since the term 'Palestinians' 
implied the (pre)existence of Palestine: in 1969, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir famously declared. "There is no 
such thing as a Palestinian people, .. It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their country. They didn't 
exist." (Statement to The Sunday Times, UK, on 06/15/69). However, with the 'peace process', the concept of the 
'two-state solution' and the installation of the Palestinian Authority, 'Palestinian' has become an accepted identity, 
although it is often used in a context that renders it synonymous with 'terrorist(s)'. Interestingly, in the past year 
members of the American administration have begun to use the term 'Palestine'. presumably with reference to the 
isolated bantustans currenth- under Palestinian authoritv. 
lTl See Davis, 1987, which catalogues in detail the differe~ces in the rights of the two peoples institutionalised in 
Israeli law and practise, Also see Greenberg, 1980, for historical sociological discussion on the similarities and 
differences between South African Apartheid and Israeli Political Zionism. 
nH Said delineates "the web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism anel dehumanising ideology" that 
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Palestinian 'Neighbours' 
The phrase 'our neighbours' appears frequently m Sharon's discourse as a semantic 
equivalent to 'the Palestinians'. On the most basic level, it indicates close physical proximity, 
useful in the invocation of fear as "we do not fear things that are a very long way off."179 
Within these texts it usually appears amid varying degrees of negative judgement, such as the 
"murderous insanity" discussed above. On 21-02-02, we are told that "Unfortunately, our 
neighbours have misinterpreted both our yearning for peace and our way of life," (§9a-c); on 
8 April, that "For eighteen months Israel has been under bitter and bloody attack, initiated by 
our Palestinian neighbours," (§14a); and on 22 January 2003 Sharon begins by announcing 
that he will focus his comments on "OUt' cont1ict with our Palestinian neighbours," (§lb). 
In this context, 'neighbours' might seem for Sharon to be a slightly jocular euphemism for 
'our nearby enemies', but critical analysts such as Labov, Cameron, Martin and Rose and 
others strongly emphasise the use of contrast as an evaluative device. Since the term 
'neighbours' usually holds connotations of friendliness and fellow-humanity,180 its apparent 
incongruity here emphasises, rather than detracts from, the surrounding negative judgement 
of Palestinians. By performing the many evil deeds explicitly attributed to them in the 
speeches, 'they' are violating the "expected rule of behaviour"181 of neighbours, emphasising a 
huge contrast between what they are and what they should be. Meanwhile, thanks to the 
morally polarised framework of these narratives, 'their' un-neighbourliness automatically 
implies 'our' neighbourliness: Israel's intentions towards the Palestinians are neighbourly, 
\Vith all the (cruelly spurned) friendliness and good-intention that the term evokes. 
Furthermore, since 'neighbours' tend to live on their own land, in their own homes, these 
implications are also carried, creating a masterfully implicit denial that the Palestinian 
'neighbours' are all living under varying degrees of Israeli occupation, and not so much 
'neighbours' as unwilling hosts to the Israeli armed forces and settlers. Finally, it should be 
noted that the possessive pronoun renders 'our neighbours' an attribute of 'us': once again, as 
throughout the texts, the Palestinians are defined in purely Israeli terms, and do not exist in 
and of themselves. 11l2 
Constructed Logic 
So far I ha\'e discussed some of the vvays in which the narrator might convey subjecthities as 
17') Aristotle. Rhetoric, Book 2 Chapter 5. @ ::l23BC 
180 The second definition offered by the OED for 'neighbour' is "fellow human being," while 'neighbourly' is 
defined as "like a good neighbour; friendly; kind," OED. 1996. 
18l LabO\', 1972, PP370-1. 
1S2 Although Sharon does not refer to it in his speeches, "the practice of compelling Palestinian neighbours to tour 
buildings suspected of being booby-trapped .. , is a widely-used method, which has even been given a regular 











fact, or how myths, as Barthes has it, "transform history into nature."183 The defining 
evaluations of both the situation and the key players, whether direct or implied, positive or 
negative, form the premises from which Sharon can briet1y outline his intended action, in the 
place and form oflogical conclusions. 
According to Kress, "the major content of an utterance is often to be found in the modal 
operations, rather than in the ostensible content."l84 Making a similar point, Gee (1999) 
reproduces the first stanza of Carroll's Jabberwocky to explain the difference between 
'function' (or 'grammatical') words, which "show how content words in a phrase, clause or 
sentence relate to each other, or how pieces of information fit into the overall ongoing 
communication,"'li') and 'content' (or 'lexical') words, the "pieces of information" themselves. 
Twas bryllyg, and the slithy toves. 
Did gyre and gymble in the wabe. 
All mimsy were the borogovgs. 
And the mome rathli outgrabe. IH6 
Although "function words ... tend to be iriformationally less salient than content words,"187 
they "can help us make guesses"188 about confusing or unknown content words by clarifying 
their relationship to each other. In spite of the meaninglessness of its 'content words', 
Jabberwocky makes grammatical sense and even achieves sensory impression: "Thus," says 
Gee, "we readily interpret the [Carroll] stanza as a description of an outdoor scene with 
creatures of various sorts frolicking or moving about." While this or any other interpretation 
of the poem must have much to do \vith the sounds of the content words, it is clear that 
function words can be used to create seemingly logical structures from otherwise 
meaningless premises. 
Sharon's speeches do not contain nonsensical content words (it could be said that the reverse 
is true, although being imbued with so many layers of meaning does not necessarily make 
words more intelligible), but there is something analogous in the way he constructs a logical 
relationship between 'content phrases' by means of causal 'function words', as follows: 
22-01-03 §lOa Israel should obviously not be expected to make political concessions 
b prior to a proven state of calm and Palestinian governmental reforms. 
c The reform process is necessary 
,tll Barthes. 1993, p129. 
'll~ Kress, 1990, p127. 
,85 Gee 1999, plOL 
d in order to remove Arafat from the reins of power and decision-making 
e and to establish a more proper goycrnment, 
1116 Lewis Carroll, Jabberwocky, cited in Gee 1999, pplOO-lOL 
,87 Gee 1999. PiOl. Emphasis in original. 
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f which will lead to security, economic and democratic reforms. 
g In this context it should be emphasized that 
h one of the most important tests of the new regime 
i will be not only the prevention and dismantling of terrorism, 
j but also a complete cessation of incitement 
k and the nurturing of an education system 
I that teaches the values of peace and coexistence. 
Breaking the above stanza (loosely) into 'content' and 'function' words or phrases yields the 
follmving: 
[function 1J: Obviously (It is 'fact' that): 
[A]: Israel should not be expected to make political concessions 
[function until (A depends on B) 
[B]: there is a proven state of calm, 
[function 3]: and (B requires C) 
[C]: Palestinian governmental reforms 
[function 4]: in order to (C must achieve D) 
[D]: remove Arafat from power 
[function 5J: and (D requires E) 
[E]: establish a more proper government 
[function 6]: which will lead to (D and E must cause F) 
[F]: Reforms 
[function 7 J: it should be emphasised that (It is 'fact' that) 
[function 8J: one of the most important tests of (F must cause G) 
[G]: the new regime 
[function 9]: will be not only (G mustfulfil H) 
[H]: the prevention and dismantling of terrorism 
[function 10 J: but also (H requires 1) 
[I]: a complete cessation ofincitement 
[function 12]: and (the nurturing of) (H and I must achieve J) 
[J]: a new education system 
[function 13]: that (J must achieve K) 
[K]: teaches the value of peace and coexistence 
The above is not an exhaustive breakdown of §lO'S 'function' and 'content' words, since it 
does not acknowledge, for example, the cases where function words are embedded vvithin a 
content phrase, such as "a proven state of calm," or "establish a more proper government." 
"Proven" and "more proper" are informationally unsalient, because they indicate a relathity 
whose parameters are not clearly defined. However, it does illustrate the circular endlessness 
that has been built into the logic of this stanza, \'.·here each 'content' phrase prerequires 











{A depends on B} -7 {B requires C} -7 {C must achieve D} -7 {D requires E} -7 {D and E 
must cause F} -7 {F must cause G} -7 {G must fulfil H} -7 {H requires I} -7 {H and I must 
achieve J} -7 {J must achieve K} 
Sharon explains that requirements of each step of the process are constantly under review. In 
other words, the process may be interrupted indefinitely at any stage because of a politically 
subjective assessment, with undefined criteria, of the 'progress' being made, and at the end of 
all this is the chance - but not the certainty - that Israel will 'make political concessions'. The 
nature of the concessions themselves is unclear, although since they are presented as being 
desirable to Palestinians, they imply that Israel will cease its assaults and appropriations. 
Aside from the fact that to do so is framed by sleight of hand as 'making concessions', the 
structure of the logic is in any case such that the end can never be reached. If we look 
carefully we see that many of the content words, such as [C] (Palestinian governmental 
reforms); [E] (a more proper government); [F] (Reforms) and [G] (the new regime') contain 
the same or very similar information. The result is an endless loop. In Sharon's vision there 
must be peace before peace is negotiated, and in the meantime Israel v'fill continue to occupy, 
assassinate, and restrict human rights and liberty as it sees fit. 
The above logic is also presented as the only possible course of action: "This is the only way 
to win a war and the only way to achieve sustainable peace," (21-02-02 §3j-k); "There is no 
other way," ( 21-02-02 §26k) and so on. 
3.4. Emotion 
Emotional response is sought in Sharon's audiences by several means, including the use of 
stereotypes and slogans, as well as parallelisms, hyperboles, climax and metaphors. Direct 
invocation of pain and suffering usually takes place at the outset of his speeches, in a form of 
'orientation' to inform the listener of the context within which his statements are situated. 
Whether they are originally delivered in English or \ iewed in translation, his speeches are 
remarkable for their noticeably flowery, almost poetic use of imagery, to an extent unusual in 
political discourse. Sharon also tends to juxtapose emotionally-charged words and phrases 
against an overarching structural rationality. These aspects v.ill be discussed below. 
Mr Sharon likes to say that he stands up to terrorists to show he is not afraid. In fact, his 
policies are driven by fear. His great talent is that he fully understands the depths of Jewish 
fear of another Holocaust... and he is an expert at harnessing all of it for his political ends. For 
Sharon, Je\vish fe<lr is a guarantee that his power will go unchecked, granting him the 
impunity needed to do the unthinkable: send troops into the Palestinian Authority's education 
ministry to steal and destroy records, bury children ali\'e in their homes, block ambulances 
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happened in Jenin.l!l9 
Ariel Sharon is expert at tapping into and increasing feelings ofbe\vilderment, insecurity and 
isolation among the Jewish and Israeli people. His announcement at the beginning of 
'Operation Defensive Shield' that "we are fighting a war for our homes, a very tough battle for 
the survival of the Jewish people!"'90 may seem sensationalist even to those outsiders who 
support "Israel's right to defend herself,"191 it is completely absurd to Palestinians at the 
receiving end of Israel's military invincibility, but its sentiment echoes throughout the Israeli 
media and would seem to have been comprehensively absorbed by a great many of the 
people. 
3.4.1 . Emotional Orientation 
A common feature of all Sharon's narratives examined in this thesis is the 'e,motional 
orientation' of their opening stanzas, where he routinely either evokes the death and 
destruction of the most recent attacks against Israelis or asserts Israeli victimhood with 
reference to a contextually appropriate historical event. This has the effect of contextualising 
his remarks from the outset; providing them with an emotional response according to which 
any reciprocal action (which might be in the mind of the audience from other sources) seems 
automatically justified. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often described by the international media as a 'cycle of 
violence', and the advantage of a 'cycle' for propagandists (on any 'side') is that they need 
only specify a starting point for everything that follows to seem consequentiaL 192 In other 
words, once you have pinpointed a 'beginning' then you have also attributed blame, cause 
and effect for everything that unfolds from that point onwards, whatever may have preceded 
it. For Sharon, the 'beginning' is always a Palestinian attack, to whose bereaved and injured 
he expresses deep regret. In so doing, as well as defining the emotional context within which 
the logic of his arguments can be followed, he also reinforces his own credibility as an insider 
source, or 'one of the people'. To illustrate emotional orientation I shall refer to four of the 
lil9 Klein, 25 April 2002. 
190 BBC World Service, 10 April 2002. 
191 This formation of Israel as "she" is widely used by "her" supporters, including US President George W Bush: 18 
April 2002. Presidellt Bush. SecretanJ Powell Discuss Middle East; Remarks by the President alld Secretary of 
State Colill Powell, The Oval Office, hll.Q.Jbn\\\.whitehou~l!.gO\ /l1t'\\s/releases/')Oo2/o4/"oo"0418-:i.l!tllll. In 
English, countries do not normally take a gender pronoun and are referred to as 'it', but the 'feminisation' of Israel 
can frequently be found in English-language discussion. This may simply be a direct translation from Hebrew, 
where countries are feminine. but it is unclear why George Bush and many other non-Hebrew speakers opt for 
this term. Perhaps it is an attempt to demonstrate sympathy' by 'personifying' the country; or perhaps a 
demonstration of Israel's nllnerability, a trait classically endowed upon females. 
lq2 According to the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs' website FAQ section, "There is no 'cycle of violence', rather 
there is Palestinian violent action followed by Israeli defensiw reaction, The violence cannot end until the 
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texts, as follows: 
1) On February 21 2002,193 immediately after greeting his audience ("citizens of Israel"), 
Sharon states, "I extend my deepest condolences to the bereaved families of the victims of the 
murderous attacks, and wish a speedy recovery to the wounded," (§1b-g). This brief 
expression of sympathy develops a complex theme in one sentence: It is clear that people 
were killed in the attacks to which he refers, and that those who died were not the only 
victims, having left behind their families, who are now bereaved, as well as the wounded, who 
now suffer. With their emphatic positioning at the beginning of the speech, these terrible 
happenings ta ke the shape of its premises, while instilling in thc listener a series of emotions 
pertaining to \'ictimhood, murder <.Im110ss, To critically c\'ahwtc the argument that is based 
on such premises, listeners must perform the difficult task of overriding their emotional -
and therefore apparently instinctive response, which readily transposes itqelf onto 
whate\'er conclusions may be drawn by the speaker. In other words, the emotional response 
triggered by the argument's opening premises leave the listener more willing to accept its 
conclusions. 
2) On 8 April 2002194 Sharon is at his most lyrical in his speech to the Knesset, whose 
function, inter alia, is to respond to the storm of controversy attracted by the events of 
'Operation Defensive Shield'. He begins with reference to the suicide bombing in Netanya: 
"Our dead lie in a long row: women and children, young and old. And ,\'e stand facing them, 
facing the vacuum created by their murders, and we are speechless," (§lb-f). For the first four 
stanzas of this speech, Sharon concentrates on orientating his listeners with vividly emotive 
imagery, appraising his own 'affect', or emotions, in reaction to the attack. After briefly 
outlining his personal involvement (§2a-§3e), he ,\'idens the scope to include his listeners and 
their emotions alongside his own, making intertextual reference to the "faces and human 
stories" pouring from the television screens and newspaper pages those who did not 
encounter these would have been few, and by referring to popular knowledge Sharon has also 
implicitly aligned himself as one of the people, and one of the victims. 
3) The article published in the New York Times on 9 June 2002'95 reaches back to the 'Six 
Day War' of June 1967 when "Israel faced a threat to its very existence as a coalition of Arab 
armies massed their troops along the fragile armistice lines that had separated Arab and 
Israeli forces since 1949," (§1b-f). The emotional evocation of a threat to Israel's "very 
existence" (v"ith 'very' acting here to imply the core of its existence as soft, exposed and at 
1", Sharon 21-02-02, Annex PI, pp AI-A4. 
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risk) is unmistakable, with the country, as this narrative would have it, protected only by 
"fragile armistice lines" (where was the army?) while a whole coalition of Arab armies 
"massed their troops" ready to attack; menacing, innumerable, and once again entirely 
unfathomable. Fortunately it transpired that the 'threat' was eradicated in just six days. 
4) On 7 October 2003/96 addressing the veterans of the 1973 Yom Kippur war and their 
families, Sharon reaches back thirty years to define the beginning point of yet another war in 
the cycle: "the fires of war were suddenly lit amidst the sanctity of Yom Kippur," (§1b-c), and 
how it pertains, emotionally, to the present: "Thirty years have passed since your loved ones 
hastclll'd directly from their synagogues and homes to the hea\y battle, and did not return. 
Those same thirty years have engrm'ed the moment of a hasty separation and the bundle of 
precious memories, the truth of war and the shock of the most terrible of all news, in your 
hearts," (§1d-l). 
Logical Formulae 
The frequent superimposition of logical formula onto highly emotionally-charged statements 
creates the impression that Sharon, as responsible state leader, is attempting to contain the 
emotions of his audiences, presupposing these to be already intense, rather than to impose 
them, as follows: 
21-02-02 §3a These are not easy times 
b A rasping cry is heard from some quarters 
c in these days when we must 
d more than ever 
e remain calm, reasonable and restrained 
f When it comes to matters of war and peace, 
g we must not act rashly 
h There is a time for everything -
not too late and not too early 
J This is the only way to win a war 
k and the only way to achieve sustainable peace. 
In this stanza, the speaker is ostensibly advising his people to contain their emotions and 
await further instruction, entreating them to maintain a level head in spite of the 
circumstances as defined by Sharon himself. In view of what has gone before ("murderous 
attacks," §le; "a brutal campaign of terrorism," §2d, etc) and of what is to come (" ... escalation 
and deterioration into an all-out war," §13i; "our war against those who are trying to destroy 
our people," §28c, etc), §3a's "these are not easy times" seems to constitute an obvious and 
hea\'ily-muted understatement. It is implicitly acknowledged as such by the speaker through 
l% Sharon 09-06-02. Annex Pl, pp A1S-A17. 
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its repetition (see §2e, §25a and §25i) and other contextual devices, such as the close 
juxtaposition of the "rasping cry," ",vith the overall result of amplifying the meaning far 
beyond that which the words themselves would othef\\'ise contain. 
Sharon has established the premise that the people listening are all suffering, and that he is 
aware of the extent of their suffering. Through this acknowledgement, he implicitly indicates 
his understanding of the intense pre-existing emotion that might motivate his audience to 
one of 1\vo undesirable courses: either to take wild and "rash" retributive action against the 
unnamed agent (the Palestinian people) whose actions and existence are clearly understood 
to have caused the difficulties; or to lose faith in Sharon's leadership, which has not yet 
produced the promised result of increased security for the Israeli people, and dissent in 
search of other solutions. In other words, perhaps mindful of the fact that "a speech should 
not only sound meaningful, it should also neutralise defensive reactions the listi1ner may 
have,"197 he has gi\'en his listeners the choice between three potential alignments: 1) with 
Sharon; 2) to the right of Sharon (by acting "rashly" beyond his chosen course of action) and 
3) to the left of Sharon (by casting doubt on the efficacy of his chosen course of action). The 
last 1\vo are discredited as over-emotional (they are not "calm, reasonable and restrained," 
§3e), unlike Sharon's way, which has been framed as central, mainstream and wise: it is "the 
only way to win a war, and the only way to achieve sustainable peace," C§3}k). 
21-02-02 §3a These are not easy times 
b A rasping cry is heard from some quarters 
The "rasping cry" of §3b stands out because of its particularly emotive adjective and noun 
combination, and their apparent incompatibility, since "rasping" might apply to a low, weary, 
gravely kind of voice, almost a whisper, while a "cry" pertains more to sudden, loud shouts or 
screams of grief or pain. "Rasping" can also have sinister connotations, which could discredit 
the message of the QVvner of this voice, but because its "some quarters" source is contained by 
the 'we' pronoun, they are not external, and their message can only be one of dissent, 
dissatisfaction, or pain caused by external agents. It may be that the intention here is to 
convey a sense of suffering over time: what was once a spontaneous shriek has hoarsened 
through repetition and fatigue into a rasp. It is difficult to ascertain precisely what is meant 
because, interestingly, we are not told what is being said by the rasping cry. Later in the 
speech Sharon refers to other nameless voices, but each time he allows the nature of what 
they are saying (or what he says they are saying) to act in their judgement, for example when 
he speaks of "expressions of disobedience," (§8i) and "those who are talking about a collapse, 
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despair and loss of hope," (§27a-b). The only message that might possibly be attributed to the 
rasping cry comes three stanzas later, in the form of a refutation from Sharon: "[tJhe State of 
Israel is not collapsing and will not collapse," (§6a-b) but the connection is far from clear. 
In any case, according to the logic of this stanza, "rasping" is defined as the opposite of 
remaining "calm, reasonable and restrained," and is therefore undesirable, although Sharon 
seems to express some degree of sympathy for its cause. It is tempting to conclude that the 
phrase has been included more for its evocative atmospheric qualities than for its precise 
semantic meaning. 
21-()2-02 ~:{(' in these days when wc mllst -
d more than ever -
e remain calm, reasonable and restrained 
f When it comes to matters of war and peace, 
g we must not act rashly 
h There is a time for everything -
not too late and not too early 
Within the context of these highly emotional premises and the general atmosphere of pain 
(posited, of course, by the speaker himself), he takes the chance to re-order the emotional 
disarray, with his ostensibly un-emotional advice becoming the central theme of the stanza. 
Even here there is room for emotional manipulation. The assertion "we must remain calm, 
reasonable and restrained," (§3c-e), is interrupted by the phrase "more than ever" C§3d), 
which alerts us to the fact that level-headedness is probably more difficult than ever as the 
situation is now worse than ever. Also implied is the judgement that 'we' have always been 
"calm, reasonable and restrained" (since we must "remain" so). Other intensifiers include the 
presentation of this stanza as slow and deliberative, through the repetition and drawing out 
of its central point with tautology: "there is a time for everything - not too late and not too 
early," (§3h-i). All in all, the stanza resembles in its patterning the kind of slow, calm advice 
that might be given to someone on the edge of hysteria, which of course implies that there 
might be cause for hysteria. If the listener was not emotional before, he or she might very 
well by now be wondering why on earth not. 198 
3.5. The Policy Narrated 
3.5.1. Operation Defensive Shield 
So thoroughly constructed is the spectre of the Palestinians' terrorist intent that when we are 
told, on 8 April 2002, that "the government of Israel has thus decided to instruct the IDF and 
other security forces to embark on Operation Defensive Shield," (§23a-c), and "IDF soldiers 
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and officers have been given clear orders: to enter cities and \illages which have become 
havens for terrorists; to catch and arrest terrorists and, primarily, their dispatchers and those 
who finance and support them," (§24a-d), as well as to "dismantle" the "infrastructure of 
terrorism" (§15a and §56m) it seems almost churlish, as if we are somehow missing the point, 
to mention that these same cities and villages are home to several million innocent people. 
The opening weeks of 'Operation Defensive Shield', according to internal and external 
commentators,199 took the form of the most intense military assault on the Occupied 
Territories since the 1967 war, and in dismantling the "infrastructure of terrorism," the IDF 
managed to comprehensh'ely dismantle the ci\'ilian infrastructure, destroying ... vater and 
electricity net\\orks, dri\'ing tanks over cars and traffic lights, through shop \vindows and 
ancient stone walls, ransacking government ministries, schools, offices, cultural institutes, 
hospitals, television and radio stations and even supermarkets, shelling all of t1)e above, 
destroying or confiscating computer hard drives and files that had been compiled by both 
Palestinian ministries and civil society organisations, taking O\'er the airwaves of the stations 
whose transmitters had not been destroyed to broadcast pornographic films, ... -vith mdespread 
defecating on walls, floors and office equipment for good measure,200 In the meantime, 
millions of Palestinians were held under such intense curfe'w, many for several week" on end, 
that people were reduced to drinking poisonous urine to stay alive, while unable to reach the 
dead and injured outside their mndows. In some cases, where people were killed inside their 
homes as a result of indiscriminate shelling and shooting, their families were not permitted 
to take the decomposing bodies outside to bury them until at least ten days later.201 
In the following section we move to Jenin refugee camp, one of the main stages for the 
performance scripted and stage-directed by Operation Defensive Shield, ,vhose justificational 
policy narratives are by now familiar. To 'set the scene' for the narrative analysis of Moshe 
Nissim that follows in section 4, I mIl refer to contemporary news reports and media 
coverage, as well as to the reports of Amnesty International and the IDF. 
3·5·2. J enin Refugee Camp 
"Inside that camp it's a hornet's nest of potential suicide bombers. "~()~ 
A41: Containing Emotions, which discusses Sharon 08-04-02. 
''lq See writings by Edward Said (eg Thinking ahead, 5 April 2002, http://I\\\:'-I.h'jcI\5,COI1l) and others, including 
Israeli journalists such as Amira Hass and Uri Avnery, and a great many of the communications from 
international acti\'ists ilnd Palestinian residents of the WBGS at the time. See also Annex BI12, p A76: Tzaporah 
Ryter's Eyewitness Report/rom Ral7lal/al!, 2 April 2002. 
200 See Annex B113, p A79: All Overview of Operation De/ensive Shield. It is interesting to consider the soldiers' 
more scatological offerings in light of the abuse photographs recently emerging from occupied Iraq. 
See Annex B18. p A6:3= Ran HaCohen, In Times of War Crimes: The Banality of Et,i1. April 192002. 
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During the Israel Defence Force's controversial 4-15 April 2002 operation in .lenin refugee 
camp, the ramshackle camp was comprehensively sealed and 
... the IDF denied access to Jenin refugee camp to all, including medical doctors and nurses, 
ambulances, humanitarian relief services, human rights organisations, and journalists. 
Amnesty International and other organisations tried to get information by the only means that 
seemed possible: constantly telephoning residents under curfew.20:1 
These telephone calls, some of which were later published by Amnesty and other NGOs, 
reported scenes of brutality and destruction including: heavy IDF fire prohibiting people 
from reaching the dead and injured in the streets, the use of Palestinian civilians as 'human 
shields', mass arrests, group executions,co4 and, after 11 April, the bulldozing of houses with 
people still inside. ;\ccOl'ding to one testimony, "some bodies are bmied under the rubble, 
others crushed by tanks, and the rest are left lying in the streets."205 
By 9 April, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz newspaper was reporting that "100 Palestinians have 
already been killed in fighting with IDF forces," and that Israeli Foreign Minster Shimon 
Peres (among others) was "referring to the battle as a 'massacre. '''206 The same report 
speculated on the army's reasons for forbidding access to the camp, citing an anonymous IDF 
source: "When the 'world sees the pictures of what we have done there, it vvill do us immense 
damage." The Palestinian Authority, for its part, announced on 15 April that "more than 600 
people have been killed [in .lenin],"207 but this claim was later \vithdrawn as false. Amid the 
horror, there was some faint optimism among the Palestinians that 'the world' would no 
longer be able to ignore the situation, and indeed, Israel was already facing a barrage of 
difficult questions from the international community. 
However, the hubbub quickly died down. The IDF published its own report in response to 
that of Amnesty International, claiming that "the Palestinians [had] tried to weave a net of 
lies regarding Jenin - including allegations of a massacre and the prevention of humanitarian 
aid, and even went so far as to stage fictional funerals''208 for the sake of international 
sympathy. As the Israeli establishment attempted to dmw the focus outwards from the 
individual deaths and suffering its army had caused, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
published aerial photographs highlighting the section that had been razed, whose dimensions 
direction of .Jenin refugee camp. BBC World News, 10 April 2002. 
20:1 Amnesty International, 4 November 2002. 
"q 'Hamid': "But the most terrible thing was seeing Israeli soldiers take eight men and line them up and kill 
them." Oi Giovanni, 9 April 2002 
2ns Amnestv International. 4 November 2002. 
206 Benn a~d Harel, 9 April 2002 
2()~ Palestinian president Yasser Arafat, interview with Fox TV network, 15 April 2002. Cited in IOF report, 
November 2002. See Annex BI14, p A84: IDF Response to A III Ilesty Report all Jellin. 
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described by the caption as "100m x 100m" look relatively small within the distant 
physical relief we understand to be the refugee camp. We '.\Iill note later that Moshe Nissim 
has received and absorbed this information ("I didn't mind seeing the hundred by hundred 
we've flattened ... "2(9), although in fact these dimensions are contested by journalists and 
relief workers who later visited the scene. 210 The 'official' figure cited by the IDF for 
Palestinians dead stands at 52 - somehow presented as a small amount of death, and 
justified by the claim that "the majority of [them] were terrorist activists who actively 
participated in the battle against the IDF"211 with 23 Israeli soldiers. 
As with other such incursions into densely-packed civilian areas, Israel compared its methods 
favourably to those employed by other countries in \\'ar. GO\'crnmcnt spoke~lllan Danny 
Seaman explained that, "One of the reasons we had these casualties [the 13 Israeli soldiers 
who were ambushed and killed during their incursion in Jenin camp] is that unlilse the US 
and the UK we don't bomb first to clear the ground."212 As we have recurrently noted, 
negatives evoke their opposite, so with Seaman's "unlike", he is implicitly comparing Israel 
with the US and the UK - perceived throughout the world, rightly or wrongly, as the two 
most 'powerful' nations (largely due to the wars they wage and win, their colonising 
influence, and their alliance). The Israeli army, it is therefore implied, is equally powerful as 
those of the US and UK, but more humane. It does not kill indiscriminately. Like Sharon, 
Seaman implicitly raises the stakes of the conflict through presupposition it has become a 
'war', where tactics such as "bombing first to clear the ground" take place and are potentially 
justifiable. 
According to the IDF, "the fighting III Jenin" (referred to as "the capital of suicide 
bombers"213) , 
should be perceived in its vI/idest context, as part of Israel's ongoing struggle against the 
Palestinian campaign of terror. These terrorist organisations are connected to international 
terrorist organisations that threaten world'wide peace and security.~q 
Almost imperceptibly the prevailing narrative shifted2 !'j: plans for a UN fact-fInding mission 
were dropped, there was no official independent investigation, and although the IDF 
"0<) Moshe Nissim, §62f-g, See Annex P2, pp A25-A34, 
,:10 See Annex Bll, p A43: alice IIpon (l time ill Jellill. by Huggler and Reeves, 25 April 2002. 
"Ii Military spokesman Captain Jacob Dallal, 25-04-02, cited in Lancaster, 26 April 2002. 
Danny Seaman, director ofIsrael's Government Press Office, interviewed on BBC World news, 9 April 2002. 
"Jenin was the 'capitnl of suicide bombers', in which a terror infrastructure - unprecedented in scope-
perpetrated a large number of terror attacks." - IDF, 11/02. See Annex B114, p A84: lDF Response to Anl1lesty 
Report on Jenill. 
"H IDF report, November 2002, Introduction, See Annex B1l4, p A84: lDF Response to Amnesty Report on Jenill. 
CI'> For a contemporary news report from the time of this shift, outlining its rationale, see Annex EllS, p A86: 
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conducted a 'cleaning-up' campaign before re-opening the camp (amid Palestinian claims 
that dead bodies were being surreptitiously driven away in trucks), residents were given no 
heavy machinery to facilitate their search under the rubble - some of which had once stood 
several storeys tall - for missing people. Because there were no 'unbiased observers', there is 
deep uncertainty to this day over what 'really' happened in Jenin - exactly how many died, 
whether what took place constituted a 'massacre',216 and whether the IDF behaved in 
contravention of international legality. According to Uri Avnery in Ha'aretz, "there is full 
agreement between all those who were in the Jenin refugee camp on only one thing. A week 
after the end of the fighting, foreign journalists and IDF soldiers, UN representatives and 
hired hacks in the Israeli media, members of the welfare organisations and government 
propagandists all report that a terrible stench of decomposing bodies lingers everywhere."217 
3·5·3· Narrative Images: A matter of perspective 
Enlargement of Jenin refugee camp and combat 
zone on April 13. 2002. after the battle. 
15-04-02 Palestinian women sift through the rubble in 






(AP Photo: Jerome Delay) 
Fig. 3.5.3. Two images of Jenin refugee camp after the incursion. 
Figure 3.5.3. above contrasts two separate visual representations of the aftermath of the April 
2002 events at Jenin refugee camp. The image on the left side is the one referred to above, 
taken from a section devoted to "the battle in J enin" on the website of the Israeli Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs,218 while the image on the right is one of countless news agency photographs 
taken from the ground by journalists once the camp had been reopened to the public by the 
IDF, captioned as it appears on the Associated Press website. These images can be seen as 
representative samples of two genres: the first being part of a 'justificational narrative' in the 
form of an official response to widespread criticism and concern over the IDF's actions, and 
216 It is commonly accepted today by journalists and NGOs that it did not. However, the Palestinians disagree, 
asking how the invasion of a refugee camp and the killing of 52-56 people there can be termed anything but a 
massacre. 
217 Avnery, 20 April 2002 
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the second taken by neither an Israeli nor a Palestinian photographer and as such presenting 
the assumed objectivity of news reportage. Together they provide a strong, but not polarised, 
contrast of two perspectives from which narratives on Jenin can be framed, illustrating the 
breadth of the divide behveen Israeli military discourse and the emotional and physical 
reality experienced by Palestinians. 
In the discussion on representation and interaction in their work entitled Reading Images: 
The Grammar of Visual Design,219 Kress and Van Leeuwen outline the resources of visual 
communication for constituting the interaction between the producer and the viewer of an 
image. They begin by defining t\\'o types of participants: the 'represented participants', who 
are "the people, the places and things depicted in images," and the 'interactiYe participants', 
who are "the people who communicate with each other through images, the producers and 
viewers of images," in other words, the "real people who produce and make sense 9f images 
in the context of social institutions." The authors then define the possible relations between 
these participants as follows: "1) relations between represented participants; 2) relations 
between interactive and represented participants [ ... J and 3) relations between interactive 
participants."22o Of course this third category of relation, in the context of published and 
widely circulated images such as these, and particularly in the day of the internet, is rarely 
direct. When we are presented with an image through the mass media, we do not meet the 
photographer or the editor who has selected and may have framed, resized and cropped it. 
Similarly, the producers also do not know us, the viewers; we are necessarily an 'idealised' 
audience, expected to 'make sense' of the images before us in a predictable manner. As such, 
the producer and viewer cannot know each other's intentions or reactions, they can only 
interpret them, and the viewer's interpretation of the producer's intentions must often be 
based only on an interpretation of the image itself. 
Neither of the 1\"'0 images displayed above is, strictly speaking, what Kress and Van Leeuwen 
would describe as a 'demand' picture, since neither of them contains represented participants 
who look directly at the vie\ver or somehow engage us (Kress and Van Leeuwen offer the 
example of the 1914 'Your Country Needs You!' British army recruitment campaign poster as 
an archetypal 'demand' picture - not only does the depicted officer look directly 'into our 
eyes', he also engages us by pointing at the vie\\'er, to whom he is depicted as being probably 
close enough to touch). 
The IDF image contains no human participants, or rather, it contains many thousands of 
"lq Kress and nm Leeuwen. 1996. 
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them but none close enough for the viewer to see. It is categorically an 'offer' picture, 
technical and non personally-engaging, whose purpose is to provide 
information from a purely military perspective, as emphasised by the 
surrounding text. The extreme long distance creates an "invisible 
barrier between the viewer and the object," which is there "for our 
contemplation only," and in fact, the relationship between 'we' interactive participants - the 
concerned viewers and the IDF producers - is enhanced by our shared distance from the 
(un)represented human participants, who lie so far below as to appear absent or irrelevant, 
avoiding any chance of emotional response or human interaction with them. Even the houses 
are so far away as to seem like little other than physical relief; they are certainly 
indistinguishable as people's homes. Although the photograph represents a place where tens 
of thousands of people live their daily lives, at this level of detachment it is simply a map; a 
very abstract representation of geographical space. 
This perspective is further enhanced by the surrounding text which, in military technicality, 
draws our attention to the levelled area by encircling and labelling it the 'combat zone', 
justifying the military action and rendering it 'proportionate': only a relatively small section 
of the refugee camp has been damaged, says this picture, and from that section is deleted all 
evidence of human existence. The bracketed dimensions, along with the "1000 meters (2/3 
mile)" caption below, demonstrate that things are not so bad as we might have thought; the 
levelled area seems tiny from all the way up here and we might even suspect the IDF and the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs to have overstated its size (it looks like less than a tenth of the 
overall depicted area). 
Returning to the issue of the viewer's relationship with the producer, which in this case is 
fortified at the expense of the (un)portrayed people far below, it is perhaps worth noting in 
passing that this image was clearly taken at night with the aid of 'flares' to illuminate the 
scene. From the ground it is all but impossible to tell the difference between an aircraft that 
drones overhead simply for the purpose of taking pictures and one that is about to launch a 
missile, and since Jenin refugee camp was subjected to intensive shelling as well as other 
forms of assault, the photograph that here is presented to reassure us viewers is likely to have 
caused, in the moments of its production, as much anxiety to the people below as any 
potential bomb. 
As for the second picture, it could perhaps be argued that we are invited 
to feel sympathy for the two Palestinian women searching in the rubble 











Ariel Sharon's Policy Narratives 
come from the women themselves, who are thoroughly absorbed in their task and whose 
faces are wholly or partially obscured. This too is an 'offer' picture; although its represented 
human participants are themselves the object, they do not engage us either by demand or by 
close distance. The woman closest to us is at 'far social distance' (according to Edward Hall, 
"this distance has a more formal and impersonal character than in the close phase,"221) while 
the second woman, whose face we cannot see, stoops at 'public distance' (the distance 
between her and us is "the distance between people who are strangers."222) 
Although this image is 'humanised', we are not invited by its producers to identify too closely 
with the represented participants they too are there simply for our ObSelYation, and any 
sympathy the ObSelyer may feel is not llue to the manner in which they are presented but 
through the implications of their activity (and, perhaps, now that I have joined the chain of 
'interactive participants' by selecting the picture for inclusion here, the stark contrast with 
the utter impersonality of the IDF picture beside it). Can we imagine ourselves rummaging in 
the ruins of our own homes? Most of 'us' who \\ill see this picture are clearly not expected to 
be able to do so. Neither woman is directly facing the viewer: they are both represented at 
what Kress and Van Leeuwen describe as an 'oblique point of view', which is described as 
saying "'what you see here is not part of our world; it is their world, something we are not 
involved ""ith."'22a Again, the viewers are being addressed as 'uninvolved,' a function perhaps 
of the ostensibly 'objective' stance taken by news reportage. Although this picture shows 
'more' than the other one, and would usually be seen as 'sympathetic to the Palestinians', it 
too is part of a narrative that makes no reference to an insider's vie\"rpoint, and is therefore 
silent about the lived experience of real people. 
The narrative analysed in the following section is delivered from a very similar perspective to 
that of the IDF photograph discussed above. There are no (or hardly any) Palestinian people 
present in the narrative of Moshe Nissim, the driver of a D-9 bulldozer that flattened the 
Hawamish district of Jenin camp. 
221 Edward Hall, The Hidden Dilllension, 1966, cited in Kress and van Leeuwen. 1996, P13L 
222 Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996, P13L 
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4. Narrative of Personal Experience: Moshe Nissim 
His sense of purpose clarified and grew until he was veritably a man who, like so many 
before him, would know no peace until he had drowned evil in its own blood.224 
The narrative of personal experience to be analysed in this section is that of Moshe Nissim, a 
reserve soldier in his early forties recruited for the latter part of the IDF's operation in Jenin 
to operate a 'D-9L'; a heavy armoured bulldozer employed by the army for its demolition 
work in Jenin and elsewhere.225 Moshe's narrative, elicited in an interview by Tsadok 
Yeheskeli, provides the backbone of an article that appeared in the Israeli Yediot Aharonot 
newspaper on 31 May 2002, under the title I Created For Them a Teddy Stadium in the 
Middle of the Camp.226 The 'Teddy Stadium' is the main Jerusalem stadium for sporting 
events, and as we shall see it is also an important narrative theme for the "man who knows no 
fear," (§23e). 
Fig. 4: "I left them with a football stadium, so they can play." Reuters picture. 
Because the article first appeared in Hebrew, a detail of translation worth mentioning at the 
outset is a slight confusion with tense correlation. Since Hebrew, like Arabic, does not 
operate as many past tenses as English, even the most skilled translators sometimes fall into 
the trap of translating 'one degree closer to the present', for example producing a present 
perfect ('I have done') where a simple past ('I did') is required. Hence, where the text says, 
"What haven't 1 done for them to take me?", Moshe's meaning, as is clear from the context, 
224 De Bernieres, 1998. P334. 
225 According to BBe News Online UK Edition, 25 January 2004, the UN reports that since October 2000, more 
than 14,000 people in the Gaza Strip alone have lost homes to Israeli bulldozers, almost 10,000 of whom are in 
Rafah. UN Warns Over Israeli Demolitions, htt~: flnews.bbc.co.ukll/hi/world/middle east/3428S17.stm. 
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should be interpreted as 'What didn't I do [to get] them to take me?' 
§17e What haven't I done for them to take me? 
f I sent the guys to twist the battalion commander's arm, 
g I phoned the company commander, 
h 1 drove them mad 
i "I promise to work," 1 pleaded with the battalion commander. 
Similarly, we also find verbs mistranslated into the present tense instead of the present 
perfect. For example, "I cannot go to the Beitar matches for half a year now" would seem to 
imply that he will be unable to go for the next half a year, but Moshe means that he has been 
unable to go for the past half a year, as we infer from the description that follows: 
§27g I cannot go to the Beitar matches for half a year now 
h The suspense kills me, 
i and I am constantly afraid of getting a heart attack 
j Sometimes, I can walk around 'Teddy' 
k with a ticket in my hand, 
I and I can't go in. 
Although these tense inaccuracies are easily unravelled \vith reference to their context, there 
are enough of them in the text to warn against applying models for ergative and transitivity 
analysis of verbs, such as that provided by Simpson. However, these and other translation 
pitfalls do not obscure Moshe's narrative direction, and nor do they prevent us from 
examining other narrative aspects such as repetition, ellipsis, metaphor, 'sourced' opinions 
and so on. Martin and Rose's advice on 'appraisal' analysis prompts consideration of "the 
kinds of attitudes that are negotiated in a text, the strength of the feelings involved and the 
ways in which values are sourced,":.!:.!7 because "[aJppraisal is to rhetoric as conjunction is to 
logic it unfolds dynamically to engage us, to get us on side, through a spectrum of 
manoeuvres that work themselves out phase by phase."22il 
4.1. Overview 
Before examining Moshe's attitudinal indications, it is worth making some more general 
observations about the narrative in its entirety. According to Ochs and Capps, "All narrative 
exhibits tension between the desire to construct an over-arching storyline that ties events 
together in a seamless explanatory framework and the desire to capture the complexity of the 
events experienced.":.!29 In Moshe's narrative, particularly if we assume it to be 'about' Jenin, 
this tension is so great that neither an over-arching storyline nor the complexity of the events 
experienced seems adequately achieved, with the result that there is nothing to help us 
2"- Martin and Rose. September 2001. P25. 
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"experience [the situation] alongside the protagonists."2:JO 
Whatever the explanatory framework that justifies armed combat and motivates soldiers, it 
must surely be overtaken in the moment of combat by other less intellectual urges related, for 
example, to power, fear and survival. To express the complexity of events such as these, 
words are truly inadequate tools: no quality or quantity of verbal description can hope to 
capture the sensory reality surrounding the cognition, for example, that 'there is shooting all 
around me.' Furthermore, if we permit a moment of imaginative empathy for Moshe, we 
might see that very little detail is likely to filter through the roar of falling buildings and the 
exhilaration of c(}using them to fall, fuL'llcd for three days as he was only by '\d1isky and 
something to munch on," (§42i), but en~n the falling buildings themselves are only t1eetingly 
mentioned. If he is "avoiding facets of a situation that don't make sense within the prevailing 
storyline,"2~1 these facets are many, particularly when he finally reaches the requested (or 
'core') narrative of ' in Jenin' itself. 2 32 
The "complexity"2:l:l expressed all takes the form of detailed, repeated evaluation of Moshe's 
own mindset, emotions and character. To adapt Ochs and Capps, another point of tension in 
this narrative is its subject matter. If we adapt our expectations and realise that the narrative 
is actually 'about' Moshe himself, rather than Jenin, we can find an overarching storyline 
(Moshe is victim-turned-hero) and complexity (Moshe is fearless and altruistic, but 
misunderstood, so his 'fearlessness' is sometimes perceived as 'madness', etc). Although this 
is not meant to be a politically persuasive speech, it does seek to elicit approval or admiration 
for his actions, and he attempts, with occasional nods towards, for example, "the pictures on 
the television," (§ssa), to pin his narrative onto a 'socially acceptable' framework, widely 
available from the sort of propaganda I discuss elsewhere in this thesis: Moshe can be victim-
turned-hero (turned indestructible war machine) in perfect harmony with the doctrines of 
Ariel Sharon et al ("If there is a national lesson ... the lesson is that... in matters regarding our 
security, Israel's strength must be ready and able at all times ... in fighting spirit and 
equipment alike, as if the next war was around the corner"2:l4), whose discourse would have 
this progression at the heart of Israeli national identity. 
Moshe's narrative is full of contradictions. Although he opens 'with the words, "I entered 
O"q Ochs and Capps, 2001, P4. 
0:10 Ochs and Capps, 2001, P4. 
"11 Ochs and Capps, 2001, P4. 
2j2 There is an interesting parallel here between Moshe's depiction of Jenin and that of the IDF photograph 
discussed above - both narratives delete all evidence of human existence within a physical space. 
"11 Ochs and Capps, 2001, P4. 
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Jenin driven by madness, by desperation," (§la-c), he later explicitly denies that his own 
problems had influenced his work in Jenin: "The moment I drove the tractor into the camp ... 
all the desperation caused by my personal condition just vanished at once," (§32a-c). The 
point is reiterated in §42f-h: "For 75 hours I didn't think about my life at home, about all the 
problems. Everything was erased." By applying the negative aspect to contrast what 'really 
happened' with what 'might have been expected',:!:ls Moshe inadvertently gives credence to the 
very possibility that he seeks to deny: that his 'personal condition' was the main motivating 
force behind his desire to do "a good job operating the tractor," (§s6i), and to "get as many 
houses as possible," (§47m-n). Concluding the theme in §S3a-b, Moshe emphasises "I had 
lots of satisfaction in .lenin, lots of satisfactioll. It \\'as like getting all thc 18 years of doing 
nothing into three days." In spite of these assertions and expectations, a later comment to his 
interviewer explicitly merges the 'Disasters' and 'Jenin' themes to end the overall narrative, 
like so many of its threads, in disappointment instead of triumph: "Jenin ... helped me forget 
my troubles. I had hoped it would be some turning point, until this [his son's illness] hit 
"230 me. 
Similarly, this narrative contains many different manifestations of fear (primarily felt, 
according to Moshe, by the other people around him). They appear alongside such elaborate 
protestations of his own fearlessness that it is worth examining the text for rebel 
manifestations of his own fear and insecurity. In brief, Moshe's narrative contains strong 
indications that he may be afraid of the judgement of others, of inadequacy, of failure, and 
even of life itself. These fears, although ostensibly unlike those sought in the 'ideal audiences' 
of Ariel Sharon (fear of terrorism and of existential threat), are nonetheless a powerful 
motivational force behind the bulldozer driver's self-expression in Jenin. Sharon's discourse 
explains how to respond to fear - by taking up arms and becoming invincible - and this 
'acceptable reaction' framework allows Moshe to "sanction [his] social practices through 
reference to collective interests and systems of values."237 In short, it will be argued that 
Sharon's discourse provides the script, and the IDF mission in Jenin provides the stage, for 
Moshe Nissim to externalise his demons and wreak havoc on the Palestinian reality. 
4·1.1. Structuralovennew 
Breaking the text into stanzas and lines (as explained in section 2.1. above) highlights the 
relative proportions of 'In Jenin' and 'Not in Jenin' narrative it contains. Immediately 
apparent from a structural overview, represented in Fig. 4.1.1. below, is that the core 
210 Labov's "violation of an expected rule of behaviour." Labov, 1972, PP370-1 
230 This quote is attributed to Moshe by Yeheskeli. 31 May '02, but not included in the interview transcript. 
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narrative - 'what happened in Jenin' - can only really be said to 'begin' after 34 stanzas (of a 
total of 62). Moshe creates, with varying degrees of commitment, no less than nine possible 
entry-points to the core '.Jenin' narrative (§la; §22a; §23a; §2sa; §28a-b; §32a; §33a; §34a), 
but each time immediately retreats to the realm of background information, usually with a 
sub-narrative explaining his psychological state or reinforcing an aspect of his self-evaluation 
(such as §28c-e, which underlines previous assertions about his defiance in the face of 
authority). In Fig. 4.1.1., potential entry points to the core "Jenin' narrative are denoted '.J-'. 
Fig. 4.1.1: Moshe in Jenin - Narrathc Structure (linear) 
Moshe begins the narrative with an n-stanza 'recount' ("designed to chronicle and evaluate 
the significance of events"238) of the catalogue of disasters that have contributed to his 
"desperation"; "for two years it is just one blow after another," (§na), ending with the 
realisation that he has not been called for reserve service along vvith "the guys," (§ni). Two 
more illustrative diversions (,Military Service' and 'Versailles') demonstrate that, according to 
Moshe, his negative evaluation by his commanders was based only on the side of his 
character he had so far chosen to show them, "Truth is, I understood my commanders. Hey, 
I've been doing my reserves duty for 16 years now, and I was useless. I did nothing but make 
trouble," (§12a-c), but the other "truth is," that "they didn't even know me," (§lsa). 
'Convincing Them' outlines the effort he applied to gain their acceptance, and 'Driving 
Lesson' shows us that Moshe does indeed learn fast when he applies himself. By §22, he 
seems to have been armed with enough positive self-appraisal to enter the bulldozer and 
begin his work, but although it is located in Jenin, this stanza turns out to be another false 
start, again to illustrate how quickly he can learn: 
§22a This is what happened in .Jenin as well 
b I have never demolished a house before, 
c or even a wall 
d I got into the D-9 with a friend of mine, 
e a Yemenite 
f I let him work for an hour, 
g and then told him, 
h ·OK. I got the idea.' 
Moshe interrupts this thread with the words, "but the real thing started the day that 13 of our 
soldiers were killed up that alley in the Jenin refugee camp," (§23a-c, emphasis added). 
Although the IDF had already bulldozed several houses by then, it was indeed in response to 
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plaza of rubble in the centre of the camp, a crossroads for the Israeli tanks."2:l9 However it 
seems that for this narrator the "real thing" is not what we might anticipate (either the 
beginning of the core narrative 'action' or a sub-narrative about the thirteen soldiers), but 
instead an elaborate projection of the other soldiers' reactions to him ("When they brought us 
in, I knew that nobody wanted to work with me," etc, §24), followed by a short sub-narrative 
to illustrate the extent of his fearlessness (and to position himself firmly within a framework 
of fear): 
§24a When they brought us in, 
b I knew that nobody wanted to work \\"ith me 
e They were afraid to be with Ill~ Oil th~ tractor 
d Not only did I have a reputatl()Il of a troublemaker. 
e but also of a man who knows no fear, 
f and they were right about that 
g I really have no fear 
h They knew I had no fear, 
i that I don't give a damn, 
j and that I can go anywhere, 
k without asking questions, 
I without an escort of tanks or APC's or anything 
m Once, in Jenin, 
n I left the tank that escorted us everywhere ... 
In §2sa we again enter the camp, but only for long enough to see Moshe tying his football 
team's flag to the bulldozer, having "told the family and the kids: 'you will see my tractor on 
television. When you see the Beitar flag that will be me,'" (§2Si-k), as if to illustrate his desire 
for 'positi\"e' recognition, before departing immediately on the 'Beitar' sub-narrative, which 
outlines his obsession with that football club ("Beitar is a kink in my brain," §27a) and reveals 
a great many personal motivations in the process. It is only in §32 - after yet another 
informative little sub-narrative, this time about his chosen 'nom de guerre' - that we are 
finally enveloped in the requested narrative. Even now Moshe makes three more consecutive 
false starts before beginning the narrative action, returning i'mmediately to his own mind 
after the introductory clauses of each new stanza: 
Action: Entering the camp 
Reaction: 'Going mad' 




§32a The moment I drove the tractor into the camp, 
b Something switched in my head 
c I went mad 
d All the desperation caused by my personal condition 
e just vanished at once 
f All that remained was the anger 
g over what had happened to our guys 
h Till now I am cominced, 
i and so are the rest of us, 
j that if we were let into the camp earlier, 
k with all our might. 
"38 Martin and Rose, September 2001, p2S. 










Action: Entering the camp 
Reaction: Thinking 
Evaluating soldiers 
(and self, by juxtaposition) 
Projecting experience 
Action: Givenfirst mission 
Reaction: Evaluating 
COT'e narrative action begins 
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Twenty-four soldiers would not have been killed in this camp. 
§33a The moment I went into the camp for the first time, 
b I just thought of how to help these soldiers 
c These fighters 
d Children the age of my son 
e I couldn't grasp how they worked there, 
f where a charge blows up on you with every step you take. 
§34a With the first mission I was given, 
b to open a track inside the camp, 
c I understood what kind of hell this was. 
§3sa My first mission, voluntarily, 
b was to bring the soldiers food 
c I was told: 
d The only way to get food in there is with the D-9' 
e They haven't eaten in two days 
f You couldn't poke your nose out 
g I filled the tractor till the roof, 
h and drove the tractor right up to the door of their post,. 
so that they would not have to take 
] even one step outside their shelter 
k One step was enough in order to lose an arm or a leg. 
The 'narrative clauses' of §35, vvith something of a progression of time and action, indicate 
that we have finally embarked upon the core narrative, and now that we have entered we 
remain in Jenin until Moshe reaches its coda in §6o-62. As such, stanzas §32-§35 can be 
seen, loosely, as the structural 'dividing line' between two discrete sections of this narrative; 
'Before Jenin' and 'In Jenin', which differ not only in focus but substantially in character. In 
'Before Jenin' Moshe takes care to fill in what he seems to perceive as necessary background 
information for our favourable judgement of him, before we embark on the hazy, 
structureless account of the three days 'In Jenin', with its absence of descriptive detail and 
specific temporal markers. 
4·1.2. Sub-narratives 
Fig. 4.1.2. provides another structural representation of Moshe's narrative, with the Jenin 
section at the core. Each main sub-plot (as delineated in Fig. 4.1.1.) is represented by another 
ring, whose width is proportional to the number of stanzas that form it. In this way we can 
see at a glance the number and length of obstacles placed by the narrator on the path to 
Jenin. 
After 'Disasters', the longest diversion is the 'Beitar' sub-narrative (§25-§30), ostensibly 
inserted to explain "why the Beitar [football team's] t1ag was on the bulldozer in Jenin," 
(§28a-b). Moshe periodically uses the 'football stadium' metaphor to summarise his 
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here. Don't you worry"', (§29h-i); "By the end, I built the Teddy' football stadium there," 
Fig. 4.1.2: Moshe's Narrative Structure (circular) 
(§44m); and "As far as I am concerned, I left 
them with a football stadium, so they can play," 
(§62g-i). This contrivance may in part have 
developed from external sources. For instance, if 
he has often retold the story in the month 
between the events and this account, the flag on 
his "tractor" may have elicited admiration or 
some other desired response and so the theme 
might subsequently h~l\'e been developed. The 
bulldozed area of .Tenin was frequently refcrred 
to in the ensuing media reports as "the size of a 
large football field,"24 0 which may aJso have 
contributed to developing the metaphor. 
Whatever its roots, the 'Beitar' sub-narrative is as important to our analysis as it is to Moshe's 
story, but for different reasons. It neatly but presumably unintentionally - mirrors the 
structure of the overarching narrative. If we refer to Fig. 4.1.2. above, we see a structural 
representation of Moshe circling around his core narrative, so often unable to find entry. In 
this, the 27th stanza of preamble to entering Jenin, he informs us of a similar difficulty he has 
entering the real football stadium: "The suspense kills me, and I am constantly afraid of 
getting a heart attack. Sometimes, I can walk around 'Teddy' \\'ith a ticket in my hand, and I 
can't go in," (§27i-j). With his insistence on the 'football stadium' metaphor to describe his 
actions there, Moshe indirectly associates Jenin with the fear and vulnerability represented 
by the Beitar matches. With his reluctance to enter either the real or the metaphorical 
stadium, we are tempted to see the football stadium metaphor as having been created from 
memories that he cannot face. As if aware of the potential for exposure, he presents his fear 
in contrastive juxtaposition ("In .Jenin, I was not scared for a moment, but I cannot go to the 
Beitar matches for half a year now," §27e-f). Although he cannot access Beitar, what he can 
do, according to this narrative at least, is to recreate, from the homes of the Palestinian 
residents of Jenin, a Teddy where he may ride, brave and in\incible in a 0-9 bulldozer, 
straight into the middle, without fear and without failure. 
The effect of this Beitar sub-narrative, then, is to arm him for entry to the core narrative, and 
in fact he is almost there. The final sub-narrative is short, and located more or less in Jenin-
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will respond, follO\ved by an equally brief exemplum to illustrate: 
§30a On the radio, they wanted to call me 'Moshe-Bear', 
b but I insisted on Kurdi 
c I told the Golanis, "I am Kurdi, 
d and I won't answer if you call me by any other name," 
e That is how 'Kurdi Bear' was born.~~l 
f This is my name, 
g and I am stubborn. 
In the reserves, 
they already got used to my signature: 
c 'Moshe Nissim Beitar ,Jerusalem' 
cl For a while they asked me to stop it. 
but finally they just gcn'c up, e 
For Moshe, this is simply another example of his defiance in the face of authority (and of his 
'fearlessness'), similar to that of the earlier 'Military Senice' sub-narrative, where "Kurdi 
always did his thing," (§13n). But the issue of Moshe's identity is intriguing. We already 
suspect that although the narrative is intended to be 'about' Jenin, or his experience of it, its 
primary function is to present a (highly contrived) portrait of Moshe himself. Over and again, 
he indicates the wrongfulness of negative appraisals of his character ("This is a terrible 
injustice .. , bribery? Me?" §7a-e); in fact, of the identity that has been imposed upon him, 
particularly by his commanding officers and others in authority. Persuading them to enlist 
him for work was a matter of persuading them that they had misjudged him; they did not 
know the 'real' Moshe ("When I am given responsibility, I can act differently," §lSb-c). Here, 
in a final f1ourish, he is able to disburden himself entirely of the imposed identity, simply by 
refusing to answer to his allocated code name. The fact that his real name and his code name 
are both 'Moshe' also seems to indicate some discomfort with his own identity, as well as a 
similarity between his 'real' identity and that which is imposed on him by his superiors. For 
now, however, he has replaced an external label for himself "ith one of his own design, and 
within the narrative he is now fully empowered to enter Jenin. 
The lengthy prelude may have been compelled by Moshe's awareness that, as with the 
football matches, once inside he would lose control of his own excitement, and thereby the 
coherence of his "over-arching storyline. "~~2 Just as "an inten'ie\\', for example, may yield a 
tidy story that subsequently disintegrates,"24:l 'in Jenin' the elaborate control mechanism of 
the previous section fragments into contrived f1ippancy ("DiHicult? No way. You must be 
kidding," §4sa-c), contradiction ("I took the opportunity to bring down some more houses; 
,,~o See for example Paul Martin, Jell ill 'massacre' reduced to death toll of 56. The Washington Times, April 2002. 
2~' 'Kurdi' denotes someone of Kurdish origin; 'Bear' is the IDF code for its D-9 operators, 
"~,, Oehs and Capps, :2001, P4. 
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not because I wanted to ... " §46d-e, emphasis added), insubstantial justification ("it was all 
under orders," §47x), and eventually to unconcealed satisfaction ("1 found joy with every 
house that came down, because I knew they didn't mind dying, but they cared for their 
homes," §48k-m). 
From §Slg, Moshe tells of the Israeli army's order for the bulldozers to redeploy ("because the 
army didn't 'vant the cameras and press to see us working," §slk-l). Although chronologically 
this might naturally represent an ending, relatively little has actually been said, and there 
follulA four stanzas of analepsis and another four that end the story by reinforcing the 
message of his popularity and triumph at .renin ('T\'(~ in\itcJ thclll cdl fur Kubch at my place," 
~S6o), before he eventually reaches his three-stanza coda (~60-~62). :Vloshc's unwillingness 
to end the core narrative mirrors his earlier reluctance to begin it, as well another important 
textual theme - his reluctance to stop working when the time came: "I bitched the.m to give 
me more \\ork. 1 would tell them ... 'Why are you letting me rest? I want more work!''' (§S2a-
d). Emphasised by repetition, this theme is clearly important to Moshe in that it illustrates 
the characteristics for ,vhich it seems, according to this analysis of his narrative, that he 
would lik,' to be famed as selfless, brave and dedicated. "Even when we had a two-hour 
break," he t,c!lls us, "I insisted on going on," (§49b-c). The point is elaborated at length for the 
remainder of §S2: "All this time, I was really sick. I had fever. I got back from Jenin ''''iped 
out. Torn to bits. The next day, I went up again. One of the guys \vas ill, and I volunteered to 
help. I back there. The battalion-commander was in shock when he saw me. The other 
operators all cracked up and needed rest, but I refused to leave. I wanted more." (§S2e-o). 
4.2. Fear And Insecurity 
Moshe's desire for social acceptance and integration is a dominant, although sub-textual, 
theme. It can be argued with reference to this narrative that Moshe is (or perceives himself to 
be) highly socially disintegrated, and that he desires approval and positive evaluation above 
all. It is probably for this reason that he causes so many aspects of his self-evaluation to be 
reinforced through 'heteroglossia' ("where the source of an attitude is other than the 
narrator"2.J.J). Other characters' positive appraisals of Moshe are either direct or implied, 
attributed as direct speech (eg, "The soldiers came up to me and said: 'Kurdi, thanks a lot. 
Thanks a lot,'" §S3c), or to be inferred from their actions: "Reservists who went home on 
short leave came back with Beitar flags,just to imitate me," (§29b-d, emphasis added). Much 
ostensiblJ' 'external' appraisal whether positive or negative - is achieved through 
projection, without reference to specific speech or action from the other characters. 
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Interestingly, these projections are usually preceded by the verb 'to know', indicating that 
their findings are a matter of fact rather than of Moshe's own speculation: "I knew that 
nobody wanted to work lvvith me," (§24b). Even when his speech returns from the narrative 
action to explicitly address the listener, it does so to project a certain appraisal of himself 
onto the addressee: "I know it sounds crazy," (§26a), and "I knmv how this sounds," (§27m). 
4.2 •1• Sources of Attitudes 
Very little of what we are told about in Moshe's narrative takes place outside his own mind, 
and where other people do appear, they function only to illustrate an aspect of his self-
evaluation. For instance, we know there is a partner in the bulldozer with him ("I got the big 
D-9L, me and the Yemenite, my partner," §2sd-e). Although presumably sitting beside 
Moshe for the duration of his time in Jenin, this partner is mentioned only twice,245 each time 
to illustrate his fear in reaction (and contrast) to Moshe: "Gadi, the other operator who was 
with me, nearly fainted," (§24s-t), and "My partner screamed at me to reverse ... " (§soe-f). 
For a closer look at the roles of fear and of interpersonal appraisal (of Moshe by others, and 
of the others by Moshe) in Moshe's narrative, I shall return to stanza 24 vvith reference to 
Martin and Rose's model for appraisal analysis: 
§24a When they brought us in, 
b I knew that nobody wanted to work with me 
c They were afraid to be with me on the tractor 
d Not only did I have a reputation of a troublemaker, 
e but also of a man who knows no fear, 
f and they were right about that 
g I really have no fear. 
At the beginning of the stanza, he indicates awareness that "nobody wanted to work Vvith 
me," (§24b), which constitutes a projection of affect, or Moshe's assessment of the feelings of 
others, presented as negative personal judgement of himself, reinforced by the assertion that 
he knew (as opposed to 'felt', or 'thought') it to be true. He makes use of the fact that this is 
his narrative to reciprocate their (real or imagined) negative judgement with one of his own, 
by asserting a reason for it: "they were afraid," (§24c). This constitutes a direct personal 
negative judgement of those who, to Moshe's mind, have already judged him. 
Moshe's judgement is already stronger than that which sparked it, since it is direct while the 
first was indirect; the point (that he is brave while they are not) has already been made. He 
~45 It is not absolutely clear from the text whether he is referring in both cases to the same partner, or whether the 
incident with Gadi happened on another occasion. According to the article from which this narrative was taken, 
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has negated their negative judgement and emerged with an indirect positive personal 
judgement of himself (indirect since it is presented through contrast). Nonetheless, he 
continues building the contrast: not only are they afraid while he is not, but the cause of their 
fear, he tells us, is his own fearlessness. "Not only did I have the reputation of a 
troublemaker, but also of a man who knows no fear," (§24d-e). If they are afraid of his 
fearlessness then their judgement of him is the judgement of cowards and has been further 
negated, while his own has been enhanced and re-emphasised, not least with the positive 
non-modalised conclusion "and they were right about that. I really have no fear," (§24f-g). 
But Moshe is not yet satisfied: 
§24g I really have no fear 
h They knew I had no fear, 
i that I don't give a damn, 
j and that I can go anywhere, 
k without asking questions, ( 
He reiterates, reinforcing his direct positive self-appraisal (§24g) by re-inserting it into the 
minds of his alleged detractors and presenting them once again as the source of the appraisal: 
"They knew I had no fear, that I don't give a damn ... " (§24h-i). But still Moshe's self-appraisal 
is not complete, and it gathers momentum once more as he takes us from the immediate 
scene of events and into another illustrative anecdote. Again, he presents an external source 
- this time his partner - to back up the truth of what he is saying and against whom he 
contrasts favourably in a very similar manner. From the description of Gadi's behaviour ("he 
started going mad," §24s), we discern an indirect negative personal judgement of Gadi, 
because he is also afraid in contrast with Moshe's fearlessness. 
§24q Gadi, the other operator who was with me, 
r nearly fainted 
s He started going mad: 
t 'Get back,' he shouted, 
u 'we have no escort!', 
v but I had to get to know the place better, 
w to find an exit, 
x just in case we needed one 
y I was not afraid to die 
z At least I was insured 
aa This would have helped my family. 
To end the sequence, he emphasises that his motivation is level-headed and altruistic: "I had 
to get to know the place better, to find an exit, just in case we needed one," (§24v-x), and 
states for the second time in the narrative that he was not afraid to die, because "at least I was 
insured. This would hm'e helped my family," (§24z-aa). It is not clear, and apparently 
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both died (and another question altogether is whether this was ever truly a risk). Other 
reinforcements of Moshe's positive self-judgement include 'amplifications' such as the 
insertion of "anywhere" and "anything," to emphasise that nothing is too difficult or 
frightening for him, however much it may intimidate others, and the 'appreciation' of props, 
such as, in this stanza, the tank, whose importance is emphasised by being "the tank that 
escorted us everywhere," (§24n). The stressed importance of the tank highlights Moshe's 
departure from it as a brave act. In brief, an 'appraisal' breakdown of stanza 24 might look 
something like this: 
i Attitude: I [S241;J I knc\\ that nobody wanted to \~~rk with me ...... . ..... --.~.---...... -~ 
• [§24s) the other'CJIlerat()r who was \\lith me, nearly fainted. He started going macl:_ 
i--=-====:==7::'--1-'[!;-"S=2-'.4c.::.o'):--.:They were afraid to be with me on the tractor. 
(§2411] I left the tank that escorted us eve ,here 
[§24j-l] I can go anywhere, \vithout asking quesc....:ti=-on-s-,-Wl-:-·t-:-hout an escort of tanks or 
!-c:------__ ~A::_P=C..=.'s~oI:anything. 
Source: . [§24Q-s] Gadi... nearly fainted .. =...H:..::.e-=s-"'ta=rt'-.:-e.:....;d=-g"'-o::.;:i=IlQg.::.:.m:::.:a=-=d::.:... __________ ----' 
Fig. 4.2.1: Appraisal Breakdown of Stanza 24. 
With its elaborate positioning of Moshe within a framework of fear, this stanza is a defining 
point in the narrative, as emphasised by its introduction as "the real thing," (§23a). The fact 
that the framework is constructed primarily through the portrayal of other people's negative 
reactions to him, and then by overemphasis of his fearlessness, suggests that for Moshe there 
might be a strong (inverted) connection between fear and social integration. His response -
to 'prove' his own fearlessness through \vild example (§24m-y) - demonstrates, I believe, 
precisely the urge that led him to commit such thorough and indiscriminate destruction in 
Jenin refugee camp. 
Contrast and Juxtaposition 
The emphasis of Moshe's fearlessness is so important that as well as being juxtaposed 
alongside other people's fears, it is also contrasted with the way it is perceived by others 
("they told me I am mad," §4oe), as well as with his own fear in an apparently unrelated 
context ("In Jenin, I was not scared for a moment, but I cannot go to the Beitar matches ... I 
am constantly afraid of getting a heart attack," §27f-g). Related contrasts include Moshe's 
indestructibility ("For me, in the D-9, it was nothing. I didn't mind. You would just hear the 
explosions," §37a-c) versus the soldiers' vulnerability, as follows: 
§39a I fell in love with those children 
b I was willing to do with my tractor 
c anything they would ask for. 
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§33c-e); as Moshe tells us in a later stanza, "my heart went out for them," (§44i), and it is 
interesting to see how, here and elsewhere, he evokes their vulnerability and positions 
himself as their protector ("I would erase anyone with the D-9, just so that our soldiers won't 
expose themselves to danger," §44b-c; "I was afraid for our soldiers," §44e). 
§40a They, in return, protected me 
b I would leave the tractor without weapons, 
c nothing 
d Just walked in 
e They told me I am mad, 
f but I said: 'Leave me alone 
g Anyhow. the armored vest will not saw me." 
h This is how I worked 
i Eycn without a shirt 
j Half naked. 
Although they reciprocated his protection (and, implicitly, his affection fo~ them), 
presumably by 'covering' him when he left the bulldozer and "just walked in," (§40d), 
Moshe's own indestructibility, "even without a shirt," (§40i), is portrayed as superior to that 
of the heavily-armed soldiers of one of the world's most powerful armies, who thought he was 
"mad." Revealingly, they also "protected" him when he had finished working: 
§s6a After I finished the work, 
b I got out of the tractor, 
c piled up some clothes on the side of the road, 
d and fell asleep 
e They looked after me, 
f so that I won't get run over by a tank or something. 
It is not clear where he was sleeping, but Moshe indicates that it was not far from the 
"tractor" - in other words, very near the scene of events, although presumably behind Israeli 
lines. Since there are no Palestinian tanks, this stanza must refer to the possibility of being 
run over by an Israeli tank, which seems very unlikely to happen, as well as illustrating the 
absence of a threat from the Palestinians in the area (who may have been too busy extricating 
themselves from the rubble of their homes). Similarly, although we have no way of knowing 
how many times Moshe left "the tractor without weapons," (§40b), the event is linguistically 
constructed as recurrent (with the 'habitual aspect marker' "I would leave," instead of ' I left'.) 
However, the narrated speech events which follow ("they told me," and "I said,") are both 
described in the past simple, as 'one-off events, seeming to indicate that it only happened 
once. But even this seems unlikely, as there is absolutely no description of what happened 
when he got off the bulldozer, where he went ("I just walked in" - to where?), or what was 
going on around him - we begin to suspect that although Moshe would like us to imagine 
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and shells whizzing past his ears, this was far from being the case. 
In any event, he is very soon to contradict his own assertion: "Do you know how I held out for 
75 hours? I didn't get off the tractor," (§41a-b, emphasis added), and "Anyhow I could not 
leave the tractor. You open the door, and get a bullet," (§42c-e, emphasis added). His 
nakedness ("This is how I worked. Even without a shirt. Half-naked," §40h-j) seems far less 
defiant from within the impenetrable confines of the heavily armoured D-9 bulldozer 
("Clothes? Didn't need any. A towel was enough," §42a-b). Nonetheless, for the purpose of 
Moshe's self-appraisal, two very important points have been made - he is popular with the 
other soldiers, and, of course, he is braw. 
Family and Home 
While these are not often mentioned III Moshe's narrative, when they do appear their 
allocated function is similar to that of all 'other people' - to reinforce an aspect of his own 
self-evaluation. Hovvever, the episodes where he mentions his family also contain revealing 
contradictions to Moshe's self-presentation. For instance, his financial problems (inserted to 
support Moshe's protestation that he is innocent of accepting bribes) are emphasised in §8h 
with the lamentation "and I have four children to keep," implying that a 'real man' supports 
his family, which Moshe cannot. His mission in Jenin is presented from the outset as a way to 
somehow gain their positive evaluation of him ("I wanted the family to be able to identify me. 
I told the family and the kids: 'you will see my tractor on television. When you see the Beitar 
flag, that will be me' ," §25h-k), to the extent that if he dies in action, "no big deal," (§le): 
§2a I told my wife: 
b "If anything happens to me, 
c at least someone will take care of you!" 
This sentiment, as noted above, is echoed in §24: 
§24Y I was not afraid to die 
z At least I was insured 
aa This would have helped my family. 
Moshe's assertions that he is not afraid to die, when they occur, are hinged on this caveat: if 
he dies, at least he v\ill finally, through his life insurance policy, be able to help his family. It 
is possible to speculate that one of the reasons that he is not afraid of death is because he is 
afraid of life: in life he perceives himself as inadequate, incompetent and insufficient, but in 
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4.3. Justifications 
§61a All the human rights organizations 
b and the UN 
c that messed with Jenin, 
d and turned what we have done there into such an issue, 
e are just bullshitting, lying 
f Lots of the wans in those houses 
g just exploded by themselves, 
h at our slightest touch 
i It is true, though, 
j that during the last days we smashed the camp 
k And yes, it was justified 
I They mowed our soldiers down 
m They had a chancC' to surrender. 
Having thus far pointed at certain (internal) motivating factors behind Moshe's actions in 
Jenin, I turn now to the ways in which he might be seen to seek the "psychological impunity" 
described by Pratkanis and Aronson/46 and justifications from the overarching n~rratives 
available to him, including the echo of those presented by .A.riel Sharon. 
Logic And Ideology 
Moshe's narrative makes very little mention of the policy narratives and propaganda 
discussed above, and here it becomes clear that the persuasive strength of such propaganda 
does not lie in its details so much as in the overall atmosphere it creates. In other words, the 
recipient (in this case Moshe) need not necessarily understand or even listen to the finely-
constructed logic of Ariel Sharon, because "increasingly, the goal of modern propaganda is 
not to inform and enlighten but rather to move the masses toward a desired position or point 
of view."247 
Moshe is apparently unmotivated by religious or nationalistic concerns. The word 'Israel' 
does not appear in his narrative, and nor does the endless oppression of the Jewish people. In 
fact, according to his narrative, and against the 'solidarity' doctrine of Sharon, Moshe's Israel 
is broken into a range of smaller groups, with everyone he refers to carrying a regional label. 
He refers twice his partner as a 'Yemenite' (§22e, §2se); the soldiers and officers he works 
.vith are 'Golani'248 (§28i, §29f, §30c, §SlC, §S4h), and of course he himself is Kurdi249 (§26n, 
§30c). Similarly, the 'others' are 'Palestinian' (§S3k, §S4b, §SSd) or 'Arab' (§60e). 
Politically, Moshe defInes himself as a member of the nationalistic Beitar youth movement 
"~6 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, P38. 
247 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, pH. 
218 'Golanis' come from the Golan Heights. 
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and Sharon's ruling Likud party (§6ob), emphasising that he is "heavily on the right," (§6oc). 
From juxtaposition, as well as from his insistence that being right-wing has "nothing to do 
with what I have done in Jenin," (§6od) we discern that the main implication of this 
alignment is a licence to take harsh 'revenge' on the Palestinians: 
§60a I know many people will think that my attitude 
b stems from me being a 'Beitar' and 'Likud' member. 
c It is true. I am heavily on the right. 
d But this has nothing to do with what I have done in Jenin. 
e I have many Arab friends. 
f And I say, if a man has done nothing 
g don't touch him. 
h A man who has done something -
i hang him, as far as I am concerned. 
Having dismissed the notion that his narrated actions stem from political concerns, Moshe 
constructs an elaborate alternative framework to represent his attitude to\\rards the 
Palestinians as morally justifiable, beginning with the classic disclaimer of racism that "I have 
many Arab friends," (§6oe). The sequence might indicate Moshe perceiving that declaring 
himself "heavily on the right" could imply to some that his actions had been facilitated by a 
racist attitude, and hastening to rebuff that notion. If a man has done nothing, don't touch 
him; but a man who has done 'something' could justifiably be hanged. Once again, Moshe 
warms to his theme to the detriment of his own preconstructed logic: 
§60h A man who has done something -
i hang him, as far as I am concerned. 
j Even a pregnant woman -
k shoot her without mercy, 
I if she has a terrorist behind her. 
In this way Moshe illustrates his perception, echoing Sharon's notion of 'collective 
punishment' discussed above, that the Palestinians are all guilty, purely by merit of their 
ethnicity: in spite of the assertion that a 'man who has done nothing' should not be touched, 
"even a pregnant woman" (who has done nothing) can be justifiably shot "without mercy" if 
there is a terrorist lurking somewhere behind her. 
Propaganda 
As part of the analysis of Moshe's "language that justifies and explains violence,"25o it is 
important to look at his narrative representations of the people who live in Jenin refugee 
camp (where they do occur), As discussed in the analysis of Sharon's policy narratives, it is 
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'like ourselves', because "by reducing dissonance, a person defends the ego and retains a 
positive self-image."251 For Moshe, all Palestinians are guilty and deserving of punishment: "I 
didn't feel sorry for all those Palestinians who were left homeless,"252 (§S4b), except perhaps 
the children. After their homes had been destroyed, Moshe includes himself in a display of 
altruism toward them: "We took care ofthem, of the children. The soldiers gave them candy," 
(§S4k-l). Moshe's compassion quickly recedes: "But I had no mercy for the parents of these 
children," (§S4m). 
Moshe twice points to televised propaganda as a source of his attitude towards the 
Palestinians. For example, he tells us that he \\L\S not thinking about his problems during his 
three days in .Jenin, but to fill the void, "sometimes images of terror attacks in .Jerusalem 
crossed my mind," (§42i). As so often in Sharon's narratives, there is no need to mention 
Palestinians because the connection is clear. More explicitly, in §SS, he explains why' he "had 
no mercy": 
§ssa I remembered the picture on television, 
b of the mother who said she will bear children 
c so that they will explode in Tel Aviv 
d I asked the Palestinian women I saw there: 
e 'Aren't you ashamed?' 
According to Ochs and Capps, "Narrators often shape the narrative to make their own 
comportment appear morally superior to that of another protagonist. This predilection is 
what discourse analysts ... call the 'looking good' principle."253 By placing the requirement of 
shame onto his victims, he seeks to reassure himself (and us) that he is morally superior to 
them. Presumably he did not meet the woman from "the picture on television," (§ssa) 
indeed, as discussed above, it is uncertain whether he ever got down from the bulldozer at all, 
which implies that it might be only now, in the telling of his story, that Moshe reaches out to 
propaganda for justifications. For Moshe, as for Sharon, the Palestinians form a single entity; 
they all look and act the same, and to punish one is to punish them all. It is not too difficult to 
imagine the state's motivation for inserting these "picture[s] on the television" into the 
"endless 100p"'254 described by HaCohen, since they provide men like Moshe, already heavily 
armed with the force of their own failures and insecurities, 'with all the information they need 
to justify the destruction of other lives. As Moshe says, "If I had been given three weeks, I 
would have had a lot more fun. That is, if they let me tear the whole camp dO\vn," (§6oq-s). 
150 Payne. 22 May 2002. 
251 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992. P35. 
25'2 Various sources estimate the Palestinians left homeless after the .Jenin operation at between 6 and 10,000. 
253 Ochs and Capps, 2001, P49. 
'c54 "If there is a Palestinian terror attack, all programmes are immediatelv suppressed in favour of reports and 











./ustijicational Narratives Narrative of Personal Experience: ll10slze Nissim 
Propaganda, like all mythology, "impoverishes the meaning"255 of that which it portrays, 
providing a set of ready-made justifications to those who would execute policy "'viII. In this 
context the most basic achievement of state propaganda, for all its embellishments, is an 
overarching polarisation of 'we' and 'they', to stimulate emotions of fear and anger or, where 
those emotions already exist, as we have seen in Moshe's narrative, to channel them towards 
a socially acceptable outlet destroying the 'other' - which can then be described as 'work'. 
Acknowledgement And Excuses 
Moshe's 'core narrative' is peppered with phrases like, "It is not as if! wanted to kill," C§4Si); 
"not because I wanted to," (§46e); "I would have to do it even if I didn't want to," (§46i), and 
so on, implying a request not to judge him too harshly as he was simply acting under orders. 
If Moshe is making or implying - excuses, this points to the conclusion that he is'on some 
level aware of how difficult his tale might be for an 'outsider' to understand, and, as will 
emerge, that he may even have received some criticism for his actions in Jenin from within 
his own circle. 
The excuses do not tend to appear alongside 'excuse markers' in other words, they are 
implied excuses but not directly acknowledged as such, indicating Moshe's resistance to the 
idea of accepting, or admitting, any responsibility for the negative consequences of his 
actions. The negative consequences would seem to be the very "facets of a situation that don't 
make sense \'Vithin the prevailing storyline,"256 whose absence makes Moshe's narrative so 
surreal and disjointed. It seems that his discourse would be unsustainable vvith any explicit 
acknowledgement of guilt or even of the potential for having done wrong, so excuses, 
however mild, must be stripped of their markers and merged vvith the narrative. Nonetheless 
an excuse without a marker will usually still point to its object, as in §4Si's "it's not as if I 
wanted to kill," which conveys the implicit admission that he did in fact kill people, along 
with the unmarked excuse that that had not been his desire. To illustrate further we refer to 
the core of the narrative where, following §3ge's description in of Moshe begging, "Let me 
finish another house, open another track," he has been asked to explain what he means by 
'opening a track'. 
First, because Moshe does not, it is necessary to give a brief description of the place he was 
working in. Most refugee camps in the WBGS2S7 began life as rows of tents donated by 
OS5 Barthes, 1993, puB. 
256 Ochs and Capps, 2001, P4. 
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UNRWNsB after the 1948 war. Since then, they have received infrastructural development 
only through sporadic donations form international aid agencies. With S6 years' population 
growth, the 'camps' have become densely-populated shanty towns, with closely-packed 
buildings and narrow labyrinthine alleyways. It is extremely difficult for the IDF to perform 
its 'operations' under these circumstances, as the alleyways and rooftops naturally favour 
their own inhabitants. For the Israeli army, the answer is to 'open tracks' with bulldozers in 
order to allow its soldiers to pass through safely in their tanks. Moshe describes his job as 
"eras[ing] buildings. On both sides," (§43b), with the justification that "There is no other 
choice, because the tractor was much wider than their alleys," (§43c-d). 
There are numerous indications that Moshe is aware of hming killed people as he "opened" 
these "tracks," and we can identify three variables in these indications: the explicitness of 
their presentation; the degree of acknowledgement they portray; and their vicin,ity to an 
excuse or excuse marker. It is interesting to look at these variables in relation to each other, 
as follows: 
Immediately after stating "it's not as if I wanted to kill" in §4Si, Moshe continues, "We didn't 
harm those who carne out of the houses we had started to demolish, waving white flags. We 
screwed just those who wanted to fight," (§4sk-n). In this context "screwed" clearly means 
'killed', so Moshe is saying in fact that 'we killed just those who wanted to fight'. In other 
words this assertion is a strong, explicit acknowledgement of having killed people, albeit 
justified by their having been "those who wanted to fight." The 'excuse' has already appeared 
in §4Si as noted above, ""ithout an explicit marker to present it as such. But it is worth 
observing that while the 'excuse' itself is delivered in the first person singular, he retreats into 
'we' for its elaboration; another presumably subconscious attempt to deflect any personal 
blame for his actions similar to the later protestation that "it was all under orders," (§47X). 
In §46o-p, Moshe says, "What we did actually saved the lives of the Palestinians themselves." 
In this sentence, "actually" and 'themselves' add a defensive slant to the non-modalised 'what 
we did saved the lives of the Palestinians'; serving to imply that Moshe is pre-empting the 
unspoken allegation that 'what [you] did killed Palestinians.' These lines are an implicitly 
presented and weak acknowledgement that Palestinians \vere killed. With "themselves," 
Moshe emphasises that his actions were for the greater good not only of the Israeli soldiers 
but also of the Palestinians 'themselves', which would imply another attempt at mitigation. 
Similar to the pre\10US example, Moshe's defence again inmh-es the fact that he was part of a 
larger project, and that his actions were caused hy 'we' rather than T alone. However, the 
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bravado is all his own: 
§47a For three days, I just destroyed and destroyed 
b The whole area 
c Any house that they fired from came down 
d And to knock it down, 
e I tore down some more 
f They were warned by loudspeaker 
g to get out of the house before I come, 
h but I gave no one a chance 
I didn't wait 
j I didn't give one blow, and wait for them to come out 
k I would just ram the house with full power, 
I to bring it down as fast as possible 
m I wanted to get to the other houses 
n To get as many as possible 
o Others may have restrained themselves, 
p or so they say 
q Who are they kidding? 
r Anyone who was there, 
s and saw our soldiers in the houses, 
t would understand they were in a death trap. 
As his excitement grows Moshe appears to become less guarded about the degree of 
acknowledgement he expresses. In §47f-1 it is so high as to be almost explicit: "They were 
warned by loudspeaker to get out of the house before I come, but I gave no one a chance. I 
didn't wait. I didn't give one blow, and wait for them to come out. I would just ram the house 
\\-ith full power, to bring it down as fast as possible." He is clearly aware that there were 
people in these buildings, since he has told us that he gave them no chance to leave. This 
sequence is devoid of any excuse or excuse marker; its purpose in fact is to convey the 
pleasure, which he returns to and emphasises in later stanzas ("I had plenty of satisfaction. I 
really enjoyed it," §soa-b), that Moshe took from destroying buildings. 
In the conflict between caution and bravado Moshe tends to contradict himself and 
undermine his own defence. For example, as regards the issue of what he did or did not 
'want' to do, he has already told us that "I wanted to destroy everything. I begged the officers, 
over the radio, to let me knock it all down from top to bottom, to level everything," (§4Sd-h). 
Moshe's protest that he acted only under orders is contradicted by the description of himself 
begging for those orders. Similarly, he tells us in §470-P that "others may have restrained 
themselves, or so they say," which implies that he may have been criticised by those "others," 
or at least that they have compared his actions \,\lith what they might have done in the same 
circumstances. Perhaps, in the manner of other negative judgements he attributes to others, 
this criticism is merely projected upon them (see 4.2.1.), but it implies that Moshe's restraint 
(or the lack of it) was to some extent a matter of individual choice. In any event Moshe is 
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kidding?" (§47q), and then by providing a brief illustration of not only the necessity but also 
the altruism of his behaviour: "Anyone who was there, and saw our soldiers in the houses, 
would understand they were in a death trap. I thought about saving them," (§47r-u). 
§47U I thought about saving them 
v I didn't give a damn about the Palestinians, 
w but I didn't just min with no reason 
x It was all under orders. 
Moshe continues the sequence by reverting back to the excuse he has only just dismantled, 
and §47\'-x highlight his caution/bravado dilemma, On one hand it seems he means to say 
that "1 didn't giYe a damn about [killing] the Pale~tinians," but ~uch is his lack of concern 
(whether feigned or genuine) that the word 'killing' is not inserted, It was not even an issue at 
that point, and nor was it his primary source of satisfaction (as he tells us later, "I found joy 
with every house that came down, because I knew they didn't mind dying, but they tared for 
their homes," §48k-m), On the other hand, he finds it necessary to follow this sentiment 'with 
yet another repetition of the excuse that "it was all under orders," seizing justification from 
the prevailing political and military narrative, Moshe's actions are justified as having been 
demanded by the government, the army and the people who issue the orders, The excerpt 
constitutes a strong implicit acknowledgement that Palestinians were killed, along with the 
boast that he "didn't give a damn," followed immediately by an unmarked excuse as further 
implicit acknowledgement. 
Similarly, in his concluding stanza, Moshe once again conveys tension between the desires to 
be recognised for his heroism and mitigated for his actions: 
§62a No one expressed any reservations against doing it 
b Not only me 
c Who would dare speak? 
In §62a and b, he reasserts his usual defence of acting under orders and collective 
responsibility, Since "no-one [else] expressed any reservations against doing if' - 'if being 
turning Jenin refugee camp into "a footban stadium" - Moshe implies that he surely cannot 
have been expected to express such reservations on his own and go against the tide of what 
'everyone else' was doing; what had been 'ordered.' §62C'S "who would dare speak?" almost 
seems to indicate that he and his co-workers were afraid of reprisal if they resisted the 
commands of their superiors, However, this possible defence is immediately shattered in the 
lines that follow: 
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d If anyone would as much as open his mouth, 
e I would have buried him under the D-9. 
Although we cannot tell whether Moshe's company was afraid and in awe of him to the extent 
he would have us believe, §62d-e is the strongest confirmation yet that Moshe was not, and 
does not perceive himself to have been, acting "under orders." In any case, he has already 
informed us in §6on that he "answered to no one." 
The most explicit - or at least the most descriptive - acknowledgement of Palestinian death 
takes place in §48a-f: "Many people were inside houses we went to demolish. They would 
come out of the houses we were working on. I didn't see, 'with my own eyes, people dying 
under the blade of the D-9 and I didn't see houses falling dO\m on lh'e people. But if there 
were any, I wouldn't care at alL" This description is perhaps only possible because it is 
emphatically presented in the negative, distancing Moshe as far as possible £rom the 
information it contains. With the insertion of "with my own eyes," Moshe exemplifies the 
potential loophole that recurs in cases where perpetrators are eventually questioned about 
their crimes. During the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, 
with its requirement that amnesty applicants make "full disclosures," much attention was 
paid to the issue of selective amnesia. As I argued in Representations of Benzien at the 
TRC,259 it is possible to be cognisant of having committed certain acts without remembering 
them specifically. In the same way, it is possible for Moshe to have been aware that there 
were "people d}1ng under the blade of the D-9" and "houses falling down on live people" 
without ha\1ng seen it '>vith his own eyes': it is enough to have known, as he did, that there 
were people inside the buildings he pulled down. Wherever recognition of this fact seems 
logically imminent, what Moshe does with his narrative is to 'delete' them, in an interesting 
parallel ""ith the IDF photograph discussed in 3-4.3. above. 
In her work on 'Confessional Performances', Leigh Payne remarks that "Perpetrators often 
block memories. They learn a language that justifies and explains \1.olence, and they erase 
from memory acts or emotions that contradict that story,"260 Although it is impossible to 
know whether the vast gaps in Moshe's story are due to memory failure or conscious self-
censorship, they would seem to indicate some inconsistency between the information he does 
provide and an unvoiced 'inner narrative' ("that contradict[s] that story"). To focus too much 
on the buildings themselves, beyond his action of causing them to fall, might require some 
consideration of their function as homes to living people, and wherever this does happen, 
Moshe quickly follows with the defensive assertion that he "didn't give a damn." Beyond the 
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dust, there is very little else to see 'outside' the bulldozer, which is a dangerous place: "You 
couldn't poke your nose out," (§3St); "one step was enough in order to lose an arm or a leg," 
(§3Sk), and "You open the door, and get a bullet," (§42d-e). 
4.4. Conclusion 
It is difficult and disturbing to reach too far for Moshe's 'inner narrative', since there is strong 
evidence of hatred and vindictiveness (such as §48k-m's "I found joy with every house that 
came down, because I knew they didn't mind dying, but they cared for their homes"), and 
much room for discussion on whether or not he actually saw himself causing death and abject 
terror all around him, whether or not this gave him pleasure, and so on. Whatever emotions 
are evoked in the circumstance of driving a bulldozer through a refugee camp, they belong to 
a different reality from that of posthumous explanations. According to Linfield, 
Acknowledgement does not automatically occur once people reveal their experiences. 
Acknowledgement is a process - one that requires critical self-consciousness, openness, 
fluidity, and a capacity for surprise, remorse, guilt, awe, grief, and shame. This is the 'working 
through' of the past [ ... J It is a process that rejects both amnesia about the past and the 
grandiose, futile ambition to 'master' it, and that requires the assumption not of collective guilt 
but, rather, of individual responsibility.261 
As we have seen, Moshe's attempts to 'master' the past through this narrative, along with his 
frequent protestations of collective rather than personal responsibility, show that he is far 
from acknowledging the full implications of his own actions, and there is no hope of any legal 
or psychiatric assessment to help him do so. The process of acknowledgement by men like 
Moshe has been indefinitely postponed due to the solid legitim ising framework provided in 
the prevailing discourse of the Israeli government and army. Whether or not it had previously 
been the IOF's intention to demolish such a large section of Jenin refugee camp, and whether 
or not we believe Moshe's assertion that "It was all under orders," the facts remain that he 
was not prevented in any way from doing so; in response to international criticism, the IOF 
published a reporP62 elaborating the necessity of this and similar operations, and Moshe was 
later awarded a medal for bravery for his work in Jenin. 
260 Payne, 22 May 2002. 
261 Linfield. Summer 2000. 
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5. Conclusion 
According to Ochs and Capps, "to understand the life of narrative ... as a discursive and 
creative activity, it is vital to examine prosaic as well as artistic realisations. "26:3 In this thesis, 
the narratives under discussion are loosely grouped together as what I have called 'narratives 
of war', \\'ith the "artistic realisations" being Ariel Sharon's poised and polished policy 
presentations, which explain the need for violent military action against the Palestinian 
population, and which have been shown to draw heavily on the same mechanisms of 
persuasion that have been tried and tested by political orators since at least the time of 
Aristotle. The "prosaic realisations," meanwhile, are the "less polished, less coherent 
narratiw5 that. .. are a hallmark of the human conuition"~hl: here Moshe's hesitant, confused 
and ideologically incoherent personal experience narrative. In linguistic terms, it is clear that 
political speeches tend to be pre-prepared, facilitating their smooth delivery and s,tructural 
cohesion, unlike more spontaneous forms of narrative such as Moshe's, which might 
therefore be said to reveal more in the way of 'hidden' urges and, of course, personal - rather 
than merely ideological motivations and belief-structures. 
Initially the idea behind this thesis was to trace the justificationallogic of Israeli government 
policy narratives from 'source' to 'recipient' and to delineate the ways in which the 
government's 'ideas' may have directly influenced the personal narratives of soldiers involved 
in torturing, killing and/or humiliating their fellow human beings. Admittedly, this line of 
inquiry was based on the assumption that people would require logical and ideological 
motivation for committing such actions, and that one of the roles of military leaders and 
governments in times of war is to propagate that motivation. During the preliminary 
analyses, however, it quickly became clear that soldiers do not seem to operate on the 
ideological level of propagandists, presumably because their duties require actions rather 
than words, and justification has already been provided by the fact that they are placed in 
their role by a higher authority, whose orders they fillSt follow. 
Although the motivations presented by Sharon and his government and military 
spokespeople, such as, for example, "we must continue fighting terrorism relentlessly, 
determinedly and stubbornly,"265 did occasionally 'filter down' to personal speech, they were 
no longer presented as motivation so much as posthumous justification, apparently more to 
det1ect the potential criticism of audiences than to explain anything salient to the narrator 
---_ .. _-------
Oehs and Capps, 2001. P4. 
21"1 Oehs and Capps, 2001, PS7 . 
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himself.266 In this sense, it is perhaps salient to apply the term 'justificational narratives' only 
to retrospective narratives; policy narratives, in their provision of ideological justification for 
war and warfare, might be better described as 'motivational narratives'. In terms of 
temporality, policy narratives are naturally more concerned with future events, while 
narratives of personal experience are more of a "sense-making activity"267 for what has gone 
before, in that they "provide a discursive forum for human beings to clarify, reinforce, or 
revise what they believe and value."268 Moshe's narrative stood out as something of a failed 
"sense-making activity" for the reasons of incoherence and senselessness discussed during 
the analysis, as well as for the scale of what had clearly been 'deleted'; and it is this very 
discord bet\veen narrati\(:s uf ll1otinltion and those of justification that inspired \\hat seemed 
to be a more interesting approach: to try to discern the personal motivations of an individual 
actor, through the political lens that encouraged, legitimised and staged their expression. As 
we have seen, Moshe appears unmotivated by political or religious concerns - such 
propagandised ideals, at this level, seem to provide little more than a justificational 
framework through which to make some sense, tl.'VO months after the event, of a far more 
prosaic reality. So how, then, is he influenced by Ariel Sharon? 
As should be clear from the analysis, .'-\riel Sharon's speeches provide justifications on all 
levels for violent responses to fear. Moshe's personal narrative is embedded, and thereby 
made sense of, within the overarching political context. In other words, he has integrated his 
personal conflict into the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and in so doing he has found a solution 
and 'acceptable reaction' framework for the personal problems he started with. The personal 
has become political, rather than, as I had initially assumed, the other way around. 
Because Moshe's narrative bears so few direct traces of Sharon's, it could be argued that he is 
unique; even if we are disturbed by the narrative presentation of his actions in .lenin, it 
proves nothing about the overarching ideology of the state. The strongest response to this 
argument is that those actions were staged, sanctioned and rewarded by the Israeli 
government and its agents. By his own admission (§19-§22) Moshe, a civilian reservist, 
received no more than a few hours' training before being let loose on a refugee camp of 
30,000 inhabitants in the massive D-9; once there he was allovved to continue unabated, 
drunk on whisky (§41d-i) and, I assume, the feeling of power, bulldozing indiscriminately and 
finding "joy with every house that came down," (§48k), for 75 hours \vithout a break. Even 
without considering the residents of the camp, the irresponsibility of his supervisors, in an 
army that prides itself on its professionalism, is startling. 
------------
266 Al\ of the narratives I analysed, whether or not they have been included in this thesis, were deli\"ered by men. 











The main influence of war propaganda is its provision of a tacit set of cause and effect 
relations, which institutionalise particular cognitive frames. The danger of subjecting 
societies to this form of propaganda is that it creates mythologies to render certain violent 
actions acceptable, even if they are not performed for the reasons suggested by the 
propaganda. In other words, they enable self-interested actors like Moshe (whose self-
interest has been discussed at length) to 'borrow' intellectually, emotionally and/or morally 
satisfying justifications for the outward expression of their own pre-existing emotions. In 
other words, it legitimises an external response to personal evils; as well as extcrnalising 
those e\-ils themseh-es and ellibudying them in the 'other'. For those like Moshc \\hu, it seems 
reasonable to suspect, may not h;l\-c the critical consciousness (or interest) to fully evaluate 
the nuances of Sharon's intellectual arguments (and the similar arguments of other 
government and military spokespeople), the 'might is right' message will be filtE:red down 
only into a licence for brutality. In all cases, the role of fear in narratives of war is 
justification. 
Having clarified the different nature of the narratives analysed here, it is worth noting several 
points of comparison between their presentations of 'reality.' Perhaps one of the most 
important is that both Moshe and Sharon use rationality to disguise emotion. By assuming 
that his audience is already emotional, Sharon is able to impose a causational argument for 
the need to 'flatten' the enemies who have ostensibly inspired the negative emotions, in this 
case fear and insecurity, by their presupposed ferocity and innately violent tendencies. 
Emotion (what we 'feel' to be true), supported by myihologised caricatures, establishes the 
boundaries of what seems logical. Moshe, on the other hand, makes frequent attempts to 
foreground his own rationality ("what is 'opening a track'? You erase buildings. On both 
sides. There is no other choice," §43a-c) but seems unable to suppress his emotional 
satisfaction. 
Both draw heavily on the terminology of 'victimhood', making frequent reference to the past 
as a motivational force for present and future attitudes and actions. As I have argued, one of 
the most important functions of Sharon's speeches is to inspire and maintain in his national 
audience a sense of victimhood, as exemplified by his repeated portrayal of the current crisis 
as something over which they have no power ("We are currently in the midst of a difficult 
campaignjorced upon us, ":.'bq etc) and to which they can only react. However, Moshe's sense 
of personal dctimhood seems most likely to have been inspired not by Sharon's speeches but 
",,8 Ochs and Capps, 2001, P46. 












by the disasters (§1-§11) that he represents as having conspired to send him into Jenin 
"driven by madness, by desperation," with the feeling that he "had nothing to lose," (§la-d). 
Both narrators represent themselves to some extent as the leader and saviour of other people 
(Moshe is repeatedly portrayed as 'protecting' the other soldiers), but only Sharon, with the 
advantage of his actual position as head of state, as well as that of having his speeches written 
for him in advance, is successful. Flawless in wording, structure and presentation, they 
contain no contradictions, while Moshe's narrative contains too many hints of a conflicting 
'internal' narrative, such as his narrative discontinuity and gaping ellipses, the labyrinthine 
passage to .Jenin, and the o\cmhclming absence of descriptiYc detail once he gets therc, for 
his 'heroic' self-presentation to he \\'holly' crediblc. Finally, both Sharon and yloshe pre-cmpt 
resistance to their narratives and make efforts to deflect potential criticism; Moshe \'\rith his 
embedded excuses, and Sharon, as discussed in detail above, with the structural logic of his 
arguments and his deictic shifts. 
Ariel Sharon is not single-handedly responsible for the thought processes of his people, or 
even of the minority who commit atrocities against the Palestinian people. He is also not 
single-handedly responsible for the prevailing narrative of his government. However, 
through his narratives Sharon helps to maintain a society that allows men like Moshe to be 
more prominent than he would otherwise be. In other societies he would perhaps have been 
controlled by institutions, but here he is encouraged and rewarded: perhaps the same is also 
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Primary Annexes 
All primary texts have been broken into lines and stanzas for ease of reference. The stanzas are indicated 
by the symbol [§]; their lines are lettered. 
Annex Pl: Ariel Sharon Speeches In Full 
[1] 21 February 2002: Sharon Addresses the Nation 
Source: Israeli Government Press Office wW'IV~israelemb.org/articals/2004LEebruCI!:Y.L2QQ20222J)~Q,htI1JJ 
This speech was delivered in Hebrew and translated; grammatical errors are presumably those of the 
translator. 
§ 1a Good evening citizens of Israel. 
b I extend my deepest condolences 
c to the bereaved families 
d of the victims of the murderous attacks, 
e and to wish a speedy recovery 
f to the wounded. 
§2a We are currently in the midst 
b of a difficult campaign 
c forced upon us -
d a brutal campaign of terrorism. 
e These are not easy times 
f and I express my gratitude 
9 to the Israel Defense Forces, 
h the Israel Police, 
i the Border Police, 
j the security services 
k and the Mossad 
I for their courageous stand. 
§3a These are not easy times. 
b A rasping cry is heard from some quarters 
c in these days when we must -
d more than ever -
e remain calm, reasonable and restrained. 
f When it comes to matters of war and peace, 
g we must not act rashly. 
h There is a time for everything -
i not too late and not too early. 
j This is the only way to win a war 
k and the only way to achieve sustainable peace. 
§4a We are a nation 
b That has accumulated vast experience 
c in confronting problems 
d and we have an inexhaustible source of talent 
e and the ability to pull ourselves out. 
f If there is anything that concerns me 
g it is not our ability to confront and solve problems, 
h but the gap between 
i our true capability on the one hand 
and this unfounded doubt that we have in our ability, on the other. 
§5a Just take a moment and ponder 
b the past year and a half of struggle 
c that has been forced upon us. 
d I believe that we have endured this experience admirably. 
e Soldiers and civilians, 
f new immigrants and veterans, 
g demonstrate resourcefulness and valor, 
h willingness to reach out to others 
i and a spirit of volunteering. 
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k full of vitality and willpower, 
I a society whose sons and daughters 
m are no less qualified 
n than the generations which established the State, 
o broke the siege imposed upon us in 1967 
p and pulled themselves out of the depth of the abyss in 1973 
§6a The State of Israel is not collapsing 
b and will not collapse. 
c Everything is in our hands, 
d and future developments depend on us -
e our conduct, 
f our courage. 
g It depends on the attainment of complete unity between us, 
h on forgoing all disputes and personal ambitions, 
i facing the dangers together 
j and striding together toward hope. 
k We are proud of our democracy, 
I and we yearn for peace with our neighbors, 
m even at the price of painful concessions. 
n All we seek is to maintain our freedom and our way of life. 
o We are an open society 
p and we insist on remaining so, 
q despite the tremendous threats 
r which have been hovering over the State since its inception. 
§7a We want to live peacefully 
b and nurture the prosperity of our SOCiety, 
c our children's education, 
d the welfare of the weak, 
e the dignity of the elderly -
f and equal opportunities for all. 
g We want to study and work, 
h trade, research and develop. 
§8a Unfortunately, our neighbors have misinterpreted 
b both our yearning for peace and our way of life. 
c They also fail to understand our domestic disagreements, 
d which are not only the lifeblood of our democracy 
e but also one of the sources of our strength. 
f They are wrong in their estimate that our nation is faltering. 
g ExpreSsions of disobedience 
h naturally encourage terrorist organizations 
i and motivate them to intensify their actions. 
§9a But they are wrong. 
b The people of Israel are much stronger and more resilient than they imagine. 
§10a The "Merkava" Tank (developed by Maj. Gen. Tal - "Talik") 
b is the winning tank - the best in the world. 
c The IDF is one of the greatest offensive armies in the world. 
d Our Air Force and Navy are also among the most outstanding in the world. 
§11a We will continue to fight terrorism and terrorists with all our might 
b and will intensify our activities. 
c We will not rest until terrorism is eradicated, 
d until the terrorist organizations infrastructure is dismantled 
e and their weapons are confiscated and destroyed. 
f Simultaneously, 
g we will continue to do everything in our power to promote a cease fire -
h one which will lead, eventually, 
to a settlement, an agreement, peace. 
§12a I wish to emphasize that 
b contrary to what is being published, 
c the political echelon has placed no constraints 
d on the security forces in taking whatever action 
e is deemed necessary to fight terrorism. 
f Israel's security policy is determined by our needs. 
g I strongly reject all the unfounded publicity 
h suggesting that Israel is prevented from taking action 
because of international pressure. 
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k the international anti-terrorism campaign, 
I knows and understands that it is our duty 
m to protect the lives of our citizens. 
§13a I will do everything in my power 
b to bring an end to violence and terrorism 
c and achieve a cease fire. 
d I will continue to meet with Palestinian officials 
e and take whatever security steps are necessary, 
f in accordance with the government decisions. 
g I will continue, on my part, 
h to make every effort to avoid escalation 
i and deterioration into an all-out war. 
§ 14a In order to enhance the security of the citizens of Israel, 
b and for the purpose of achieving a security separation, 
c we have decided to establish buffer zones. 
d During a discussion by the "extended kitchenette" 
e it was decided to immediately begin marking buffer zones 
f and placing obstacles along them. 
§ 15a Citizens of Israel, 
b We all want peace, 
c we are all committed to peace. 
d My aim is to achieve a comprehensive peace with the Palestinians, 
e to ensure a quiet and peaceful life for both our peoples. 
f This agreement will be predicated on two stages: 
§ 16a The first stage: 
b an armistice agreement that creates a situation of non-warfare. 
c A complete demilitarization of the Palestinian zone is categorical. 
§17a The second stage: 
b the permanent settlement 
c which will determine the final borders 
d for ourselves and the Palestinians. 
e These will reflect the character of our relationship. 
§18a But one must remember that there are no magical solutions, 
b and we must not be duped by false prescriptions 
c proffered by "experts and commentators." 
d Negotiations on a political settlement 
e can only take place after a complete cease fire. 
f This is how it was when we signed the peace agreement with Egypt -
g an agreement preceded by all the stages 
h leading to a complete cease fire and interim agreements. 
§19a I have said before and I say today: 
b for the sake of real peace, 
c there will be painful compromises. 
d But there will not be any compromise 
e on the security of the State of Israel and its citizens. 
f First the terrorism will stop, 
g then calm will be restored 
h and then we will talk peace. 
§20a I turn from here also to the Palestinian people 
b to say what I have said in the past -
c I know that it is not easy being a Palestinian. 
§21a I turn to those Palestinians who do not want war 
b and are not involved in terrorism. 
c Those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families 
d and afford clothes for their children. 
e You are observing us, Israelis, yearningly, 
f and see Israel's many achievements. 
g In the last 53 years 
h Israel has developed flourishing industries and agriculture, 
i among the most advanced in the world; 
j our hi-tech industry will prosper again 
k with the recovery of the world economy; 
lone of the most advanced food industries in the world; 
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n and education and health systems 
o which are envied across the world. 
p All this has been achieved in 53 years. 
§22a Today I suggest that you think long and hard 
b what you and your children 
c would want to achieve in the coming years. 
d Will you continue to follow 
e those who lead you to ruin, destruction and despair? 
f Will you continue to be misled 
g by those who call upon your sons to commit SUicide, 
h or will you follow those who choose to progress and to thrive? 
§23a Today I promise you all, 
b Jews and Arabs alike, 
c when quiet prevails and you stop encouraging hatred, 
d we will all prosper. 
e And I know that eventually this is how it will be. 
§24a Citizens of Israel, 
b As I am convinced that we will overcome terrorism, 
c which will take time and require patience and determination, 
d I am also convinced that we will overcome 
e the international economic crisis 
f which resulted in the local economic crisis. 
g Finally, after many hardships, 
h we succeeded in passing the national budget, 
and will start pursuing that goal. 
I will discuss this topic soon. 
§25a I know that today it is not easy to ask you to be patient. 
b As I have stated in the past, restraint is strength. 
c I am telling you today - determination is also strength. 
d We have proven this to be true. 
e We are having a difficult time -
f I am having a difficult time -
g but I am asking you 
h to continue to live by those principles today. 
The economiC and security situations are not easy, 
but together only together - we can overcome them. 
§26a I know that the war of terrorism 
b which was forced upon us 17 months ago 
c raised serious questions. 
d I hear the voices asking every day: 
e Where are we headed? 
f What should be done? 
g From this platform, I turn to each and every one of you -
h we will overcome, 
i we will prevail, 
j not only because our cause is just, 
k but because there is no other way. 
§27a I would also like to turn to those who are talking 
b about a collapse, despair and loss of hope. 
c This is not the time to utter words of disaster -
d it is the time to stand firm and united 
e and assist wherever you can. 
f This is the time for demonstrating the unity 
g which is at the core of the character of the Jewish people. 
h This is the time to demonstrate 
i that we are proud to be Israelis and Jews 
j in the Land of Israel. 
k Yes, proud to be Israelis and Jews 
I in the Land of Israel. 
§28a Citizens of Israel, 
b We will always continue to aspire for peace 
c and our war, against those who are trying to destroy our people, 
d will continue to be painful and uncompromising. 
e We have always stood united in our common goal, 
f and when we reach a cease-fire which will bring quiet -
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[2] 31 March 2002: Sharon Addresses the Nation 
Source: CNN www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/03/31/sharon.transcript.This speech was delivered in 
Hebrew with simultaneous interpretation for the international media. 
(JOINED IN PROGRESS) SHARON (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): ... for a speedy recovery to the many 
people who are in hospital, recovering from their injuries. 
§ la Citizens of Israel, 
b the state of Israel is in a war, 
c a war against terrorism. 
d It's a war that has been imposed upon us. 
e It's not one that we have chosen to undertake. 
f It is a war for our home. 
§2a The state of Israel, under my leadership, 
b has made every effort in order to achieve a cease-fire. 
c Every single moment since I was elected 
d in the midst of the wave of Palestinian terrorism, 
e we have set for ourselves a goal of achieving peace and quiet 
f in order to be able to undertake political diplomatic negotiations. 
§3a We have cooperated with the American emissary, Zinni, 
b and we've received terrorism in return. 
c We've cooperated with Vice President Dick Cheney, 
d and we've received terrorism in return. 
§4a We gave our -- in order to achieve a cease-fire, 
b our requirement of seven days of peace and qUiet, 
c and we got terrorism in return. 
d We removed our troops from the cities, 
e and we got terrorism in return. 
§5a The only thing we've had in return for our efforts 
b has been terrorism, terrorism and more terrorism. 
c We have to combat this terrorism uncompromisingly. 
d We have to uproot it. 
e You cannot make any compromise with terrorism. 
f You cannot compromise with people who are prepared, 
g like the suicide bombers in Israel's street, 
h or the Twin Towers in the U.S., 
i to die simply in order to kill innocent people -
j men, women and children 
k to die in order to sow terror and horror. 
§6a This terrorism is being directed, promoted, 
b initiated by one person, 
c Vasser Arafat. 
d Vasser Arafat is the head of a coalition of terrorism. 
e He operates an infrastructure of terrorism. 
f Vasser Arafat is the enemy of Israel 
g and the enemy of the free world. 
§7a Everyone who is peace-loving, 
b everyone who has been educated 
c in the values of liberty and democracy' 
d must be aware of the fact that 
e Vasser Arafat is a stumbling block to peace in the Middle East. 
f Vasser Arafat is a danger to the entire region, 
§8a In the Israel government session on Thursday last, 
b the decision was taken to uproot the infrastructure of terrorism 
c directed by the Palestinian Authority. 
d We will uproot the whole of this infrastructure 
e because we know the only way of achieving a cease-fire 
f proceeding to negotiations and reaching a settlement in peace, 
g is only if we manage to wipe out this infrastructure of terrorism. 
h The state of Israel is a state which strives for peace. 
i Our hand has been and still is outstretched to the Palestinians in peace. 
j But no one should be deceived: 
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§9a Citizens of Israel, 
b the state of Israel is currently in a very difficult situation. 
c We have been in very difficult situations before 
d and we have overcome them. 
e This time, too, we will win out. 
f This time, too, we will be victorious. 
9 And when this happens, 
h we will be able to live here together in peace. 
[3] 08 April 2002: Sharon Addresses Knesset 
Source: Israeli Government Press Office http://www.israelemb.org 
§la Mr. Speaker, Members of Knesset, 
b Our dead lie in a long row: 
c women and children, young and old. 
d And we stand facing them, 
e facing the vacuum created by their murders, 
f and we are speechless. 
§2a On the recent evening of the seder, 
b while I was sitting with my family at the table, 
c I received the terrible news 
d of the massacre in Netanya. 
§3a There is no more dreadful moment 
b in the term of a prime minister, 
c than that horrendous moment when the telephone rings, 
d or a note is passed during a meeting, 
e and carrying Job's tidings. 
§4a And then the sights and sounds come rushing in, 
b the sights of destruction, 
c the cries of the wounded, 
d the sirens. 
e Then the awful silence of the funerals, 
f the faces and human stories 
g which stare at us from the newspapers: 
h the face of Rachel Koren, 
i whose husband and two children were buried 
j on the same day, 
k side by side, 
I a short distance from her; 
m the face of Karmit Ron, 
n forever separated from her husband, 
o 21-year-old daughter, 
p and 17-year-otd son; 
q the face of Adi Shiran 
r who was buried while both her parents are unconscious, 
s fighting for their lives in the hospital; 
t the face of Zahava Wieder -
u a true heroine of the people of Israel -
v who lost her husband, 
w daughter and son-in-law at that seder, 
x and during the seven days of mourning 
y agreed to donate her husband's organs 
z to a Palestinian family in Shuafat. 
aa She is living proof of the fact that, 
bb even at the most trying times, 
cc we remain humane. 
§5a Victims of coexistence, 
b those whose worlds fell apart 
c while eating at an Arab restaurant in Haifa -
d their blood mixing with the blood of Israeli Arabs 
e who were sitting beside them. 
f Entire families, Jewish and Arab, are destroyed 
9 in the heat of the murderous insanity 
h which has taken hold of our Palestinian neighbors 
And thus the killers and dispatchers intend to destroy the hope for peace, 
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k and hope for a normal life. 
§6a It is not a coincidence, members of Knesset. 
b It is not cruel fate. 
c The murderous gangs have a leader, 
d a purpose, 
e and a directing hand. 
f They have one mission: 
g to chase us out of here, from everywhere 
h from our home in Elon Moreh 
and from the supermarket in Jerusalem, 
j from the cafe in Tel Aviv 
k and from the restaurant in Haifa, 
I from the synagogue in Netzarim -
m where the murderers slaughtered two over 70 worshippers, 
n walking in their prayer shawls to morning prayers -
o and from the Seder table in Netanya. 
§7a And there is one dispatcher: 
b Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir Arafat. 
c He is the man who, in a series of agreements, 
d promised to abandon the path of terrorism, 
e refrain from committing murder, 
f use his forces to prevent it -
g and betrayed all his promises. 
h Because of his promises 
Israel agreed to the establishment 
j of the Palestinian Authority. 
k That is why Israel agreed to transfer security responsibility 
I in the areas given to its control. 
§8a Thus, Israel agreed to the establishment 
b of Palestinian security forces. 
c We hoped that the Palestinians would understand, 
d as they promised, 
e that ruling does not mean a license to kill, 
f but rather the assumption of responsibility 
g for the prevention of killing. 
§9a But what was merely apprehension at the beginning, 
b and intenSified into suspicion, 
c has turned into solid facts which nobody can deny. 
d In the territories under his rule, 
e Arafat has established a regime of terror, 
f which nationally and officially trains terrorists 
g and inCites, finances, arms and sends them 
h to perpetuate murderous operations across Israel. 
§10a There is overwhelming evidence, 
b accepted by all serious people in the world. 
c For example, in a chilling document 
d which was found in Arafat's offices, 
e terror tariffs are displayed. 
f For those who haven't seen, here are the documents. 
§l1a Mr. Speaker, I admit that ordinarily it is not customary 
b to present a document to the Knesset, 
c but the horror, malice, brutality and deception 
d revealed here are alarming. 
e I will not show the document, 
f but I am allowed to read it, Mr. Speaker. 
g Here is a letter signed by Yasir Arafat, 
h addressed to him as "the PreSident, warrior, brother Abu-Amar, God protect him," 
i and requesting that he "kindly allocate funds in the amount of $2,500 
j to the following brothers: 
k Ra'ad el-Karmi (I hope you still remember him), 
I Ziad Muhammad Ash, 
m Ammar Ka'adan." 
n There are additional documents 
o which incriminate murderous terrorist elements, 
p some of whom -
q thanks to our security system -
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s There is also a letter signed by Marwan Barguti 
t addressed to "the President, brother Abu-Ammar, God protect him," 
u asking him to "instruct that $1,000 be earmarked 
v to each of the fighting brothers," 
w with the same list mentioned earlier. 
§12a And there is another interesting document, 
b detailing the cost of murdering a Jew. 
c We have a financial report from the "AI-Aksa Martyrs Brigade" 
d to the person who served 
e as the liaison between Arafat and the Iranians -
f Fuad Shubaki. 
g The report specifies the cost of an explosive belt -
h 700 NIS, 
i stating that: "we need 5-9 charges each week 
j for the groups in the various areas." 
k There are complete details 
I as to the cost of each deadly weapon 
m aimed at murdering innocent civilians in cold blood. 
§13a Such and such an amount for a suicide attack, 
b such and such an amount for a charge of explosives, 
c such and such an amount for an explosive belt. 
d The document contains the "bloody" accounting 
e in the handwriting of Arafat's treasurer -
f the man who paid for the attempt 
g to smuggle Katyushas and rockets, 
h and who, today, sits with Arafat in Ramallah 
i and enjoys his personal protection. 
j This is the bill for the price of Jewish lives 
k at Yasir Arafat's organized bureaucracy of murder. 
§14a Members of Knesset, 
b For eighteen months Israel has been under bitter and bloody attack, 
c initiated by our Palestinian neighbors. 
d We have paid a high price in blood, 
e solely because of our honest wish to live in peace with them, 
f and because of our belief that they want the same. 
§15a The infrastructure of terror against Israel 
b was established before this government took office. 
c The main purpose of our National Unity Government 
d was to achieve a cessation of violence and incitement 
e as a vital and essential condition 
f for the resumption of our efforts to achieve peace in the region. 
g This is the essence of this government's existence. 
§16a On my first day in office, 
b I sent a personal letter to Arafat. 
c I offered a practical proposal to the end the violence, 
d and reiterated our Wish for peace. 
e I promised that we did not intend to harm innocent civilians, 
f and suggested ways to ease their suffering. 
g I extended my hand in peace, and my hand was rejected. 
§17a Since then we have made an endless number 
b of efforts to reach a cease-fire: 
c we tried to ease security measures 
d and each time we lifted a closure, 
e opened a road 
f and withdrew the IDF, 
g we were immediately answered with horrific terrorist attacks; 
h we accepted the Mitchell plan, 
i which includes painful compromises for Israel; 
j we accepted the Tenet plan; 
k we even waived the most elementary demand 
I for seven days of quiet -
m we did not even get seven hours free 
n of an attempt to perpetrate a murderous suicide attack; 
o we cooperated with General Zinni -
p and I take this opportunity 
q to thank him for his continuing efforts -












s and carried on with his reign of terror. 
§ 18a We remained patient and moderate 
b as one atrocity followed another. 
§ 19a Despite the fact that we knew of our power to act, 
b we hoped that we would not be forced to use our forces, 
c and rejected extreme suggestions of all sorts. 
d We gave many opportunities to world leaders, 
e those who promised over and over again 
f that they were capable of stopping terror 
g by means of persuasion or pressure on Arafat. 
§20a We have not given up on direct dialogue, 
b to bring about an end to violence. 
c Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres 
d has left no stone unturned 
e in his efforts to find a partner for dialogue. 
f I have personally hosted several Palestinian Authority officials, 
g and reiterated our proposals for a cease-fire 
h and the resumption of political negotiations. 
§21a In talks with various world leaders, 
b I presented our ideas for the political settlement 
c possible after the cessation of terror. 
d We presented Israel's honest wish for a peace 
e that will bring honor, prosperity and security for both peoples. 
§22a However, Arafat chose a different path. 
b We know which path his is. 
c He assumed, and still assumes, 
d that he will be able to defeat Israel and break its spirit. 
e In our sensitivity to the sanctity of human life 
f and in our openness for political debate, 
g he sees basic weakness. 
h By way of blood and horror 
i he wants to force Israel into a unilateral withdrawal 
j to its 1967 borders, 
k including Jerusalem, 
I thereby achieving his aims through violence, 
m and he is not averse to using any means. 
§23a The government of Israel has thus decided 
b to instruct the IDF and other security forces 
c to embark on Operation Defensive Shield, 
d which has one goal: 
e uprooting the terrorist infrastructure 
f which Arafat built to continue attacking us. 
§24a IDF soldiers and officers have been given clear orders: 
b to enter cities and villages 
c which have become havens for terrorists; 
d to catch and arrest terrorists 
e and, primarily, their dispatchers 
f and those who finance and support them; 
g to confiscate weapons 
h intended to be used against Israeli citizens; 
i to expose and destroy terrorist facilities and explosives, 
j laboratories, 
k weapons production factories 
I and secret installations. 
m The orders are clear: 
n target and paralyze anyone who takes up weapons 
o and tries to oppose our troops, 
p resists them or endanger them -
q and to avoid harming the civilian population. 
§25a All the aforementioned 
b should have been carried out by the Palestinian Authority, 
c according to its agreements with Israel, 
d and as they were requested to do 
e by all the responsible leaders in the world. 
f Only when it transpired that the Palestinian Authority 












g was not willing to fulfill its promises, 
h that it is infested with terror, 
and that it has factually turned into an authority 
j which is actively involved in terror 
k only then, having no other choice, 
I were we forced to act. 
§26a The IDF has achieved great successes, 
b thanks to the intelligence and courage of its officers, 
c and the determination and perseverance of its soldiers. 
d The IDF has taken the territories according to plan. 
e Over 1,500 fugitives have been arrested, 
f including over 500 with Israeli blood on their hands. 
g Dozens of terrorist facilities were discovered and destroyed. 
h Terrorist organizations have stopped functioning 
and their members are on the run. 
j We have foiled terrorist plans 
k and prevented many casualties in the heart of our country. 
§27a During these days 
b we are seeing the people of Israel at its best 
c a proud people whose spirit will not be broken, 
d a people determined to protect its home, 
e while extending its hand in peace. 
f Every day we see new expressions of courage, 
g volunteers and mutual assistance. 
§28a I wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude 
b to our soldiers and officers, 
c to those in compulsory service and the reservists; 
d to the families on the home front 
e who are the real backbone of the army, 
f to the anonymous security personnel, 
g to policemen and border guards, 
h to civilian rescue units - Magen David Adom, 
ii to the fire brigade, 
j the "Zaka" (identification of disaster victims squads), 
k security of guards, 
I civil defense volunteers, 
m and to each and every one who 
n in spite of the worries and understandable fear, 
o still continue our lives. 
§29a To all of you - thank you, from the bottom of our hearts. 
§30a Members of Knesset, 
b From the outset, 
c this IDF operation was planned be temporary, 
d lasting for the span of time required 
e to complete the actions I described. 
§31a These actions have not yet been completed, 
b and the IDF will therefore continue to operate, 
c as speedily as pOSSible, 
d until the mission has been accomplished, 
e until Arafat's terrorist infrastructures are uprooted 
f and until murderers holed up in various places are captured -
g including those in the Church of Nativity, in Bethlehem, 
h since we have no intention of desecrating the site, 
i unlike the murderers who have commandeered the church 
j and are holding the clergymen hostage. 
k We expect the international community to demand 
I that they lay down their weapons and leave the holy site. 
m Until that time the IDF will remain there 
n to prevent them from escaping justice. 
§32a We never intended and do not intend 
b to permanently reoccupy Palestinian cities. 
c After the IDF completes all its missions, it Will Withdraw, 
d in accordance with the instructions of the government, 
e to defined security zones. 
f In my talks with President Bush, 
g and recognizing his sincere wish for peace in our region, 












h I have promised to make every effort 
i to accelerate our military activities, 
j and to withdraw our forces 
k from those places in which our actions have been completed. 
§33a In these security zones, 
b our forces will deploy to constitute a buffer 
c between Palestinian territories and our territories, 
d in order to prevent any penetration into Israeli communities, 
e attacks on Israeli citizens, 
f and threats to our security. 
g Correspondingly, our forces will be prepared 
h to precisely target anyone who tries to contrive 
this war of terrorism against us, 
regardless of his identity I status or position. 
§34a The IDF will carry out its missions 
b from within the security zones, 
c making a genuine effort to distinguish 
d between the perpetrators of terrorism 
e and the civilian, non-belligerent population. 
f We have no quarrel with the Palestinian people 
g and we want to see the Palestinians, like us, 
h live in peace, security and dignity. 
§35a But peace can only be attained if, 
b once we evacuate the territories, 
c we find a responsible Palestinian leadership, 
d willing to accept the primary responsibility of every regime -
e to prevent the use of its territory 
f for the purpose of killing and murdering its neighbors. 
g Peace negotiations can commence and move forward 
h only after terrorism has ceased. 
§36a Accordingly, Israel accepts and warmly welcomes 
b the important initiative of U.S. President George W. Bush. 
c Since the horrific attack on Sept. 11, 
d exactly one year after the outbreak 
e of the Palestinian terrorist campaign against Israel, 
f the United States has been leading the world 
g in a heroic struggle to uproot terrorism 
h as well as the regimes which support and sponsor it. 
§37a Israel is proud of its friendship with the United States 
b and of America's leadership 
c in the moral and historiC, political military struggle 
d against the forces of evil 
e which have risen up against the civilized nations. 
f Since that deadly attack in September, 
g the partnership between Israelis and Americans has, 
h unfortunately, 
become a "partnership of blood" between victims of terror. 
j We are partners to the principle set forth 
k by President Bush in his most recent speech, 
I and I quote: 
§38a "Terror must be stopped. 
b No nation can negotiate with terrorists. 
c For there is no way to make peace with those 
d whose only goal is death." 
§39a If such a Palestinian leadership should arise, 
b it will find in Israel a hand extended 
c toward peace and negotiations. 
d I, who have seen all the horrors of war, 
e refuse to extinguish the hopes for peace 
f and the faith that the Palestinian people will recover 
g from the myth of bloodshed 
h forced upon them by their current leaders, 
i and will find the way to peace and good neighborly relations. 
§40a Peace is important to Israel, 
b but not only to Israel. 












c It is important to the Palestinians, 
d because only through peace 
e will they find their way to existence 
f as a nation in dignity and prosperity. 
g Peace is important to all the peoples of the Middle East, 
h because the continuation of terror and violence 
encourages fundamentalist elements and regimes 
to try and achieve their goals through violence. 
§41a Israel will do everything in its power to repel these threats, 
b avoid escalation and maintain regional stability. 
c In this spirit, we are noticing the first buds of a transformation 
d in the longtime Arab trend 
e to deny the very right of the State of Israel to exist. 
f Despite the extreme demands included 
g in the resolutions of the conference of Arab leaders in Beirut, 
h I welcome the fact that an important Arab leader 
such as Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has, for the first time, 
j acknowledged Israel's right to exist 
k within secure and recognized borders. 
§42a There is a positive component of the Saudi initiative, 
b but the details must be negotiated 
c between the parties themselves. 
d Peace negotiations cannot be dictated. 
e They must be based on mutual respect 
f and a genuine attempt to reach a compromise. 
g In the absence of open dialogue between the parties, 
h this initiative will remain devoid of any real content. 
§43a No party can enforce unilateral conditions. 
b U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 
c affirm Israel's right to exist in peace, 
d and in secure and recognized borders, 
e free from any military threat, 
f like any other nation in the region. 
g These borders 
h and the way to ensure Israel's security 
in the face of any military or terrorist threat 
j must be directly negotiated between the parties. 
k Israel cannot discuss the return of Arab refugees 
I a consequence of a war forced upon Israel by the Arabs -
m to its territory, 
n as it would effectively terminate the existence 
o of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. 
§44a That is why I offered to go to Beirut 
b to meet with the leaders of the Arab States. 
c A mere willingness to make peace is meaningless 
d without the willingness to meet and negotiate. 
e I take this opportunity to reiterate my proposal 
f to meet immediately 
g with moderate and responsible leaders in the Middle East. 
h I am willing to go anywhere, 
without any pre-conditions from any party, 
to discuss peace. 
§45a The United States can and should be 
b a leading and driving force behind such an initiative, 
c just as it spearheaded the negotiations 
d leading to the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference 
e over a decade ago. 
§46a U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell 
b will be arriving in the region this week. 
c I intend to discuss methods of achieve an end to terrorism 
d and advancing my initiative to meet with regional leaders, 
e in order to restart the negotiating process 
f on the framework for peace in the Middle East. 
§47a What is the outline through which 
b a comprehensive peace in the Middle East may be advanced? 
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§48a Personally, I am skeptical 
b as to the prospects of "leaping" 
c from the current violent conflict 
d directly into a permanent agreement 
e that will bring a complete and final end to the conflict. 
f Such an approach would rapidly return us to a dead end. 
g After all, the Palestinians rejected 
h the previous government's proposals 
which included far-reaching concessions, 
j refused to negotiate over them, 
k and chose to try and enforce their will upon Israel through terrorism. 
I Only when they come to the realization 
m that this attempt has failed 
n will we be able to achieve a real cease-fire. 
o It is from that point that I propose to move forward 
p toward a long-term interim agreement, 
q which will determine the character of the neighborly relations 
r between Israel and the Palestinians. 
§49a It is in this Situation that the Palestinians 
b will be able to build an independent society, 
c free of any traces of occupation, 
d and rebuild their ruined economy. 
e We can and are willing to generously assist them 
f in preparing their people for peace 
g and good neighborly relations. 
h Such an interim agreement 
would put an end to the ongoing suffering 
j of the Palestinian population, 
k those who wish to live in peace and prosperity. 
§50a The further the relations and coexistence 
b between Israel and the Palestinians evolve, 
c and as damaging fanatiC elements 
d are increasingly relegated to a corner, 
e the sooner we will reach a Situation 
f in which we can determine the final borders between us 
g and reach an agreed compromise on all outstanding issues. 
§51a The history of the political relations 
b between Israel and the Arab states 
c is proof of the advantages of a gradual approach. 
d We were in a state of ferocious war with the Egyptians. 
e We went through five terrible wars. 
f The war ended with an agreed cease-fire, 
g in accordance with U.N.S.C. Resolutions 338 and 339. 
h Since that cease-fire came into effect, 
i not one bullet has been fired 
j between the Israeli and Egyptian armies. 
k Shortly afterward, 
I we proceeded toward long-term interim agreements, 
m which led to the commencement of direct negotiations 
n and to permanent agreements between the parties. 
§52a Peace with Egypt has been sustained 
b because it was predicated on the solid foundations of peace 
c alongside painful concessions. 
d Although the situation with the Palestinians 
e is more complicated, 
f the outstanding issues are more difficult 
g and the bitterness is greater, 
h together, we can build a vision 
of a better future for both our peoples. 
§53a Members of Knesset, 
b From here, 1 address the Palestinian people. 
c On behalf of the people of Israel, 1 tell you: 
d we have no quarrel with you. 
e We have no desire to control you or to dictate your fate. 
f We want to live side by side with you in peace, 
g as good neighbors, 
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§54a But in order for this to happen, 
b you can and must take your fate into your own hands. 
c If you want to seize a place of honor 
d among the family of nations, 
e you must eschew terrorism, 
f the murder of children and the elderly, 
g the terrible violence, 
h the murderous hatred and incitement. 
i Do not surrender to those elements among you 
j who have brought you one disaster after another 
k over the past 55 years, 
I because those same forces -
m they and not us 
n will guarantee your next disaster. 
§55a From here, I address the leaders of the Middle East. 
b Terrorism threatens not only Israel. 
c It threatens you as well. 
d It does not lead to peace -
e terrorism is the enemy of peace and stability. 
f Just as I am willing to focus on the positive 
g rather than the negative aspect of your recent resolution, 
h I implore you to accept my initiative for a meeting between us. 
§56a From here, I address the leaders of the Free World. 
b You must remember that leniency toward terrorists 
c is the same as a green light to terrorists, 
d who have already proven that 
e they do not distinguish between blood and blood, 
f between a Jewish victim and any other victim. 
g You cannot fight terrorism on the one hand, 
h and condemn the victims of terrorism on the other. 
There is absolutely no equivalence 
j between those who send teenage suicide bombers 
k to kill and maim, 
I and those who take self-defense actions 
m and try to uproot the infrastructure of terrorism. 
n Only your stand against terrorism 
o and actual sanctions against its perpetrators 
p in the Palestinian Authority, 
q and primarily Arafat, 
r will enable you to make a real contribution 
s to the advancement of peace in the Middle East. 
§57a From here, I address the people of Israel. 
b This battle will not be easy. 
c Unfortunately, I cannot guarantee that there will be no more victims, 
d and that we will know no more grief and bereavement. 
§5Ba But we will overcome this challenge -
b first of all, because we are an ancient nation, 
c a nation which is all too familiar with pain and hardship, 
d a nation which has overcome the greatest of tragedies. 
§59a Secondly, because we are united 
b and we stand together. 
c We are one people. 
d Indeed there are different opinions 
e and different sentiments among us, 
f but that which unites us is greater. 
g It is my understanding of this crisis 
h that has led me to struggle for the establishment 
of a National Unity Government, 
j and in order to maintain unity 
k I am sometimes willing to forgo my own pride. 
I This is not weakness, but strength. 
m I make every effort to maintain this unity 
n and to bring in additional Zionist elements. 
§60a Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hereby announce that, 
b in accordance with Article 33 (c) of the Basic Law: the Government, 
c the following ministers will be added to the government: 
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e 2. Rabbi Yitzhak Levy. 
f 3. MK David Levy. 
§61a And in accordance with Article 3 (c) of the Basic Law: the Government, 
b I request the Knesset approval of these appointments. 
§62a Members of Knesset, 
b These are important additions to the government, 
c especially at this time. 
d The NRP and Gesher factions 
e have demonstrated national responsibility, 
f taking the ongoing campaign 
g and the upcoming challenges into consideration, 
h and agreeing to join the government and the coalition. 
§63a Each of the new ministers will undoubtedly make 
b their own unique contribution to the government. 
c My friend David Levy, 
d for whom I have the highest respect, 
e has gained vast experience 
f during service in Israeli governments over many years, 
g and his judgment in political matters will undoubtedly assist 
h in the crucial and complicated deCisions ahead. 
§64a Rabbi Yitzhak Levy has served as a minister in several governments. 
b He is a public servant with high ethical values, 
c one of the most loyal sons of the Land of Israel. 
§65a Mr. Effi Eitam, a former military officer, 
b will make an important contribution with his military expertise. 
§66a Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, 
b in accordance with Article 37 (a) of the Basic Law: the Government, 
c I hereby inform the Knesset 
d that I have appointed MK Naomi Blumenthal 
e to the position of deputy minister 
f in the Ministry of National Infrastructures, 
g in place of her position as deputy minister 
h in the Prime Minister's Office. 
§67a Mr. Speaker, Members of Knesset, 
b Unity is our greatest asset 
c in this struggle which has been forced upon us, 
d and in our path toward peace and security. 
e This is not an easy path, 
f but it is nevertheless a necessary one. 
g I call upon each and every one of you to maintain this unity, 
h not to stretch the boundaries of argument, rivalry and dispute, 
but rather to strengthen the sense of unity, 
j lend a helping hand 
k and demonstrate a spirit of volunteerism and good will. 
§68a With the help of God, together, we can and will triumph. 
Thank you. 
[4] 09 June 2002: The Way Forward in the Middle East 
Article by ARIEL SHARON, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/opinion/09SHAR.html 
§ 1a Thirty-five years ago, 
b on June 5, 1967, the start of the Six Day War, 
c Israel faced a threat to its very existence 
d as a coalition of Arab armies massed their troops 
e along the fragile armistice lines 
f that had separated Arab and Israeli forces since 1949. 
g Along the hills of the West Bank, 
h which had been occupied by the Jordanians, 
armored and infantry units were deployed, 
j ready to cut Israel's narrow coastal plain, 
k which was only eight miles wide at Netanya. 
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m ready to join the coalition against Israel. 
n The declared goal of the attack was Israel's elimination. 
§2a Israel entered the West Bank 
b only after its cities and airports had come under heavy fire. 
c Israeli actions were legal -
d resulting from a clear-cut war of self-defense. 
e For that reason, the United Nations Security Council determined 
f in a historic decision, Resolution 242, 
g that Israel was entitled to "secure and recognized boundaries" 
h and was not expected to withdraw 
from all the territories that its forces had entered -
j and from which it was attacked -
k in the Six Day War. 
I In effect, the resolution established 
m that these were disputed territories 
n where Israel had legitimate rights to defensible borders, 
o besides the claims of the Arab parties to the conflict. 
§3a Under Resolution 242, 
b which became the cornerstone of peacemaking, 
c Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula 
d in accordance with the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. 
e It was under the principles of Resolution 242 
f that Israel attended the 1991 Madrid peace conference 
g where President George W. Bush 
h spoke about a "territorial compromise" between the parties. 
And again in line with Resolution 242, 
j Israel, operating under the 1993 Oslo agreement, 
k withdrew its military government over the Palestinian population 
I so that by 1999, 
m 98 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
n were under Palestinian rule. 
§4a Nonetheless, the Palestinian leadership 
b decided to initiate the current war against Israel 
c after the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000. 
d Rather than resolve Israeli-Palestinian differences peacefully, 
e it deliberately promoted a wave of terrorist attacks 
f against the people of Israel. 
g It failed to implement its written obligations 
h to dismantle international terrorist groups 
i like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
j Instead it provided them with sanctuary in the area under its jurisdiction. 
k It also unleashed some of its most loyal forces, 
I like the Tanzim militia of the Fatah movement 
m and the presidential guard, Force 17, 
n against Israeli civilians. 
o Finally, Yasir Arafat's personal financial adviser, Fuad Shubaki, 
p not only paid for many of these attacks, 
q but also organized a consortium of Middle Eastern terrorism 
r built on the Palestinian Authority, Iraq and Iran. 
§5a Despite this situation, there is a way forward. 
b First, Israel must defeat terrorism; 
c it cannot negotiate under fire. 
d Israel has made painful concessions for peace before 
e and will demonstrate diplomatic flexibility to make peace again, 
f but it requires first and foremost a reliable partner for peace. 
g In 1977, when Egyptian PreSident Anwar el-Sadat came to Jerusalem, 
h he told the people of Israel, "No more wars." 
From that point onward, 
j the threat of violence was removed from the Egyptian-Israeli relationship 
k as both negotiated their 1979 Treaty of Peace. 
I King Hussein of Jordan followed the same pattern in 1994. 
m This elementary commitment to permanently renouncing violence 
n in the resolution of political differences 
o has unfortunately not been kept by the present Palestinian leadership. 
§6a Second, when Israel and the Palestinians eventually re-engage in negotiations, 
b diplomacy must be based on realism. 
c The race to a permanent-status agreement at Camp David 
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e failed because the gaps between the parties were too wide. 
f The only serious option for a successful negotiated settlement 
g is one based on a long-term interim agreement 
h that sets aside for the future 
issues that cannot be bridged at present. 
§7a In the nearly two years of the Palestinian intifada, 
b the people of Israel have seen Israel's vulnerabilities exploited, 
c its holy sites desecrated 
d and massive weaponry smuggled and used against Israel's cities. 
e For this reason, Israel will not return 
f to the vulnerable 1967 armistice lines, 
g redivide Jerusalem 
h or concede its right to defensible borders under Resolution 242. 
Movement from a long-term interim agreement 
j to a permanent settlement 
k can only be guided by changes 
I in the reality of Israeli-Palestinian relations on the ground 
m and not by a rigid timetable. 
§8a Finally, in order to reach a stable peace 
b there has to be regional scope to diplomacy. 
c In the Six Day War, Israel faced a coalition of Arab states. 
d It is logical that Israel cannot reach a permanent peace 
e with the Palestinians in isolation. 
f Israel needs peace with the entire Arab world. 
g For this reason, Israel has proposed a regional peace conference 
h of like-minded Middle Eastern states 
i that reject terrorism and seek to enhance regional stability. 
j The idea of the conference is based on the principle 
k that eradicating terrorism will set the stage for peacemaking, 
I and not the reverse. 
§9a A little over a decade ago, 
b the American victory in the Persian Gulf war 
c established the necessary conditions 
d for convening the Madrid peace conference. 
e It was proved then that security is the prerequisite of peace. 
f Similarly, a victory in the war on terrorism today 
g will provide a new diplomatic basis for a stable Middle East peace. 
Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company 
[5] 22 January 2003: Sharon Addresses Weizmann Institute 
§la Gentlemen, 
b I wish to focus my statements this evening 
c mainly on our conflict with our Palestinian neighbors 
d and the path which I believe we must follow -
e with patience and responsibility -
f in order to lead the State of Israel 
g from the abyss of a violent conflict 
h to a different reality of stability, security and peace. 
§2a For two and a half years, 
b the people of Israel have borne this struggle 
c with courage and stamina, 
d our spirit has not broken 
e and the terrorists' schemes have come up 
f and been shattered 
g against our strength and our fortitude. 
h Despite its desire for peace and tranquility, 
our people know the truth: 
j that there is no recipe or magic wand 
k for ending the conflict in a flash. 
I The safe path to peace is long and arduous. 
m We are marching along this path 
n and making progress on both the military and political fronts, 
o and this is the path which will lead us safely to our destination. 
p Let us not be tempted to take "short-cuts" -
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r because there are none. 
§3a We must not provide free gifts. 
b We must not unilaterally withdraw 
c without political rewards 
d or in the absence of an agreement. 
e And here we must emphasize: 
f Beyond the detrimental interpretation 
g that the Palestinians and the Arab states 
h will apply to the vision of deserted and ruined communities, 
and the fact that this will be construed as an Israeli defeat 
j and will encourage terrorism, 
k there is another grave danger: 
I withdrawal without agreement relieves the Palestinians of all responsibility. 
m The Palestinians will continue to maintain large military forces uninterrupted 
n and to manufacture weapons. 
o They have already established a military industry, 
p and they will be free to enter into alliances with Israel's enemies 
q and continue the path of terror. 
r Above all, the United States will be relieved of any of the commitments taken 
s when we arrived at an agreed-upon plan. 
t We have arrived at an agreed-upon plan with the United States, 
u and once we deviate from it, 
v the United States will also deviate from it, 
w despite the great efforts invested in a long and difficult negotiation process. 
x My seven visits to Washington during the last eighteen months 
y have not been easy, 
z and they have certainly not been in vain. 
§4a Therefore, we must continue fighting terrorism 
b relentlessly, determinedly and stubbornly, 
c using every scheme and means at our disposal. 
d The IDF, the General Security Service and the Israel Police 
e are engaged in the most thorough, courageous and sophisticated work, 
f with exceptional success. 
g In this kind of warfare, 
h there is obviously no chance of a hundred percent success 
in thwarting and prevention. 
j Unfortunately, most successes remain unpublished, 
k while the few instances where terrorist attacks do occur 
I naturally receive comprehensive media coverage. 
§5a In the framework of our fight against terrorism, 
b we must continue the construction 
c of the security separation fence, 
d in order to create a continuous physical buffer zone 
e between the population centers of the State of Israel 
f and the terror centers. 
g The fence is currently being constructed, 
h with tremendous investment and at full speed. 
The fence's main section -
j from Salem to the Cross Samaria road -
k will be completed by summer. 
I At the same time, I must emphasize: 
m the significance of the security fence 
n should not be magnified beyond what it is 
o another important obstacle to terrorism 
p and a vital cornerstone 
q in the comprehensive battle 
r against the terrorist organizations, 
s but not beyond that. 
t It is not a magic drug 
u and is certainly no substitute for the continuation of the IDF activity 
v in the terror centers 
wand against the terrorists, 
x their abettors and dispatchers. 
§6a Simultaneously, we must constantly strive toward real peace, 
b demonstrate initiative and maximum flexibility, 
c but without compromising our security and Israel's vital interests. 
§7a There is no doubt that the main partner 
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c is Washington. 
d During the past two years, 
e I have nurtured our ties with the United States 
f and cemented Israel's status in the White House and on Capitol Hill. 
g We have, as you know, true friends there, 
h and the understanding, cooperation and coordination with them 
i have reached an unprecedented level. 
§8a These relations are a primary political and strategic asset to the State of Israel. 
b They yield invaluable security benefits. 
c They also yield significant economic fruits, 
d regarding the guarantees and the special security grant. 
§9a The foundation for a political settlement in our region 
b was anchored approximately six months ago, 
c on June 24, 2002, 
d in President Bush's speech on the Middle East. 
e I have said before, 
f and I reiterate, 
g that the President's peace plan is a reasonable, realistic and feasible one. 
h The underlying principle of this plan -
which is acceptable to Israel -
j is progress in phases, 
k with the first phase being a complete cessation of Palestinian terrorism. 
I The transition from one phase 
m to a more advanced one 
n is not defined according to a pre-determined timetable, 
o but on the basis of performance. 
p Each transition to the next phase is conditional 
Q on complete fulfillment of the commitments in the phase preceding it. 
§10a Israel should obviously not be expected to make political concessions 
b prior to a proven state of calm and Palestinian governmental reforms. 
c The reform process is necessary 
d in order to remove Arafat from the reins of power and decision-making 
e and to establish a more proper government, 
f which will lead the security, economic and democratic reforms. 
g In this context it should be emphasized that 
h one of the most important tests of the new regime 
will be not only the prevention and dismantling of terrorism, 
j but also a complete cessation of inCitement 
k and the nurturing of an education system 
I that teaches the values of peace and coexistence. 
§l1a Israel will never again place their trust in someone 
b who has proven time and again 
c that he is not worthy of trust. 
d Vasser Arafat is not, 
e never has been 
f and never will be 
g a leader of peace. 
h His path is rife with destruction and terror. 
i He is to be counted among the leaders 
j who brought disaster upon disaster on the Palestinian people. 
k Arafat abused his pOSition 
I and the recognition he was granted 
m to build a murderous terrorist regime 
n to continue the armed struggle against Israel. 
o Instead, he has wreaked havoc on his people. 
p More and more people understand the disaster, 
Q but they are ruled by a regime of terror, 
r and their voices are silenced. 
§ 12a I am referring to his treacherous betrayal of 
b his essential commitment: 
c the very essence of the agreement he signed 
d with the late Yitzhak Rabin: 
e the literal and absolute commitment 
f to abandon the path of violence and terrorism 
g and to solve our differences at the negotiation table. 
h Arafat's personal history 
is filled with Violent violations of signed agreements, 
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k As far as he is concerned 
I the written word is worthless 
m and there is no connection between commitments made at formal ceremonies 
n and practical intent. 
§13a After over 700 Israelis were killed 
b and more than 5000 wounded 
c since the Camp David Conference, 
d I cannot fathom that anyone in Israel 
e would trust this man again, 
f negotiate with him, 
g or view him as a reliable partner 
h to any kind of agreement. 
Is it even conceivable to shake the hand of the man responsible 
j for the evil system of savage, violent and anti-Semitic inCitement 
k in educational institutions and in the P.A. media, 
I which has bred a culture of murder and suicide 
m to slaughter Israeli citizens? 
§14a During the past two years, 
b my government has managed, 
c in a successful political effort, 
d to increase international awareness of the fact 
e that Arafat constitutes an obstacle to peace 
f and he must step down. 
g This political accomplishment 
h must not be undermined by irresponsible statements 
granting the isolated and besieged arch-terrorist 
j even a spark of false hope. 
k The statements made by the failed Palestinian leader 
I regarding the need to cease terrorist attacks until after elections in Israel 
m proves yet again the issues 
n emphasized by Israel over the past two years 
o that Vasser Arafat, 
p leading the coalition of terror he has established, 
q is responsible for terror, 
r controls the "flames", 
s and manipulates them at his will. 
§15a Israel's voice must be heard loud and clear, 
b and so it shall: 
c he who seeks peace must encourage the Palestinians 
d to replace their leadership. 
e There is no other way. 
§ 16a I have said more than once 
b that if these conditions are met, 
c I will be prepared to go far 
d and agree to painful concessions. 
e Only he who is prepared to make painful concessions 
f can make genuine peace, 
g a peace which will last for generations. 
h It is only he who is willing to suffer pain 
as the price for these concessions, 
j who is able to do whatever is necessary to preserve the peace 
k and to ensure that his concessions will not be in vain. 
I I will only be prepared to do so 
m when it is proven beyond any doubt 
n that we are offered true peace, 
o and that Israel has a partner 
p who genuinely seeks peace and coexistence 
q for the benefit of both peoples. 
§17a The final subject which I would like to address briefly is Iraq. 
b The war which the United States is planning to wage 
c in order to drive out Saddam Hussein's cruel and dictatorial regime 
d is a war in which Israel is not involved in. 
e We wholeheartedly support U.S. efforts 
f to free Iraq and the entire area 
g from the threat of Baghdad's evil regime. 
h Saddam Hussein is already responsible 
for the deaths of over one million people, 
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k in wars he instigated against his neighbors 
I (the war with Iran which lasted eight long years, 
m the invasion of Kuwait 
n and the slaughter of thousands of Kurds, 
o citizens of his own country). 
p This unrestrained tyrant 
q who has used all the vast resources of his oil-rich country 
r to build his military strength, 
s wage war 
t and produce weapons of mass destruction 
u while sacrificing the well-being of his own people 
v must be stopped. 
§18a In the existence of any nation, 
b there are times of difficulty and trial. 
c This is true in Israel's case as well. 
d I am proud of the Israeli people's strength 
e and of their tenaCity 
f in withstanding prolonged, difficult conditions. 
g The State of Israel has become stronger 
h and more powerful 
despite all the obstacles, wars and challenges. 
Thank you. 
[6] 29 July 2003: Sharon at the White House 
§la Mr. President, 
b It is a great privilege for me to be here, 
c at the White House, 
d for the eighth time. 
e I am always pleased to visit 
f and feel that I am among friends -
g true friends of the State and people of Israel. 
§2a Mr. President, I congratulate you 
b on the impressive victory in the Iraqi campaign 
c and for removing Saddam Hussein from power -
d one of the most ruthless and tyrannical leaders in history. 
e For thirty years, the Free World has witnessed 
f the recklessness and brutality of this dictator. 
g Only you, Mr. President, 
h have shown the courage, determination and leadership needed 
to spearhead the successful campaign 
to oust this merciless despot, his dynasty and evil regime. 
§3a For the first time since World War II, 
b the freedom and peace-seeking democratic world 
c had the wisdom to go after murderous and evil rulers 
d and bring them to justice. 
e I have no doubt, Mr. President, 
f that thanks to you, 
g any villain, 
h in any corner of the world, 
knows that the long arm of justice will reach them. 
j So many will owe their lives to you 
k and the great nation of America. 
§4a I am confident, Mr. President, 
b that the lessons learnt by the nations of the world and the region 
c from the courageous action of the United States in Iraq 
d will serve to advance the peace process between Israel 
e and the Palestinians 
f and the entire Arab world. 
§5a Your latest statements 
b regarding the threats emanating from Syria and Iran 
c prove, once again, the seriousness of your intentions 
d to continue leading the fight against terror. 
e It must be made clear to these countries 
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g There can be no compromise with terror and evil. 
§6a The people of Israel, Mr. President, 
b are greatly thankful and appreciative of your activity, 
c unrelenting commitment to Israel's security 
d and the safety of its citizens, 
e and your determination to advance the peace process 
f between us and the Palestinians. 
§7a We are currently at an important juncture 
b in our relations with our Palestinian neighbors. 
c While relative quiet currently prevails in Israel, 
d terror has not yet completely ceased. 
e This relative calm was achieved, first and foremost, 
f through the uncompromising activity of the Israeli security forces, 
g and as a result of your personal efforts, 
h and the actions taken by the United States 
among Arab and European countries. 
§8a We are thankful for every hour of increased quiet and less terrorism 
b and for every drop of blood that is spared. 
c At the same time, we are concerned 
d that this welcome quiet will be shattered any minute 
e as a result of the continued existence of terror organizations 
f which the Palestinian Authority is dOing nothing 
g to eliminate or dismantle. 
§9a Mr. President, I am confident that you, 
b as the leader of the Free World in its war against terror, 
c will act to ensure that the Palestinians 
d put a complete stop to the threat of Palestinian terrorism, 
e so that it will never rear its head again. 
f I wish to move forward with the political process 
g with our Palestinian neighbors, 
h and the right way to do that 
is only after a complete cessation of terror, violence and incitement, 
j full dismantlement of terror organizations 
k and completion of the reform process in the Palestinian Authority. 
§10a We had a useful talk today, 
b where we exammed ways to advance the peace process 
c between us and our Palestinian neighbors. 
d In this context, a number of issues came up: 
e the security fence which we are forced to construct 
f in order to defend our citizens against terror activities, 
g the removal of unauthorized outposts 
h and the freezing of settlements 
in Judea and Samaria. 
§ lla I listened carefully to your statements on these subjects 
b and assured you, Mr. President, that I would address them: 
c the security fence will continue to be built, 
d with every effort to minimize the infringement 
e on the daily life of the Palestinian population. 
f Unauthorized outposts will be removed 
g as required in a law-abiding country. 
h We will continue to discuss all these issues 
i both directly and through our bureaus, 
which maintain close contact. 
§ 12 Mr. President, we also discussed a series of issues 
b which could serve to promote the peace process. 
c In a statement published on my behalf last Friday, 
d we listed a long series of steps 
e to accommodate the Palestinians. 
f If calm prevails 
g and we witness the dismantlement of terror organizations, 
h Israel will be able to take additional and substantial steps 
to advance the process. 
§13a I wish to thank you again, George, 
b for your friendship and understanding 
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d and for your contribution and personal involvement 
e in the efforts to turn the Middle East 
f into a place where the peoples of the region can live 
g in peace and security, 
h and guarantee a better life for our children 
and generations to come. 
All rights reserved © 2000. For further information please contact webmaster@pmo.qov.il 
[7] 07 October 2003: The Yom Kippur Memorial Service 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's speech at the offiCial ceremony at Mt. Herzl in Jerusalem, in memory of 
members of the IDF who fell in the Yom Kippur War and the War of Attrition. 
§la Mr. PreSident, Dear families, Honored guests. 
b Thirty years ago, the fires of war were suddenly lit 
c amidst the sanctity of Yom Kippur. 
d Thirty years have passed 
e since your loved ones hastened 
f directly from their synagogues and homes 
g to the heavy battle, 
h and did not return. 
i Those same thirty years have engraved the moment of a hasty separation 
j and the bundle of precious memories, 
k the truth of war and the shock of the most terrible of all news, 
I in your hearts. 
§2a The time that has passed has bound the wounds, 
b but sorrow cannot be healed 
c and the longing has no end. 
d The photo is on the wall, 
e and a name is engraved on the headstone in the military cemetery. 
f Life continues thanks to those who fell 150; 
g and in their absence. 
h The heart cannot forget. 
§3a Every war, first of all, 
b belongs to the soldiers and commanders on the field of battle, 
c despite the fact that others, not far to the rear, 
d take the laurels for themselves. 
e The Yom Kippur War belonged to all those warriors. 
f It is they who, with their fighting, 
g with their blood and herOism, 
h contained the harsh surprise and more than a few mistakes, 
and led to victory. 
§4a The State of Israel emerged changed from that war -
b hurting, sobered and humbled. 
c Yom Kippur itself will not be what it was before that Yom Kippur. 
d It has Since been marked 
e by the sorrowful memories of the fallen, 
f the cries of the wounded 
g and the cacophony and turmoil of war 
h that violated the tranquility of the holy day. 
§5a I still carry with me the image of the courageous fighters 
b from the battles to blunt the enemy's drive, 
c and of the heroes who successfully changed the face of the war; 
d 0 still remember the look of the dead 
e and the smell of the burnt equipment, 
f the blood and the smoke; 
g I still hear the soldiers in the bunkers who cried out for aid 
h and many received none. 
§6a If there is a national lesson, 
b it is not just in berating ourselves for being haughty. 
c The lesson is that in security, 
d we cannot rely on shrewd assessments or deterrent ability alone, 
e or even on agreements. 
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g Israel's strength must be ready and able at all times; 
h we must constantly foster and develop this strength's qualitative advantage, 
i in fighting spirit and equipment alike, 
j as if the next war was around the corner. 
k We are not immune from surprises, 
I Only if we are constantly prepared will we achieve peace, 
m and we will achieve it, 
§7a Today, we also remember the many soldiers 
b who fell during the long and anonymous War of Attrition, 
c in which the faces of young soldiers stared at us 
d day after day in the newspapers, 
e There, far away, in the bunkers, 
f in pursuit of terrorists in the Jordan Valley, 
g during battles in the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley, 
h clearing terrorist nests in alleyways in Gaza and Rafiah, 
i in special operations deep into enemy territory, 
j in land, air and naval battles, 
k far from where anyone could see, 
I this tenacious war took place, 
m with much spilling of blood, and bravery. 
n The soldiers, mostly in compulsory service, 
o but also many volunteers, 
p those same 'tigers' who came to aid us, 
q thwarted the enemy's strategy to weaken Israel and force us to withdraw. 
r The War of Attrition was pushed aside, 
s overshadowed and eclipsed, 
t between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. 
u This year we have redeemed the honor of its fighters. 
v They also deserve recognition. 
§8a You, the bereaved families, 
b know better than anyone else the heavy price of war, 
c those of you who were there in the fields of death, 
d those of you who commanded the fighters in battle 
e and who lost best friends and subordinates 
f also know the curse of war 
g and will despise it to the end of your days. 
§9a The Hebrew month of Tishrei is a month of introspection, 
b and the shadow of those wars 
c has lasted more than three decades. 
d The battle continues. 
e This generation of fighters carries in it 
f the courage and abilities of those before them, 
g of their parents, 
h of those who fought in Sinai and the Golan Heights, 
the Gaza Strip and the Jordan Valley, 
j in the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur war. 
k This generation is leading 
I Israel's necessary battle against the terror organizations, 
m whose murderous desires were demonstrated to us on Saturday. 
n Israel will not recoil from defending its citizens 
o and will strike its enemies 
p in every place and with any means. 
q At the same time, we will not miss an opening or an opportunity 
r to reach an agreement with our neighbors 
s for the peace we long for so much. 
§lOa Only with this combination will it be possible for this generation 
b to see with its eyes the end of war 
c and enter the gates of peace. 
§l1a May the memory of those who fell in Israel's wars 
b be bound in the chain of life, 
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Annex P2: Personal Experience - Moshe Nissim 
This transcript was published in the Israeli Yediot Aharonot newspaper on 31 May 2002, under the title] 
Created For Them a Teddy Stadium in the Middle of the Camp. Interview with Israeli reserve soldier and 
bulldozer driver Moshe Nissim by Tsadok Yeheskeli for Yediot Aharonot's 7-Day magazine, 31 May 2002. 
§ 1a I entered Jenin 
b driven by madness, 
c by desperation, 
d I felt I have nothing to lose, 
e That even if I 'get it', 
f no big deal. 
§2a I told my wife: 
b "If anything happens to me, 
c at least someone will take care of you!." 
§3a I started my reserve service 
b in the worst conditions possible. 
c Maybe this is why I didn't give a damn. 
d Not about explosive charges, 
e not about gun fire. 
§4a My life was in deep shit 
b for'the past one and a half years. 
c For almost half a year I am suspended from work 
d as a senior inspector in the Jerusalem municipality. 
§5a I worked there for 17 years, 
b till that cursed day, 
c January the 20th, 
d exactly my 40th birthday, 
e when the police came and arrested me. 
§6a They said 
b that I and my colleagues in the inspection unit 
c are suspected for being bribed by contractors 
d and other business owners, 
e that in fact, 
f we are a corrupted bunch. 
§7a This is a terrible injustice. 
b I am a very friendly guy, 
c and in this job you mix with people you inspect. 
d But bribery? 
e Me? 
§8a I am in debt for hundreds of thousands of Shekels 
b long before all this story. 
c Had I taken bribes, 
d I would have money, 
e but I couldn't even pay the lawyer. 
f Since then I am suspended. 
g My wife was fired as well, 
h and I have four children to keep. 
§9a This was not the fjrst blow. 
b A few months earlier, 
c I was injured badly in my back, 
d my wife was fired, 
e and my son got run over 
f and had to be operated to save his leg. 
§lOa Today he is OK, 
b but his big dream, 
c and mine, 
d that he will once be a player 
e in the Beitar Jerusalem team, 
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h He was really talented. 
I have already promised him 
to get him into the children's Beitar team. 
§l1a For two years, it is just one blow after another. 
b I haven't got a cent, 
c but I love people. 
d I cannot be indifferent. 
e Every holiday, I distribute food packages for the needy. 
f The same at Passover. 
g I ran around like crazy. 
h And just then, 
I started getting phone calls from the guys: 
j "Kurdi", they said, 
k "we are all being recruited to do reserve service, 
I but you are not called." 
§12a Truth is, that I understood my commanders. 
b Hey, I've been doing my reserves duty for 16 years now, 
c and I was useless. 
d I did nothing but make trouble. 
§13a During my obligatory Military service! 
b I was constantly sentenced to prison, 
c because I refused to be a vehicle electrician. 
d In my unit as well, 
e in the tractor unit, 
f I was supposed to be an electriCian, 
g but actually, I did nothing, 
h just messed around. 
I would come to the unit, 
j and immediately open a card table, 
k open a bottle. 
I If any officer would dare send me to guard duty, 
m I would send him first. 
n Kurdi always did his thing. 
§14a If I felt like going to a Beitar football match, 
b or going home, 
c no one could stop me. 
d I would just start the car and go. 
§15a Truth is, they didn't even know me. 
b When I am given responsibility, 
c I can act differently. 
d In the "Versailles" disaster2 
e I was in charge of all the inspection team on location. 
f When I was seen by one of the guys of my military unit, 
g he was shocked. 
§16a He said: 
b "In the army you can't tie your shoelaces, 
c and here you are a big chief!" 
§ 17a The truth is that 
b when I finally decide to do something, 
c I am one stubborn guy. 
d I will go for it till the end. 
e This time was one of those moments. 
f What haven't I done for them to take me? 
g I sent the guys to twist the battalion commander's arm, 
h I phoned the company commander, 
i I drove them mad. 
j "I promise to work", I pleaded with the battalion commander. 
k Finally, he agreed to give me a chance. 
§18a I said to myself: 
1 In Israel, men are recruited at the age of 18 for 3 years of obligatory military service. At 21 they enter the reserve 
corps, usually neceSSitating 30 days of service each year until the age of 45. 













b "Kurdi, you can't let them down. 
c No more running wild!" 
§ 19a The funny bit is, 
b I didn't even know how to operate the 0-9. 
c I have never been an operator. 
d But I begged them to give me a chance to learn. 
§20a Before we went into Shekhem (Nablus), 
b I asked some of the guys to teach me. 
c They sat with me for two hours. 
d They taught me how to drive forwards 
e and make a flat surface. 
§21a I took it on with no problem 
b and told them: 
c 'That's it. 
d Move aside and let me work.'. 
§22a This is what happened in Jenin as well. 
b I have never demolished a house before, 
c or even a wall. 
d I got into the 0-9 with a friend of mine, 
e a Yemenite. 
f I let him work for an hour, 
g and then told him, 
h 'OK. I got the idea.' 
§23a But the real thing started 
b the day 13 of our soldiers were killed 
c up that alley in the Jenin refugee camp. 
§24a When they brought us in, 
b I knew that nobody wanted to work with me. 
c They were afraid to be with me on the tractor. 
d Not only did I have a reputation of a troublemaker, 
e but also of a man who knows no fear, 
f and they were right about that. 
g I really have no fear. 
h They knew I had no fear, 
that I don't give a damn, 
j and that I can go anywhere, 
k without asking questions, 
I without an escort of tanks or APe's or anything. 
m Once, in Jenin, 
n I left the tank that escorted us everywhere. 
o I wanted to have a spin around the camp, 
p see what's going on. 
q Gadi, the other operator who was with me, 
r nearly fainted. 
s He started gOing mad: 
t 'Get back,' he shouted, 
u 'we have no escort!', 
v but I had to get to know the place better, 
w to find an exit, 
x just in case we needed one. 
y I was not afraid to die. 
z At least I was insured. 
aa This would have helped my family. 
§25a When we got into the camp, 
b the 0-9's were already waiting. 
c They were hauled from Shekhem. 
d I got the big 0-9 L, 
e me and the Yemenite, my partner. 
f First thing I did was to tie the Beitar team flag. 
g I had it prepared in advance. 
h I wanted the family to be able to identify me. 
I told the family and the kids: 
j 'you will see my tractor on television. 
k When you see the Beitar flag, that will be me'. 
I And this is exactly what happened. 
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§26a I know it sounds crazy, 
b but for me, 
c to hang this flag was completely natural. 
d Like eating. 
e Here, look at this Beitar pendant around my neck. 
f It never comes off. 
g Not off me, 
h and not off the kids. 
i I carry the Beitar flags everywhere I go. 
j Look at my car, all covered with these flags. 
k This is the way I am. 
I I always go to the Beitar matches, 
m in a Beitar colored Galabia3 , 
n and a big drum of the Kurds from the C. 
o Once, after our first national championship, 
p I took a ride on the roof of a car, 
Q carrying the drum, 
r all the way to Jerusalem. 
§27a Beitar is a kink in my brain. 
b There is no other way to explain it. 
c After my family, 
d it is the most important thing in my life, 
e and the only thing that can kill me. 
f In Jenin, I was not scared for a moment, 
g but I cannot go to the Beitar matches for half a year now. 
h The suspense kills me, 
and I am constantly afraid of getting a heart attack. 
j Sometimes, I can walk around 'Teddy,4 
k with a ticket in my hand, 
I and I can't go in. 
m In one match, in Beit Shean, 
n I fainted after they scored a goal. 
o I know how this sounds, 
p but that's the way it is. 
Q Incurable. 
r At home, they know better than to talk to me 
s if Beitar lost a match. 
§28a So now you understand why 
b the Beitar flag was on the tractor in Jenin. 
c Someone told me 
d that my commander wanted to take it off. 
e But no way. 
f If I had a say in the matter, 
g there would be a Beitar flag 
h on the top of the mosque in the camp. 
i I tried convincing the Golani officer I worked with 
j to let me go up there and hang it, 
k but he refused. 
, He said I would be shot if I tried. 
m Pity. 
§29a The flag was the most outstanding object in the camp. 
b Reservists who went home on short leave 
c came back with Beltar flags, 
d just to imitate me. 
e It made a lot of nOise, my flag. 
f The Golani soldiers were stunned. 
g 'You brought Beitar here,' they told me. 
h And I said: 'I am going to make a Teddy stadium here. 
i Don't you worry.' 
§30a On the radiO, they wanted to call me 'Moshe-Bear', 
b but I insisted on Kurdi. 
c I told the Golanis, I am Kurdis, 
d and I won't answer if you call me by any other name.' 
e That is how 'Kurdi Bear' was born. 
3 an Arab man's dress 
4the main Jerusalem stadium 











f This is my name, 
g and I am stubborn. 
§31a In the reserves, 
b they already got used to my signature: 
c 'Moshe Nissim Beitar Jerusalem'. 
d For a while they asked me to stop it, 
e but finally they just gave up. 
§32a The moment I drove the tractor into the camp, 
b something switched in my head. 
c I went mad. 
d All the desperation caused by my personal condition 
e just vanished at once. 
f All that remained was the anger 
g over what had happened to our guys. 
h Till now I am convinced, 
I and so are the rest of us, 
j that if we were let into the camp earlier, 
k with all our might, 
Annex P2: Personal Experience - Moshe Nissim 
I twenty-four soldiers would not have been killed in this camp. 
§33a The moment I went into the camp, 
b for the first time, 
c I just thought of how to help these soldiers. 
d These fighters. 
e Children the age of my son. 
f I couldn't grasp how they worked there, 
g where a charge blows up on you 
h with every step you take. 
§34a With the first mission I was given, 
b to open a track inside the camp, 
c I understood what kind of hell this was. 
§35a My first mission, voluntarily, 
b was to bring the soldiers food. 
c I was told: 
d 'The only way to get food in there is with the D-9'. 
e They haven't eaten in two days. 
f You couldn't poke your nose out. 
g I filled the tractor till the roof, 
h and drove the tractor right up to the door of their post, 
i so that they would not have to take even one step 
j outside their shelter. 
k One step was enough in order to lose an arm or a leg. 
§36a You could not tell where the charges were. 
b They dug holes in the ground and planted charges. 
c You would just start driving, 
d and you would hit a 3" pipe, 
e welded on both ends. 
f As you touch them, they go off. 
g Everything was booby trapped. 
h Even the walls of houses. 
Just touch them, and they blow up. 
j Or, they would shoot you the moment you entered. 
k There were charges in the roads, 
I under the floor, 
m between the walls. 
n As you make an opening, something goes off. 
o I saw a bird cage blow up in some pet shop, 
p where we opened a track. 
q A flying birdcage. 
r I felt sorry for the birds. 
s They just planted charges everywhere. 
§37a For me, in the D-9, it was nothing. 
b I didn't mind. 
c You would just hear the explosions. 
§38a Even 80 Kilos of explosives 
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c It weighs three and a half tons. I; 
d It's a monster. 
e A tank can get hit in the belly. 
f Its belly is sensitive. 
g With the 0-9, 
h you should only look out for RPG's 
or 50 Kilos of explosives on the roof. 
j But I didn't think about it then. 
k The only thing that mattered was 
I that these soldiers must not risk themselves 
m just to eat or drink something. 
§39a I fell in love with those children. 
b I was willing to do with my tractor 
c anything they would ask for. 
d I begged for work: 
e 'Let me finish another house, open another track.' 
§40a They, in return, protected me. 
b I would leave the tractor without weapons, 
c nothing. 
d Just walked in. 
e They told me I am mad, 
f but I said: 'Leave me alone. 
g Anyhow, the armored vest will not save me.' 
h This is how I worked. 
Even without a shirt. 
Half naked. 
§41a Do you know how I held out for 75 hours? 
b I didn't get off the tractor. 
c I had no problem of fatigue, 
d because I drank whisky all the time. 
e I had a bottle in the tractor at all times. 
f I had put them in my bag in advance. 
g Everybody else took clothes, 
h but I knew what was waiting for me there, 
i so I took whisky and something to munch on. 
§42a Clothes? Didn't need any. 
b A towel was enough. 
c Anyhow I could not leave the tractor. 
d You open the door, 
e and get a bullet. 
f For 75 hours I didn't think about my life at home, 
g about all the problems. 
h Everything was erased. 
Sometimes images of terror attacks in Jerusalem 
j crossed my mind. 
k I witnessed some of them. 
§43a What is 'opening a track'? 
b You erase buildings. On both sides. 
c There is no other choice, 
d because the tractor was much wider than their alleys. 
e But I am not looking for excuses or anything. 
f You must 'shave' them. 
g I didn't give a damn about demolishing their houses, 
h because it saved the lives of our soldiers. 
I worked where our soldiers were slaughtered. 
j They didn't tell all the truth about what happened. 
k They drilled holes in the walls, 
I holes for gun barrels. 
m Anyone who escaped the charges, 
n was shot through these holes. 
§44a I had no mercy for anybody. 
b I would erase anyone with the 0-9, 
c just so that our soldiers won't expose themselves to danger. 
d That's what I told them. 
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e I was afraid for our soldiers. 
f You could see them sleeping together, 
g 40 soldiers in a house, 
h all crowded. 
i My heart went out for them. 
j This is why I didn't give a damn 
k about demolishing all the houses I've demolished -
I and I demolished plenty. 
m By the end, I built the 'Teddy' football stadium there. 
§45a Difficult? 
b No way. 
c You must be kidding. 
d I wanted to destroy everything. 
e I begged the officers, over the radio, 
f to let me knock it all down; 
g from top to bottom. 
h To level everything. 
It's not as if I wanted to kill. 
j Just the houses. 
k We didn't harm those who came out 
I of the houses we had started to demolish, 
m waving white flags. 
n We screwed just those who wanted to fight. 
§46a No one refused an order to knock down a house. 
b No such thing. 
c When I was told to bring down a house, 
d I took the opportunity to bring down some more houses; 
e not because I wanted to -
f but because when you are asked to demolish a house, 
g some other houses usually obscure it, 
h so there is no other way. 
I would have to do it even if I didn't want to. 
j They just stood in the way. 
k If I had to erase a house, 
I come hell or high water - I would do it. 
m And believe me, we demolished too little. 
n The whole camp was littered with detonation charges. 
o What we did actually saved the lives 
p of the Palestinians themselves, 
q because if they had returned to their homes, 
r they would blow up. 
§47a For three days, I just destroyed and destroyed. 
b The whole area. 
c Any house that they fired from came down. 
d And to knock it down, 
e I tore down some more. 
f They were warned by loudspeaker 
g to get out of the house before I come, 
h but I gave no one a chance. 
i I didn't wait. 
j I didn't give one blow, and wait for them to come out. 
k I would just ram the house with full power, 
I to bring it down as fast as possible. 
m I wanted to get to the other houses. 
n To get as many as possible. 
o Others may have restrained themselves, 
p or so they say. 
q Who are they kidding? 
r Anyone who was there, 
s and saw our soldiers in the houses, 
t would understand they were in a death trap. 
u I thought about saving them. 
v I didn't give a damn about the Palestinians, 
w but I didn't just ruin with no reason. 
x It was all under orders. 
§48a Many people were inside houses we went to demolish. 
b They would come out of the houses we were working on. 
c I didn't see, with my own eyes, 
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e and I didn't see houses falling down on live people. 
f But if there were any, I wouldn't care at all. 
g I am sure people died inside these houses, 
h but it was difficult to see, 
i there was lots of dust everywhere, 
j and we worked a lot at night. 
k I found joy with every house that came down, 
I because I knew they didn't mind dying, 
m but they cared for their homes. 
n If you knocked down a house, 
o you buried 40 or 50 people for generations. 
p If I am sorry for anything, 
q it is for not tearing the whole camp down. 
§49a I didn't stop for a moment. 
b Even when we had a two-hour break, 
c I insisted on going on. 
d I prepared a ramp to destroy a four-story building. 
e Once I steered sharply to the right, 
f and a whole wall came down. 
g Suddenly I heard shouting on the radio: 
h 'Kurdi, watch it! It is us!' 
i Turns out there were our guys inside, 
and they forgot to tell me. 
§50a I had plenty of satisfaction. 
b I really enjoyed it. 
c I remember pulling down a wall of a four-story building. 
d It came crashing down on my 0-9. 
e My partner screamed at me to reverse, 
f but I let the wall come down on us. 
g We would go for the sides of the buildings, 
h and then ram them. 
If the job was too hard, 
we would ask for a tank shell. 
§51a I couldn't stop. 
b I wanted to work and work. 
c There was this Golani officer 
d who gave us orders by radio 
e I drove him mad. 
f I kept begging for more and more missions. 
g On Sunday, 
h after the fighting was over, 
i we got orders to pull our 0-9's out of the area, 
j and stop working on our 'football stadium', 
k because the army didn't want 
I the cameras and press to see us working. 
m I was really upset, 
n because I had plans 
a to knock down the big sign at the entrance of Jenin -
p three poles with a picture of Arafat. 
q But on Sunday, they pulled us away 
r before I had time to do it. 
§52a I bitched them to give me more work. 
b I would tell them, over the radio: 
c 'Why are you letting me rest? 
d I want more work!' 
e All this time, I was really sick. I had fever. 
f I got back from Jenin wiped out. 
g Torn to bits. 
h The next day, I went up again. 
i One of the guys was ill, 
j and I volunteered to help. 
k I got back there. 
I The battalion-commander was in shock when he saw me. 
m The other operators all cracked up and needed rest, 
n but I refused to leave. 
a I wanted more. 
§53a I had lots of satisfaction in Jenin, 
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c It was like getting all the 18 years of doing nothing 
d into three days. 
e The soldiers came up to me and said: 
f 'Kurdi, thanks a lot. 
g Thanks a lot'. 
h And I hurt for the Thirteen. 7 
i If we had moved into the building 
j where they were ambushed, 
k we would have buried all those Palestinians alive. 
§54a I kept thinking of our soldiers. 
b I didn't feel sorry for all those Palestinians 
c who were left homeless. 
d I just felt sorry for their children, 
e who were not guilty. 
f There was one wounded child, 
g who was shot by Arabs. 
h A Golani paramedic came down 
i and changed his bandages, 
j till he was evacuated. 
k We took care of them, of the children. 
I The soldiers gave them candy. 
m But I had no mercy for the parents of these children. 
§55a I remembered the picture on television, 
b of the mother who said she will bear children 
c so that they will explode in Tel Aviv. 
d I asked the Palestinian women I saw there: 
e 'Aren't you ashamed?' 
§56a After I finished the work, 
b I got out of the tractor, 
c piled up some clothes on the side of the road, 
d and fell asleep. 
e They looked after me, 
f so that I won't get run over by a tank or something. 
g All the fatigue of the past 75 hours just landed on me. 
h There was a lot of excitement in what I did. 
I The fact that I did a good job operating the tractor, 
j the soldiers who came to me, 
k after it was all over, 
I and said: 'thank you'. 
m This was enough for me. 
n I miss them. 
o I've invited all of them for Kubeh at my place. 
p Their commander, Kobi, 
q the one I worked with throughout the 75 hours, 
r was amazed by the invitation. 
§57a 'Do you want the entire company 
b to come over to your house?' 
§S8a I told him: 'As far as I am concerned, 
b bring the whole battalion.' 
§S9a I phoned my mother, from the D-9, 
b and told her that the whole battalion was coming. 
c She said: 'no sweat. 
d I am waiting for them.' 
§60a I know many people will think that my attitude 
b stems from me being a 'Beitar' and 'Ukud' member.s 
c It is true. I am heavily on the right. 
d But this has nothing to do with what I have done in Jenin. 
e I have many Arab friends. 
f And I say, if a man has done nothing -
g don't touch him. 
h A man who has done something 
7 Kurdi is referring to the day in which 13 Israeli soldiers were killed by Palestinian fighters in an ambush in Jenin. 
S Two right-wing movements. Beitar, the youth movement, is more nationalistic. Ukud is the major right-wing party, 












i hang him, as far as I am concerned. 
j Even a pregnant woman -
k shoot her without mercy, 
I if she has a terrorist behind her. 
m This is the way I thought in Jenin. 
n I answered to no one. 
o Didn't give a damn. 
p The main thing was to help our soldiers. 
q If 1 had been given three weeks, 
r I would have had more fun. 
s That is, if they would let me tear the whole camp down. 
t I have no mercy. 
§61a All the human rights organizations 
b and the UN 
c that messed with Jenin, 
d and turned what we have done there into such an issue, 
e are just bullshitting, lying. 
f Lots of the walls in those houses 
g just exploded by themselves, 
h at our slightest touch. 
i It is true, though, 
j that during the last days we smashed the camp. 
k And yes, it was justified. 
I They mowed our soldiers down. 
m They had a chance to surrender. 
§62a No one expressed any reservations against doing it. 
b Not only me. 
c Who would dare speak? 
d If anyone would as much as open his mouth, 
e I would have buried him under the 0-9. 
f This is the reason I didn't mind 
g seeing the hundred by hundred we've flattened. 9 
h As far as I am concerned, 
i I left them with a football stadium, 
j so they can play. 
k This was our gift to the camp. 
I Better than killing them. 
m They will sit quietly. 
n Jenin will not return to what it used to be. 
Annex P2: Personal Experience Moshe Nissim 











Justificational Narratives Annex BA1: From Barthes' Second-Order Semiological System 
Background Analysis Annexes 
Annex SAl: From Sarthes' Second-Order Semiological 
System 
In a longer work on the subject of this thesis I would like to include and expand upon the following 
discussions, towards a deeper analysis of the issue of mythology. 
Section 2.i. is a discussion of Barthes' Second-order Semiological System. 2.ii illustrates the Palestinian 
as signifier, and 2.Ui. discusses the possibility of a third order system. 
(2.i.) Turning History into Nature: Barthes' Second-Order Semiological System 
Barthes sees mythology as performing the oppressive social function of "naturalising" reality, since only 
the powerful would seek lito keep the reality without keeping the appearances. roW Meanwhile, lithe 
oppressed ... has only one language, that of his emancipation/'ll so myth is a tool and a privilege of 
power: "the language of the [oppressed] aims at transforming, the [oppressor] at eternalising.,,12 It is 
true that when a people are drastically oppressed - in situations of extreme endurance such as war or 
famine - their immediate concern must be their own survival, which leaves little energy for mythological 
'casting'. As for the less oppressed, who may enjoy limited freedoms, their mythologies, however 
persuasive or apt, will rarely be heard beyond their particular linguistic, social or political boundaries. But 
with sufficiently powerful backing, certain mythologies can reach the status of "fact," even on a global 
scale. On these premises, Barthes discerns that "the function of myth is to empty reality,ron and so it "is 
always a language-robbery.,,14 
Barthes contends that this theory about myth can only be understood if "Iook[ed] at.. from the point of 
view of the signifier, of the thing that has been robbed; and within the signifier, from the point of view of 
. the language-object, that is, the meaning."lS To illustrate he outlines a "second-order semiological 
system," representing the relationship between Language and Myth: 
Language (1 st Order) 
MYTH (2nd Order) 
10 Barthes, 1993, p149. 
11 Barthes, 1993, p149. 
12 Barthes, 1993, p149. 
13 Barthes, 1993, p14S. 
14 Barthes, 1993, p13t. 
15 Barthes, 1993, p14S. 
1. Signifier I 2 S' 'f' d i • Ignl Ie 
, 3. Sign (meaning) 
I SIGNIFIER (form) 
. II SIGNIFIED (concept) 
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In the first order system, a linguistic or otherwise symbolic16 unit is the form (or 'signifier') allocated to 
portray a concept or thing; (ie that which is 'signified'). On the most basic level the first order can 
represent the relationship between a 'word' and its 'meaning'. It is widely agreed, in 'Western' theory at 
least, 17 that there is no essential relationship between an utterance and what it denotes but rather that 
the 'meaning' of a structure of sounds is agreed upon, then learnt, by those who utter and understand it. 
The words are then applied as to them seems normal. Those with more power are sometimes able to 
simply impose the labels on things that to them seem normal. It often happens that a word, previously 
assigned a different meaning within a speech community, is (re)appropriated to mean something new, 
whereupon the old meaning is largely abandoned over time. 1S In this way, language is continually 
evolving. Where the old meaning is entirely displaced, the signifier becomes fresh and empty of any 
previous significations. In this way, the signifier combines with the signified to produce the word that can 
be used by one and understood by others. This Barthes designates as the 'sign', a composite whole 
imbued as it is with meaning from both sides of its 'family tree': the signified and the signifier. 
On the second level, the 'sign' and all it implies are taken to aid the delivery of a new thought or concept. 
To illustrate, Barthes gives the example of a magazine cover that portrays a young black man in French 
military uniform, saluting the French flag. For Barthes, the photograph reinforces the status quo because, 
"If I state the fact of French imperiality without explaining it, I am very near to finding that it is natural 
and goes without saying.,,19 Here, not only the fact of "French imperiality," but also a strong image of its 
benign and all-embracing nature, are illustrated, or 'signified', by one of its subjects. The illustration is all 
the more convincing because, by representing a proud-and-happy imperial subject, the 'source' of the 
assessment is the 'other'.2o Stripped of his own identity and history, he has been transformed into a 
sanitised representation of the conceptually complex historical and cultural fact of French imperialism. 
"In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it 
gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics ... it organises a world which is 
without contradictions because it is without depth .. .',21 
(2.ii.) The Palestinian Signifier 
In theory, the word 'Palestinian' should be able to evoke endless potential associated images, since there 
exist Palestinian history, culture, traditions, people, etc. However, in our "world ... without depth," it now 
happens that several stock associations have been welded to this word throughout the world (although 
focused in some areas). The most immutable, 'Palestinian Terrorism/ist/s', is repeated so often in media 
reports that it has stripped the Palestinian of all other possible connotations or activities. In Israel itself, 
16 While Barthes acknowledges that linguistics is only part of the vast science of semiology, we can employ his 
arguments as he does to linguistic ends and put aside for now their applicability to other representations of meaning 
than language. 
17 The linguists discussed within this research seem to be in broad agreement on this subject, but the 'Western' 
distinction must be made because some speakers of some languages may see them as superior or even 'more godly' 
than other languages, implying that their words are closer to capturing the 'name-essence' of what they describe, such 
as ArabiC, the language of the Qu'ran, and Hebrew, the language of the Torah. For example, even non-Arabic speaking 
Muslims learn to recite from the Qu'ran in Arabic, since it is believed to be the language in which God 'delivered' it to 
the prophet Mohammed. Meanwhile, 'Edenics' students believe that Hebrew was the language of the Garden of Eden. 
18 Classic examples are words such as 'gay', 'awful' and ·silly'. For several more see Annex BA1b: Changes in Words, 
Quoted from the 'languages and linguistics' section of internet resource http://www.krysstal.com . 
19 Barthes, 1993, p143. 
20 There seems to be some ideological and structural similarity between this and Ariel Sharon's "I turn from here also 
to the Palestinian people ... You are observing us, IsraeliS, yearningly, and see Israel's many achievements. In the last 
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In turning 'history' (the fact that the Palestinians are repeatedly enraged by Israeli provocation, and that 
some resort to bombing) into 'nature' (if this is their nature then it may make sense to contain themL 
the predominant but apparently 'no-author' narrative, It is also what Barthes would call a "language 
robbery," and not just because of the Palestinian-as-adjective structure of the phrase itself, 'Palestinian 
cookery,' for example, allows the adjective to retain a multiplicity of implications depending on its context 
- it allows for a detailed history of taste, tradition, preferred ingredients, methods of cooking and beyond, 
to SOCial order and family hierarchy, and so on. If "the fundamental character of the mythical concept is 
to be appropriated,"22 then perhaps we can tentatively invert Barthes' findings and seek to identify 
mythologies according to whether a signifier's own history seems flattened or enhanced from within the 
overall sign. 23 If we see an 'empty' signifier, there is a chance that its function is to illustrate a myth. 
(2.m.) Suggestion for a Third Order - From Myth to Reality 
We can adapt and expand Barthes' semiological system to a third order, to explain how policy narrative 
(PN), with enough power at each level, is transformed into reality. Power is the constant 'signified'. 
PN 
Signifier 
!A policy narrative plus the power to implement it leads to the enactment of policy. The PN is a 'signifier' of 
Power power, the 'signified'; while the 'sign' is the combination of these elements. 
Signified • Power self-re~icates, fuelling the potential and desire for more power. 
I d b 't .. 24 "Policy, to have meaning, must be continuous y re-ma e y I S own consequences. 
Policy Sign 
Propaganda 
2nd order Signifier 
Po r The policy that is the 'sign' of the first order is reabsorbed into the system and 
2nd Orde;;;gnified em~rges as the second ord~r 'si~nifier', or the propaganda used by politicians to 
,deliver what has been promised In the lower-level PN What matters is how an action 
• is narrated, rather than how it actually happened. 
Ideology 2nd order Sign 
Perpetuation of public support for policy 
Creates 'Conventional Wisdom', 
3nl order Signifier 
I 
Reality 
3rd order Sign 
Power 
3,d order Signified 
The sign produced from the 2nd order 
signifier (propaganda) and the 2nd degree 
signified (power), is where "semiology 
becomes ideology," (or mythology, in 
Barthes' system), Ideology, the second order 
sign, is now the signifier of a third order of 
power (the 3r<1 order signified); it is accepted 
as conventional wisdom. 
The sign produced by the third order: the 
policymakers whose power is now 
conventional wisdom are directly dominating 
the reality of those affected by their policies 
and described in their narratives. This is the 
level of powerful national govemments and 
1,-· ___________________________ ----lintemational corporations. 
What is always being demonstrated or 'signified' with mythology, according to Barthes, is power: "the 
language of the [oppressed] aims at transforming, the [oppressor] at eternalising." All propagandists 
make a big show of power, for what is the point / incentive / etc in supporting an ideology that doesn't 
seem like it's going to win? Even the less powerful make a show of bravado and defiance, such as Iraq's 
threats prior to the recent war to 'annihilate' the United States. Threats like these are often re-
appropriated by the more powerful, and this is how grossly disproportionate 'clashes' are justified. This 
21 Barthes, 1993, p143. 
n Barthes, 1993, p119. 
23 It is tempting to assert that this holds true for positive as well as negative mythologies, with reference to the 
concepts of 'freedom', 'truth' and 'justice' as expounded by dominant nations, particularly in the context of forcing 
these qualities upon others through their expansionist and belligerent foreign policies. 
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would seem to reinforce Barthes' contention that the oppressed do not produce the prevalent 
mythologies, even if they appear to have contributed to them, 
Finally, all too often the propaganda is not aimed at the people whose lives and/or environment are to be 
altered, but at the domestic electorate of the government that either directly oppresses, or resorts to 
placing its nation 'at war' with, the other. This focus resembles what Said describes as the "imperial 
perspective," which is "that way of looking at a foreign reality ... seeing its people as subjects whose fate 
can be decided by what distant administrators think is best for them."zs 
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Annex BAth: Changes In Words 
http. www.krysstal.com 


















deserving of awe 
cowardice (as in bravado) 
legitimate copy 
young person of either sex 
take aim 
boy 
sinful self indulgence 
parcel of land (as in neck of the woods) 
famous 
injury, harm 
alive (as in quicksilver) 
corrupted 
to count (as in bank teller) 
beggar 
The word silly meant blessed or happy in the 11th century going through pious, innocent, harmless, 
pitiable, feeble, feeble minded before finally ending up as foolish or stupid. 
Pretty began as crafty then changed via clever, skilfully made, fine to beautiful. 
Buxom began with the meaning obedient and changed via compliant, lively, plump to large breasted. 
The word nice meant stupid and foolish in the late 13th Century. It went through a number of changes 
including wanton, extravagant, elegant, strange, modest, thin, and shy. By the middle of the 18th 
Century it had gained its current meaning of pleasant and agreeable. 
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Annex BA2: Aristotle And The Rhetoric Of Fear, Anger And 
Confidence 
Aristotelian definition (a/l definitions are quoted from Aristotle's Rhetoric, Book II.) 
Date, ref.: Sharon example 
Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil In the 
future. 
21-02-02, §7: "The State of Israel is not collapsing and will not collapse. Everything is in our hands, and future 
developments depend on us - our conduct, our courage: 
Not strong but mental picture produced by inference - negative clause leaves its positive event 'out there', imagined if 
not directly predicted. 
Fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying us or of harming us In ways that tend to cause 
us great pain. 
21-02-02. §7: 
21-02-02. §33: 
"the tremendous threats which have been hovering over the State since its inception." 
"our war against those who are trying to destroy our people .... 
Fear is caused by the enmity and anger of people who have power to do something to us. 
21-02-02. §18: "A complete demilitarisation of the Palestinian zone is categorical." 
Fear is felt by those who believe something to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in 
a particular form, and at a particular time. 
08-04-02 §4: "They have one mission: to chase us out of here. from everywhere - from our home in Elan Moreh 
and from the supermarket in Jerusalem. from the cafe in Tel Aviv and from the restaurant in Haifa .... 
There Is no fear without some faint expectation of escape, [because} fear sets us thinking about what can be 
done, which of course nobody does when things are hopeless 
21-02-02. §31: "I would also like to tum to those who are talking about a collapse, despair and loss of hope. This is 
not the time to utter words of disaster, it is the time to stand firm and united and assist wherever you can." 
The orator must make them feel that they are really in danger of something, pointing out that it has happened to 
others who were stronger than they are ... 
08-04-02 §32: "Since that deadly attack in September, the partnership between Israelis and Americans has, 
unfortunately, become a ·partnership of blood" between victims of terror." 
We feel confidence if we believe we have often succeeded and never suffered reverses, or have often met 
danger and escaped it safely. 
21-02-02 §4: "We are a nation that has accumulated vast experience in confronting problems and we have an 
inexhaustible source of talent and the ability to pull ourselves out. If there is anything that concerns me it is not our ability 
to confront and solve problems, but the gap between our true capability on the one hand and this unfounded doubt that 
we have in our ability, on the other: 
21-02-02 §6: "All these are a testimony to a healthy society. full of vitality and Willpower. a society whose sons and 
daughters are no less qualified than the generations which established the State, broke the siege imposed upon us in 
1967 and pulled themselves out of the depth of the abyss in 1973." 
22-01-03 §2: "For two and a half years the people of Israel have borne this struggle with courage and stamina, our 
spirit has not broken and the terrorists' schemes have come up and been shattered against our strength and our 
fortitude." 
[AJlso if we bel/eve ourselves superior to our rivals in ... the possession of all, or the most important, appliances 
of war. 
21-02-02 § 11: "The 'Merkava' Tank (developed by Maj. Gen. Tal - "T alik") is the winning tank - the best in the world. 
The IDF is one of the greatest offensive armies in the world. Our Air Force and Navy are also among the most 
outstanding in the world: 
The fact is that anger makes us confident - that anger is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers 
but the wronged ... 
21-02-02 §6: "Just take a moment and ponder the past year and a half of struggle that has been forced upon us: 
21-02-02 §30: "the war of terrorism which was forced upon us 17 months ago .. : 
••• and that the divine power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged. 
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Annex BA3: Containing Emotions 
By Sasha Evans, work in progress 
Disguising the imposition of emotion by superimposition of an apparently logical formula is an approach 
that takes place over and again throughout the speeches of Ariel Sharon. In most cases, the formulaic 
quality is provided simply by imposing causative conjunctions and other forms of attribution to what 
might be more honestly presented as tentative or tenuous conclusions. To illustrate we turn to perhaps 
the most emotionally-charged speech; that of 8 April 2002: 
08-04-02 §14a Members of Knesset, 
b For eighteen months Israel has been under bitter and bloody attack, 
c initiated by our Palestinian neighbours. 
d We have paid a high price in blood, 
e solely because of our honest wish to live in peace with them, 
f and because of our belief that they want the same. 
§15a The infrastructure of terror against Israel 
b was established before this government took office. 
c The main purpose of our National Unity Government 
d was to achieve a cessation of violence and incitement 
e as a vital and essential condition 
f for the resumption of our efforts to achieve peace in the region. 
g This is the essence of this government's existence. 
These stanzas take the scientific form of a 'timeline', conveying the impression of unadulterated factuality 
in cause and effect. By the time of this speech, the so-called 'Palestinian Intifada,26 has indeed been 
running for eighteen months, if we accept the 'common knowledge' of both the Israeli and the Palestinian 
narratives that the current crisis began on 28/29 September 2000. If the "eighteen months" part of § 14b 
is widely accepted as 'fact', our resistance to the second and third parts of the sentence is diminished: 
Ariel Sharon is telling us that Israel has been under "bitter and bloody attack," and he as Prime Minister 
is certainly in a position to know what has been happening to Israel. And when Israel is under attack, the 
attackers, as we all know, can be none other than the Palestinians (or, in extension, the 'Arabs'), so the 
information contained in the third part of the sentence is understood even before it has been delivered. 
According to §14d-f, "We have paid a high price in blood, solely because of our honest wish to live in 
peace with them, and because of our belief that they want the same." This sentiment echoes that of the 
"victims of coexistence" (08-04-02 §5a) discussed above. So/ely because we wanted to live in peace; 
because we believed that they wanted the same; we are being killed and wounded. Again heavily reliant 
on intertextual reference and audience pre-knowledge, Sharon is referring here to the breakdown of the 
'peace process' and the collapse of the Camp David talks in July 2000,21 According to the Israeli 
narrative, the Palestinian refusal to accept the terms of Camp David constitutes proof that they do not 
26 I believe that the term 'Intifada' was originally imposed on the Palestinians by outside sources, since although I was 
living in Palestine at the time I heard it first on CNN, while Palestinians were still reeling at the ferocity of the Israeli 
army's response to their demonstrations against Sharon's visit to the Aqsa mosque and had not yet begun to use the 
word to describe what was happening around them. 'Intifada' means 'uprising', but in the first few days of this conflict 
there was no 'uprising' to speak of except in the form of unarmed demonstrations: over 80 Palestinians had been killed 
before the first attacks on Israelis took place. However, the term was quickly accepted perhaps after the first two or 
three weeks by the Palestinians themselves. Nonetheless, I maintain that the phrase "Palestinian intifada" is 
inaccurate because it attributes the notion of Palestinian instigation to the events of the past three years. 
27 See Sharon's article The Way FOfWard in the Middle East: "the Palestinian leadership decided to initiate the current 
war against Israel after the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000. Rather than resolve Israeli-Palestinian 
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want peace,28 while the liberties accorded to the Palestinians during the years of the peace process 
simply gave them time to organise and amass forces and weapons to be used against Israelis. In 
Sharon's terms, the peace process was a mistake for this reason, all of which can now be condensed into 
the sentiments of §14d-f. 
Meanwhile the listener's emotions are tweaked by a series of evocative adjectives - Israel has been 
under "bitter and bloody" attack; 'our' wish to live in peace with 'them' was "honest" (as ever, 'honesty' 
carries with it connotations of innocence and na'ive good will), and the result has been the paying of "a 
high price in blood." Continuing with the timeline, "The infrastructure of terror against Israel was 
established before this government took office," (§lSa-b). Although this comment seems assertive and 
factual, its meaning is vague and unclear. The "infrastructure of terror" is a term that has been repeated 
so often, both in Israel and internationally, that explanation no longer seems necessary, if indeed it has 
ever been explained - but it remains problematic, particularly in view of its societal connotations. When 
speaking of the "war of attrition," commonly accepted as taking place from 1967-70, he describes Israeli 
soldiers "in pursuit of terrorists in the Jordan Valley, clearing terrorist nests in alleyways in Gaza and 
Rafiah," (07-10-03 §7f-h). Presumably these terrorists had already begun to establish their 
"infrastructure" (long before this government took office in February 2001), but it seems more likely that 
Sharon is again referring to the 'peace process' years, when, according to his comments to the Weizmann 
Institute, "Arafat abused his position and the recognition he was granted to build a murderous terrorist 
regime to continue the armed struggle against Israel," (22-01-03 §l1h-k). During the 'peace process' 
the Palestinians established their own infrastructure which, along with roads, electricity and water 
networks, included the Palestinian police and security forces. Once again, the distinction between 
"terrorists" and Palestinians is subtly blurred. 
However, the primary aim of this sentence (08-04-02 §lSa-b) seems to be to temporally distance the 
current Israeli government from the advent of terrorism, implicitly rebutting accusations that its policies 
may be responsible for provoking terrorist attacks. Indeed, Sharon continues, the "main purpose" of the 
government he heads was "to achieve a cessation of violence and incitement," (§lSd). There is no 
discussion of precisely what measures were taken to this end, but it is interesting to note that the ending 
of violence and incitement does not constitute peace itself, as we might expect, but rather "a vital and 
essential [pre]condition for the resumption of our efforts to achieve peace." In other words, it is not 
necessary to aspire to the "cessation of violence and incitement" as one would aspire to peace -
something of a non-sequitur which might seem to betray the belligerent overtones of the measures taken 
so far. 
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Background Information Annexes 
Annex BI1: Once Upon A Time In lenin 
What really happened when Israeli forces went into Jenin? Just as the world is giving up hope of learning 
the truth, Justin Huggler and Phil Reeves have unearthed compelling evidence of an atrocity 
25 April 2002, The Independent, UK (http://www.indeoendent.co.uk) 
The thought was as unshakeable as the stench wafting from the ruins. Was this really about 
counterterrorism? Was it revenge? Or was it an episode - the nastiest so far - in a long war by Ariel 
Sharon, the staunch opponent of the Oslo accords, to establish Israel's presence in the West Bank as 
permanent, and force the Palestinians into final submission? A neighbourhood had been reduced to a 
moonscape, pulverised under the tracks of bulldozers and tanks. A maze of cinder-block houses, home to 
about 800 Palestinian families, had disappeared. What was left - the piles of broken concrete and 
scattered belongings - reeked. 
The rubble in Jenin reeked, literally, of rotting human corpses, buried underneath. But it also gave off the 
whiff of wrongdoing, of an army and a government that had lost its bearings. "This is horrifying beyond 
belief," said the United Nations' Middle East envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen, as he gazed at the scene. He 
called it a "blot that will forever live on the history of the state of Israel" - a remark for which he was to 
be vilified by Israelis. Even the painstakingly careful United States envoy, William Burns, was unusually 
outspoken as he trudged across the ruins. "It's obvious that what happened in Jenin refugee camp has 
caused enormous suffering for thousands of innocent Palestinian civilians," he said. 
The Israeli army insists that its devastating invasion of the refugee camp in Jenin earlier this month was 
intended to root out the infrastructure of the Palestinian militias, particularly the authors of an 
increasingly vicious series of suicide attacks on Israelis. It now says the dead were mostly fighters. And, 
as always - although its daily behaviour in the occupied territories contradicts this claim - it insists that it 
did everything possible to protect civilians. 
But The Independent has unearthed a different story. We have found that, while the Israeli operation 
clearly dealt a devastating blow to the militant organisations - in the short term, at least - nearly half of 
the Palestinian dead who have been identified so far were civilians, including women, children and the 
elderly. They died amid a ruthless and brutal Israeli operation, in which many individual atrocities 
occurred, and which Israel is seeking to hide by launching a massive propaganda drive. 
The assault on Jenin refugee camp by Israel's armed forces began early on 3 April. One week earlier, 30 
miles to the west in the Israeli coastal town of Netanya, a Hamas suicide bomber had walked into a hotel 
and blown up a roomful of people as they were sitting down to celebrate the Passover feast. This horrific 
slaughter on one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar killed 28 people, young and old, making it the 
worst Palestinian attack of the intifada, a singularly evil moment even by the standards of the long 
conflict between the two peoples. 
Ariel Sharon, Israel's premier, and his ministers responded by activating a plan that had long lain on his 
desk. Operation Defensive Shield was to become the largest military offensive by Israel since the 1967 
war. Jenin refugee camp was high on the list of targets. Home to about 13,000 people, it was the 
heartland of violent resistance to Israel's 35-year occupation. 
The graffiti-covered walls bellowed the slogans of Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad; radical Islamists and 
secular nationalists worked side by side, burying differences in the name of the intifada. According to 
Israel, 23 suicide bombers had come out of the camp, which was a centre for bomb-making. Yet there 
were also many, many civilians. People such as Atiya Rumeleh, Afaf Desuqi and Ahmad Hamduni. 
The army was expecting a swift victory. It had overwhelming superiority of arms - 1,000 infantrymen, 
mostly reservists, accompanied by Merkava tanks, armoured vehicles, bulldozers and Cobra helicopters, 
armed with missiles and heavy machine guns. Ranged against this force were about 200 Palestinians, 
with members of the militias Hamas, al-Aqsa brigades and Islamic Jihad - fighting alongside Yasser 
Arafat's security forces, mostly armed with Kalashnikovs and explosives. 
The fight put up by the Palestinians shocked the soldiers. Eight days after entering, the Israeli army 
finally prevailed, but at a heavy price. Twenty-three soldiers were killed, 13 of them wiped out by an 
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lay utterly devastated; scenes that the Israeli authorities knew at once would outrage the world as soon 
as they hit the TV screens. "We were not expecting them to fight so well," said one exhausted-looking 
Israeli reservist as he packed up to head home. Journalists and humanitarian workers were kept away for 
five more days while the Israeli army cleaned up the area, after the serious fighting ended on 10 April. 
The Independent spent five days conducting long, detailed interviews of survivors among the ruins of the 
refugee camp, accompanied by Peter Bouckaert, a senior researcher for the Human Rights Watch 
organisation. Many of the interviews were conducted in buildings that were on the verge of collapse, in 
living rooms where one entire wall had been ripped off by the bulldozers and that were open to the 
street. 
An alarming picture has emerged of what took place. So far, 50 of the dead have been identified. The 
Independent has a list of names. Palestinians were happy, even proud, to tell us which of the dead were 
fighters for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the AI-Aqsa brigades; which belonged to their security forces; and 
which were civilians. They identified nearly half as civilians. 
Not all the Civilians were cut down in crossfire. Some, according to eyewitness accounts, were 
deliberately targeted by Israeli forces. Sami Abu Sba'a told us how his 65-year-old father, Mohammed 
Abu Sba'a, was shot dead by Israeli soldiers after he warned the driver of an approaching bulldozer that 
his house was packed with families sheltering from the fighting. The bulldozer turned back, said Mr Abu 
Sba'a - but his father was almost immediately shot in the chest where he stood. 
Israeli troops also shot dead a Palestinian nurse as she tried to help a wounded man. Hani Rumeleh, a 
19-year-old civilian, had been shot as he tried to look out of his front door. Fadwa Jamma, a riurse 
staying with her sister in a house nearby, heard Hani's screaming and came to help. Her Sister, Rufaida 
Damaj, who also ran to help, was wounded but survived. From her bed in Jenin hospital, she told us what 
happened. 
"We were woken at 3.30 in the morning by a big explosion," she said. "I heard that one guy was 
wounded outside our house. So my sister and I went to do our duty and to help the guy and give him 
first aid. There were some guys from the resistance outside and we had to ask them before we moved 
anywhere. I told them that my sister was a nurse, I asked them to let us go to the wounded. 
"Before I had finished talking to the guys the Israelis started shooting. I got a bullet in my leg and I fell 
down and broke my knee. My sister tried to come and help me. I told her, 'I'm wounded.' She said, 'I'm 
wounded too.' She had been shot in the side of her abdomen. Then they shot her again in the heart. I 
asked where she was wounded but she didn't answer, she made a terrible sound and tried to breathe 
three times." 
Ms Jamma was wearing a white nurse's uniform clearly marked with a red crescent, the emblem of 
Palestinian medical workers, when the soldiers shot her. Ms Damaj said the soldiers could clearly see the 
women because they were standing under a bright light, and could hear their cries for help because they 
were "very near." As Ms Damaj shouted to the Palestinian fighters to get help, the Israeli soldiers fired 
again: a second bullet went up through her leg into her chest. 
Eventually an ambulance was allowed through to rescue Ms Damaj. Her sister was already dead. It was 
to be one of the last times an ambulance was allowed near the wounded in Jenin camp until after the 
battle ended. Hani Rumeleh was taken to hospital, but he was dead. For his stepmother, however, the 
tragedy had only just begun; the next day, her 44-year-old husband Atiya, also a civilian, was killed. 
As she told his story, her orphaned children clung to her side. "There was shooting all around the house. 
At about Spm I went to check the building. I told my husband two bombs had come into the house. He 
went to check. After two minutes he called me to come, but he was having difficulty calling. I went with 
the children. He was still standing. In my life I've never seen the way he looked at me. He said, 'I'm 
wounded', and started bleeding from his mouth and nose. The children started crying, and he fell down. I 
asked him what happened but he couldn't talk. 
"His eyes went to the children. He looked at them one by one. Then he looked at me. Then all his body 
was shaking. When I looked, there was a bullet in his head. I tried to call an ambulance, I was screaming 
for anybody to call an ambulance. One came but it was sent back by the Israelis." 
It was Thursday 4 April, and the blockade against recovering the wounded had begun. With the fighting 
raging outSide, Ms Rumeleh could not go out of the house to fetch help. Eventually she made a rope out 
of headscarves and lowered her seven-year-old son Mohammed out of the back window to go and seek 
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A few doors away, we heard the story of Afaf Desuqi. Her sister, Aysha, told us how the 52-year-old 
woman was killed when the Israeli soldiers detonated a mine to blow the door of her house open. Ms 
Desuqi had heard the soldiers coming and gone to open the door. She showed us the remains of the 
mine, a large metal cylinder. The family screamed for an ambulance, but none was allowed through. 
Ismehan Murad, another neighbour, told us the soldiers had been using her as a human shield when they 
blew the front door off the Desuqi house. They came to the young woman's house first, and ordered her 
to go ahead of them, so that they would not be fired on. 
Jamal Feyed died after being buried alive in the rubble. His uncle, Saeb Feyed, told us that 37-year-old 
Jamal was mentally and physically disabled, and could not walk. The family had already moved him from 
house to house to avoid the fighting. When Mr Feyed saw an Israeli bulldozer approaching the house 
where his nephew was, he ran to warn the driver. But the bulldozer ploughed into the wall of the house, 
which collapsed on Jamal. 
Although they evacuated significant numbers of civilians, the Israelis made use of others as human 
shields. Rajeh Tawafshi, a 72-year-old man, told us that the soldiers tied his hands and made him walk in 
front of them as they searched house to house. Moments before, they had shot dead Ahmad Hamduni, a 
man in his eighties, before Mr Tawafshi's eyes. Mr Hamduni had sought shelter in Mr Tawafshi's house, 
but the Israeli soldiers had blown the door open. Part of the metal door landed next to the two men. Mr 
Hamduni was hunched with age, and Mr Tawafshi thinks the soldiers may have mistakenly thought he 
was wearing a suicide-bomb belt. They shot him on sight. 
Even children were not immune from the Israeli onslaught. Faris Zeben, a 14-year-old boy, wa's shot 
dead by Israeli soldiers in cold blood. There was not even any fighting at the time. The curfew on Jenin 
had been lifted for a few hours and the boy went to buy groceries. This was on Thursday 11 April. Faris's 
eight-year-old brother, Abdel Rahman, was with him when he died. Nervously picking at his cardigan, his 
eyes on the ground, the child told us what happened. 
"It was me and Faris and one other boy, and some women I didn't know. Faris told me to go home but I 
refused. We were going in front of the tank. Then we saw the front of the tank move towards us and I 
was scared. Faris told me to go home but I refused. The tank started shooting and Faris and the other 
boy ran away. I fell down. I saw Faris fall down, I thought he just fell. Then I saw blood on the ground so 
I went to Faris. Then two of the women came and put Faris in a car." 
Abdel Rahman showed us where it happened. We paced it out: the tank had been about 80m away. He 
said there was only one burst of machine-gun fire. He imitated the sound it made. The soldiers in the 
tank gave no warning, he said. And after they shot Faris they did nothing. 
Fifteen-year-old Mohammed Hawashin was shot dead as he tried to walk throl1gh the camp. Aliya Zubeidi 
told us how she was on her way to the hospital to see the body of her son Ziad, a militant from the AI-
Aqsa brigades, who had been killed in the fighting. Mohammed accompanied her. "I heard shooting," said 
Ms Zubeidi. "The boy was sitting in the door. I thought he was hiding from the bullets. Then he said, 
'Help.' We couldn't do anything for him. He had been shot in the face." 
In a deserted road by the periphery of the refugee camp, we found the fiattened remains of a wheelchair. 
It had been utterly crushed, ironed flat as if in a cartoon. In the middle of the debris lay a broken white 
flag. Durar Hassan told us how his friend, Kemal Zughayer, was shot dead as he tried to wheel himself up 
the road. The Israeli tanks must have driven over the body, because when Mr Hassan found it, one leg 
and both arms were miSSing, and the face, he said, had been ripped in two. 
Mr Zughayer, who was 58, had been shot and wounded in the first Palestinian intifada. He could not walk, 
and had no work. Mr Hassan showed us the pitiful single room where his friend lived, the only furnishing 
a filthy mattress on the floor. Mr Zughayer used to wheel himself to the petrol station where Mr Hassan 
worked every day, because he was lonely. Mr Hassan did his washing; it was he who put the white flag 
on Mr Zughayer's wheelchair. 
"After 4pm I pushed him up to the street as usual," said Mr Hassan. "Then I heard the tanks coming, 
there were four or five. I heard shooting, and I thought they were just firing warning shots to tell him to 
move out of the middle of the road." It was not until the next morning that Mr Hassan went to check 
what had happened. He found the flattened wheelchair in the road, and Mr Zughayer's mangled body 
some distance away, in the grass. 
The Independent has more such accounts. There simply is not enough space to print them all. Mr 
Bouckaert, the Human Rights Watch researcher, who is preparing a report, said the sheer number of 
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"We've carried out extensive interviews in the camp, and the testimonies of dozens of witnesses are 
entirely consistent with each other about the extent and the types of abuses that were carried out in the 
camp," said Mr Bouckaert, who has investigated human-rights abuses in a dozen war zones, including 
Rwanda, Kosovo and Chechnya. "Over and over again witnesses have been giving similar accounts of 
atrocities that were committed. Many of the people who were killed were young children or elderly 
people. Even in the cases of young men; in Palestinian society, relatives are quite forthcoming when 
young men are fighters. They take pride that their young men are so-called 'martyrs'. When Palestinian 
families claim their killed relatives were civilians we give a high degree of credibility to that." 
The events at Jenin - which have passed almost unquestioned inside Israel - have created a crisis in 
Israel's relations with the outside world. Questions are now being asked increasingly in Europe over 
whether Ariel Sharon is, ultimately, fighting a "war on terror", or whether he is trying to inflict a defeat 
that will end all chance of a Palestinian state. These suspicions grew still stronger this week as pictures 
emerged of the damage inflicted by the Israeli army elsewhere in the West Bank during the operation: 
the soldiers deliberately trashed institutions of Palestinian statehood, such as the ministries of health and 
education. 
To counter the international backlash, the Israeli government has launched an enormous public-relations 
drive to justify the operation in Jenin. Their efforts have been greatly helped by the Palestinian 
leadership, who instantly, and without proof, declared that a massacre had occurred in which as many as 
500 died. Palestinian human-rights groups made matters worse by churning out wild, and clearly untrue, 
stories. 
No holds are barred in the Israeli PR counterattack. The army - realising that many journalists' will not 
bother, or are unable, to go to Jenin - has even made an Orwellian attempt to alter the hard, physical 
facts on the ground. It has announced that the published reports of the devastated area are exaggerated, 
declaring it to be a mere 100m square - about one-twentieth of its true area. 
One spokesman, Major Rafi Lederman, a brigade chief of staff, told a press conference on Saturday that 
the Israeli armed forces did not fire missiles from its Cobra helicopters - a claim dismissed by a Western 
military expert who has toured the wrecked camp with one word: "Bollocks." There were, said the major, 
"almost no innocent civilians" - also untrue. 
The chief aim of the PR campaign has been to redirect the blame elsewhere. Israeli officials accuse 
UNWRA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, for allowing a "terrorist infrastructure" to evolve in a 
camp under its administration without raising the alarm. UNWRA officials wearily point out that it does 
not administer the camp; it provides services, mainly schools and clinics. 
The Israeli army has lashed out at the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC) and Palestinian 
Red Crescent, whose ambulances were barred from entering the camp for six days, from 9 to 15 April. It 
has accused them of refusing to allow the army to search their vehicles, and of smuggling out 
Palestinians posing as wounded. The ICRC has dismissed all these claims as nonsense, describing the ban 
- which violates the Geneva Convention - as "unacceptable." 
The Israeli army says it bulldozed buildings after the battle ended, partly because they were heavily 
booby trapped but also because there was a danger of them collapsing on to its soldiers or Palestinian 
civilians. But after the army bulldozers withdrew, The Independent found many families, including 
children, living in badly damaged homes that were in severe danger of collapse. 
The thrust of Israel's PR drive is to argue that the Palestinians blew up the neighbourhood, compelling 
the army to knock it down. It is true that there were a significant number of Palestinian booby traps 
around the camp, but how many is far from clear. Booby traps are a device typically used by a retreating 
force against an advancing one. Here, the Palestinian fighters had nowhere to go. 
What is beyond dispute is that the misery of Jenin is not over. There are Palestinians still searching for 
missing people, although it is not clear whether they are in Israeli detention, buried deep under the 
rubble, or in graves elsewhere. 
SuspiCions abound among the Palestinians that bodies have been removed by the Israeli army. They cite 
the Israeli army's differing statements about the death toll during the Jenin operation - first it said it 
thought that there were around 100 Palestinian dead; then it said hundreds of dead and wounded; and, 
finally, only dozens. More disturbingly, Israeli military sources originally said there was a plan to move 
bodies out of the camp and bury them in a "special cemetery." They now say that the plan was shelved 
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Each day, as we interviewed the survivors, there were several explosions as people trod on unexploded 
bombs and rockets that littered the ruined camp. One hour after Fadl Musharqa, 42, had spoken with us 
about the death of his brother, he was rushed to the hospital, his foot shattered after he stepped on an 
explosive. 
A man came up to us in the hospital holding out something in the palm of his hand. They were little, 
brown, fleshy stumps: the freshly severed toes of his lO-year-old son, who had stepped on some 
explosives. The boy lost both legs and an arm. The explosives that were left behind were both the 
Palestinians' crude pipe bombs and the Israelis' state-of-the-art explosives: the bombs and mines with 
which they blew open doors, the helicopter rockets they fired into civilian homes. 
These are the facts that the Israeli government does not want the world to know. To them should be 
added the preliminary conclusion of Amnesty International, which has found evidence of severe abuses of 
human rights - including extra-judicial executions - and has called for a war crimes inquiry. 
At the time of writing, Israel has withdrawn its co-operation from a fact-finding mission dispatched by the 
UN Security Council to find out what happened in Jenin. This is, given what we now know about the 
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Annex BI2: Fears For The Demographic Balance At The 
Zionist Conference 
By Amiram Barkat and Jonathan Lis, 
Ha'aretz, Israel. 
November 11, 2003, p. 11 
http://www.aad-online.org/English%20site/Eng%20Iinks/aad4/Ten4/dae4.htm 
The demographic balance between Jews and Arabs was one of the main topics discussed at the Israeli 
Zionist Conference, held yesterday in Jerusalem. Various speakers agreed that if current indicators 
continue, it is the most serious threat to the future of Israel as a democratic, Jewish state. 
The talk was organized by the Zionist Council, the executive wing of the World Zionist Organization in 
Israel. For the talk, the council issued a position paper containing recommendations on how to deal with 
the antiCipated proportional increase of Arab citizens. The council's Strategic Forum prepared a position 
paper based on the expectations of Prof. Arnon Sofer and Dr. Yitzhak Ravid, who predict that the Arabs 
will comprise 22% of the state's citizens by 2020, compared to the current 16%. • 
Prof. Arik Carmon, head of the Israeli Institute for Democracy, said during the discussion that the 
recommendation to limit the ability of Palestinians to obtain Israeli citizenship through marriage 
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Annex 813: Assassinating Sheikh Yassin 
Sharon Edges Closer to World War 
March 22, 2004, by Gilad Atzmon* 
Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was murdered at daybreak on Monday. Israel Air Force 
helicopters fired missiles at the car carrying the wheelchair-bound head of the Islamic group as he left a 
mosque near his house in Gaza City. It also appears Ariel Sharon was in direct command of the 
assassination operation, not entirely surprising considering his bloody history. 
For those who fail to realise, today's barbaric Israeli act is an open call for a world war. It is the final 
wake up call for every Muslim around the world. It is violent proof that Israel isn't only against the 
Palestinians but rather against Islam. Israel killed a prime spiritual leader on his way out of the mosque. I 
have no doubt that this Israeli act won't be forgiven. I also have no doubt that many Israelis will pay with 
their life for Sharon's act. Moreover I am sure that sooner rather than later many innocent non-Israelis 
around the world will die just for being near by an Israeli embassy, Israeli consulate, a synagogue or 
even an American bank ... This is the reality Sharon favours the most. 
This is exactly what Israel wants: to turn the entire world into a victim of terror. This might help us to 
realise the main difference between the Israeli left and right. While both believe in the right of'the Jews 
to live in Zion at the expense of the Palestinian people, the Israeli right wing rely on maintaining a bloody 
struggle, oppressing the Palestinian people (in particular) and humiliating Arabs (in general). While the 
Israeli left would attempt to come up with some unrealistic righteous suggestions to appease the 
Palestinian people and the world community (Oslo accord for instance), the right wing Israelis will 
suggest that the only method to guarantee Israeli security is to maintain the conflict with the Palestinian 
people and to let it escalate into an international battle. 
On the surface it seems bizarre considering Sharon was just recently pretending to suggest a plan of 
Israeli disengagement from the Gaza strip. Today he gave us a real chance to peep into his mind. The 
'disengagement plan' was just another of Sharon's tricks. In fact, Sharon and the Israeli right wing need 
the Palestinians, they need them oppressed and humiliated, they need their terror. Israeli right wing 
hegemony is fed by terror. And now there is a new need emerging. Israel is faCing a demographic 
disaster. Within five years there will be a Palestinian majority in the territories controlled by Israel 
(between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River). This is literally the end of the Zionist dream. 
Eventually Israel will have to give away its Jewish identity. While the Israeli left remains confused about 
this reality, the Israeli right wing is fully prepared. For years Israeli warmongers have openly discussed 
'transfer': the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people. Considering the current world affairs and general 
oppOSition to Israel it is hard to believe that large scale ethnic cleanSing would go ahead unless some 
colossal catastrophe was in place. Sharon is preparing the ground for such a disaster. He needs a war, a 
big one, something that will allow him to go wild, to go out of control, to initiate a campaign in which 
Israeli soldiers will become murderous squads ready massacre against the Palestinian civilians. Sharon 
wants to re-Iaunch the 1948 Nakba. Sharon fully understands that this is what the Israeli public want. He 
is very good at reading their innermost desires. 
The killing of Sheikh Yassin pushed the violence far beyond any recognisable measure. It is pushing the 
Palestinian masses towards martyrdom. According to the Israeli military doctrine, Israel would never be 
defeated by terror. But at the same time every Israeli realises that the Zionist adventure will be 
categorically defeated by a demographic crisis. The assassination of Sheikh Yassin is there to push the 
Palestinians towards acts that will allow the Israelis to impose the most murderous measures against the 
Palestinian civilians. Mr Sharon, a world acclaimed war criminal and serial murderer proved again that at 
least when blood games are concerned, he is one step ahead of the game. 
Gilad Atzmon was born in Israel and served in the Israeli military. He is the author of the new novel A 
Guide to the Perplexed. Atzmon is also an accomplished jazz saxophonist in Europe. His new CD, Exile, 
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Ariel Sharon 
Annex B14: Ariel Sharon Biography 
Compiled by The Electronic Intifada httg:ILelectronicintifada.netl 
by annotating on the official biography released by the Israeli MFA. 
Prime Minister of Israel 
Minister of Immigrant Absorption (Likud) 
This page contains Sharon's official biograghy from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs interspersed with 
annotations by The Electronic Intifada (in grey boxes), a note on Sharon's record and international law, 
and offers both related articles and recommended reading. For a much larger resource on Ariel Sharon, 
see httg:/lindictsharon.netl. 
SHARON'S OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY FROM THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 
[ With annotations from The Electronic Intifada in grey boxes. 
Ariel Sharon was born in Kfar Malal in 1928. 
He joined the Haganah at the age of 14. During the 1948 War of Independence, he commanded an 
infantry company in the Alexandroni Brigade. 
In 1953, he founded and led the "101" special commando unit which carried out retaliatory 
operations.£1 J 
[1] The Electronic Intifada notes: As commander of the notorious Unit 101, Sharon led attacks on 
Palestinian villages in which women and children were killed. 
The massacre in the West Bank village of Qibya, on October 14, 1953, was perhaps the most notorious. 
His troops blew up 45 houses and 69 Palestinian civilians -- about half of them women and children --
were killed. 
The U.S. Department of State issued a. statement on 18 October 1953, expressing its "deepest sympathy 
for the families of those who lost their lives" in the Qibya attack as well as the conviction that those 
responsible "should be brought to account and that effective measures should be taken to prevent such 
incidents in the future." (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1953, p. 552). 
Sharon was appointed commander of a paratroop brigade in 1956 and fought in the Sinai 
Campaign.[2J 
[2] The Electronic Intifada notes: On 16 August, 1995, Ohad Gozant in Tel Aviv, writing for The Daily 
Telegraph, in an article entitled, "Israelis Admit Massacre", reported: 
:/:~ 
nReports of how Israeli paratroopers killed about 270 Egyptian prisoners of war 40 years ago are 
strainIng relations between the two countries. Egypt has demanded an investigation into the alleged 
atrocities, which date back to Isra~/'s involVement In the 1956 Anglo-French campaign to take. the Suez 
Canal. . 
The killings were revealed in a paper on the Sinai campaign commissioned by the army's military history 
division. They were described in graphic detail in newspaper and television interviews. In all, 273 
Egyptians, some of them Sudanese civilian road workers, were killed in three separate inCidents,. 
according to the accounts. 
Arye Biro, a retired army general, admitted shooting the Sudanese at a quarry two days into the 
campaign at strategic Mltla Pass In central Sinai. Mr. Biro, then a company leader in the 890 Paratroop 
battalion, said the 49 terrified prisoners were taken into a quarry and shot dead. He said: "We couldn't 
take care of anything else before we got done. with them. One escaped with bullets in the chest and in . 
the leg, but came back on all fours because he was thirsty. He soon joined his [dead] comrades." 
Mr. Biro said he and his troops later killed 56 Egyptian soldiers and irregulars as they were advancing in a 
truck to the oil port of Ras-al~Sudr on the Gulf of Suez. 
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coming out of every hole in the flatbed truck and In huge quantities." 
A witness told the newspaper: "When the rear flap was lowered, all the bodies poured out in one mass. I 
couldn't bear the thought that we shot people without a fight. II Another 168 Egyptian soldiers were cut 
down as the paratroopers headed South. 
I Mr. Biro's commanding officers wereAri~1 Sh~ron and Rafael Eytan ... It 
In 1957 he attended the Camberley Staff College in Great Britain. 
During 1958-62, Sharon served as an infantry brigade commander and then as Infantry School 
Commander. 
He was appOinted Head of the IDF Northern Command in 1964 and Head of the Army Training 
Department in 1966. 
He participated in the 1967 Six Day War as commander of an armored division. 
In 1969 he was appointed Head of the IDF Southern Command.[3] 
[3) The Electronic Intifada notes: On 21 January 2001, Phil Reeves writing for The Independent~ in an 
article entitled, "Sharon's return puts Wreckage Street in fear," reported: 
,"'/' 
"In August 1971 alone, troops under Mr Sharon's command destroyed some 2,000 homes in the Gaza 
Strip, uprooting 12,000 people [Palestinian refugees] for the second time in their lives. Hundreds of 
young Palestinian men were arrested and deported to Jordan and Lebanon. Six hundred relatives of 
. suspected guerrillas were exiled to Sinai. In the second half of 1971, 104 guerrillas were assassinated." 
Sharon resigned from the army in June 1972, but was recalled to active military service in the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War to command an armored division and lead the crossing of the Suez Canal. 
Ariel Sharon was elected to the Knesset in December 1973, but resigned a year later, serving as security 
adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1975). 
He was again elected to the Knesset in 1977 on the Shlomzion ticket. 
ApPOinted Minister of Agriculture in the first government created by Menachem Begin, he pursued 
agricultural co-operation with Egypt. 
In 1981, Sharon was appointed Defense Minister, serving in this post during the Lebanon War, 
which brought about the destruction of the PLO terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon.l4 ] 
[4) The Electronic Intifada notes: As minister of defence in 1982, Sharon orchestrated Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon, a military operation that killed tens of thousands of civilians as Israeli forces sought 
to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organisation's infrastructure in the region. According to the statistics 
published in the Third World Quarterly (Volume 6, Issue 4, October 1984, pp. 934-949), over 29,500 
Palestinians and Lebanese were either killed or wounded from 4 July 1982 through to 15 August 1982, 40 
percent were children. Israel's stated motive for Its "Operation Peace for Galileelf invasion of Lebanon was 
to bring peace to frontline Israeli communities in Northern Galilee. In fact, the disastrous events of 1982-
85 were the very catalysts of the Hizbulfah Shi'a resistance movement in South Lebanon. Previousto 
Israel's military interventionism in the early 1980s, the Shi'a of south Lebanon had not professed any 
aggression or hostility towards the Israelis. '. . . .... ', 
, ' ~ ,,'" N V 
Ariel Sharon is responsible for the massacre of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians at the sab~a~nd'Shatiia 
refugee camps, on the southern outskirts of Beirut. The slaughter in the two contiguous carnPsatSabra 
and Shatila took place from the evening of September 16, 1982 until the morning of September 18"E 
1982, in an area under the control of the Israeli armed forces. The perpetrators were members ofthe~ 
Phalange (Kata'eb, in Arabic) militia, the Lebanese force that was armed by and closely allied with,lsrael 
since the onset of Lebanon's civil war in 1975. Prior to the massacre, Sharon had meetings with the' ' 
Phalange forces. . • N 
For over 60 hours -- aided by an Israeli siege around the camps and guided by the light ofIsraeilflares --
forces belonging to the Israeli-allied Phalanglst militia went through the camps, killing Palestinian and 
Lebanese civilians. Some were lined up against walls and mown down by machine-gun fire. Others were 
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and girls were raped and mutilated and men weredisemboweUed prior to being executed. 
The precise number of victims of the massacre may never be exactly determined. The Internatlonat 
Committee of the Red Cross counted t,500 at the time of the massacre but by September 22 this count 
had risen to 2,400. On the following day 350 bodies were uncovered so that the total then ascertained 
had reached 2,750. Israeli military intelligence estimated that 700 to. 800 were killed. . 
UN Resolution UNSC 521 (1982) of 19 September 1982 offered unequivocal condemnation of the Sabra 
and Shatila Massacres, although It avoided naming any perpetrators at this early stage. The question of 
direct Israeli involvement in the massacres is one that has never been fully resolved. However -,.. despite 
denials -- it is not crediblethat Israeli troops surrounding th.e two camps were unawareotwhatwas 
going on inside: . . 
"From 5-5.30 am low level flights ofIsraeli planes over Sabra andSh~tlla took place, after which shelling 
~~~~~~~ ~~:~ee;~~~ Times, i6 i~Pt~~beF1982, quot:lng Dr.Wi~~e, Gaza hospital. ),.;:;~0C . 
liThe Israelis established observatlollPosts o~; top ofmulti~storeybuildings in the north-west qucidr~nt of 
the Kuwaiti Embassy. From these posts, the naked eye has a clear view of several sections of the camps, 
including those parts of Shatlla where piles of bodies were found." . '.. .' 
(Source.: Newsweek, 4 October 1982, Ray Wilkinson; The Guardian, 20 September 1982; andThe,New 
York Times, 26 September 1982.) . . 
, ..i ' .. > . ..~"'0.' 
"Throughout the night flares lit up the. sky. They were fired at the rate of two a minute, as reported by an . 
Israeli soldier from a mortar unit. II 
(Source: The Jerusalem Post, 21 September 1982.) 
A Jewish-American registered nurse,"MS. Ellen Siegel, was working in Gaza hospital in the Sabra refugee 
camp in Beirut, where she and a medical team treated the first victims of the massacre. She and other 
health workers werelined up againstabutlet,:"riddled wail by Phalangists who were about to execute 
them, with rifles aimed, when an Israeli officer came running to stop this possible execution. She told The 
Electronic Intifada that: . '" . . /":;; f~<;" ' 
~;~H ;:\,~ ,'~ 
"I spoke with Zeev Schiff [a military affairs correspondent for Ha'aretz newspaper] in person aboutthis 
incident. The wall was located just outside the camp but obviously!f the commandercould see this, he 
could see other things. We were taken to. the area of the FCP [FolWard Command Post]. From there one 
could look down onto the camps; My understanding Is that the IOF had sophisticated visual eqUipment. 
There was a BBC film made in '92 ("See No Evil"). In this film they interviewed Israeli soldiers who were 
at the camps. They clearly allude to knowing what was going on." . . 
An official Israeli commission of inquiry -- chaired by Yitzhak Kahan, president of Israel's Supreme Court 
-- investigated the massacre, and inFebruary 1983 publicly released its findings. The Kahan Commission 
found that Ariel Sharon, among otherI~raelis, had responsibility for the massacre, although itcarefully 
Side-stepped any accusation of direct involvement in the massacre and chose not to attempt to reconcile 
much of the contradictory testjmony'-r~e commission's report stated in pertinent part: 
"It is our view that responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defence for having disregarded the 
danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the. refugee . 
camps/and having failedto take thlsdanger Into account when he decided to have the Phalangistsenter 
the camps. In addition, responsibility Is to be Imputed to the Minister of Defence for not ordering 
appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the danger of massacre as a condition for the' 
Phalangists' entry into the camps. These blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the 
Defence Minister was charged." 
The Commission also concluded: 
"[I]n his meeting with the Phalangist commanders, the Defence Minister made no attempt to poinfout to 
them the gravity of the danger that their men would commit acts of slaughter .... Had it become dear to 
the Defence Minister that no real supervision could be exercised over the Phalangist force that entered 
the camps with the IOF's assent/his duty would have been to prevent their entry, The usefulness of the 
Phalangists' entry into the camps was wholly disproportionate to the damage their entry could cause if it 
were uncontrolled. II 
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"We shall remark here that it is ostensibly puzzling that the Defence Minister did not in any way make the 
Prime Minister [Menachem Begin] privy to the decision on having the Phalangists enter the camps." 
In the realm of international relations, he was instrumental in renewing diplomatic relations with the 
African nations which had broken off ties with Israel during the Yom Kippu r War. In November 1981, he 
brought about the first strategic co-operation agreement with the U.S. and widened defense ties between 
Israel and many nations. He also helped bring thousands of Jews from Ethiopia through Sudan. 
Between 1984 and 1990 Sharon served as Minister of Trade and Industry. In this capacity, he concluded 
the Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. in 1985. 
In 1990-1992, he served as Minister of Construction and Housing. Following the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the waves of immigration from Russia, he initiated and carried out a program 
to absorb the immigrants throughout the country, including the construction of 144,000 
apartments. {5] 
[5] The Electronic Intifada notes: Sharon was a key player in the settlement explosion throughout the 
1977-1992 Ukud-era of Israeli government. This period was characterised by more land confiscation and 
more settlement activity than had ever been seen before in Israeli history. The number of settlers in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories increased by over two thousand percent during this period, to 
approximately 110,000 people. ...... . ..
From 1992 to 1996, he served as a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. 
In 1996, Ariel Sharon was appointed Minister of National Infrastructure and was involved in 
fostering joint ventures with Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians,£6] 
[6] The Electronic Intifada notes: Yet again, Sharon was in charge of settlement construction. In the 
post-Oslo period, Israel established 30 new settlements and thus nearly doubled the settler population in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 109,000 in 1993 to nearly 200,000 in 1999 (figures exclude new 
settlements in the greater Jerusalem metropolitan area). Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace. 
He also served as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Bedouin advancement. 
In 1998 Ariel Sharon was appOinted Foreign Minister and charged with conducting 
negotiations towards a final agreement with the Palestinian Authority. He accompanied Prime 
Minister Netanyahu to the Wye River Plantation as chief negotiator. While serving as Foreign 
Minister, Sharon met with U.S., European, Palestinian and Arab leaders to advance the peace 
process. {7] 
[7] The Electronic Intifada notes: Sharon's concept of "advancing the peace process" remained 
somewhat flawed during this period. According to an Agence France Presse report of 15 November 1998, 
while addressing a meeting of militants from the extreme right-wing Tsomet Party, Foreign Minister 
Sharon stated: 
"Everybody has to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because 
everything we take now will stay ours ... Everything we don't grab will go to them." 
He worked mostly to create and advance projects such as the Flagship Water Project funded by the 
international community to find a long-term solution to the region's water crisis and a basis to peaceful 
relations between Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians and other Middle Eastern countries. 
Following the election of Ehud Barak as Prime Minister in May 1999, Ariel Sharon was called upon to 
become interim Likud party leader, and in September 1999 was elected Chairman of the Likud. 
On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister,£8] He presented his government to 
the Knesset on March 7, 2001, retaining also the Immigrant Absorption portfolio. 
[8] The Electronic Intifada notes: Only four months before his election, the ever-confrontational 
Sharon visited al-Haram ash-Sharif on 28 September 2000 and sparked off the Second Palestinian 
Intifada that saw 393 Palestinians killed up to March 8th, according to the Palestine Red Crescent Society. 
On 19 October 2000, the United Nations Human Rights CommiSSion, meeting in an emergency session, 
adopted a resolution titled, "Grave and massive violations of the human rights ofj;he Palestinian people 
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"the provocative visit to AI-Haram aI-Sharif on 28 September 2000 by Ariel Sharon, the Likud party . 
leader, which triggered the tragic events that followed in occupied East Jerusalem and the other occupied 
Palestinian territories, resulting in a high number of deaths and injuries among Palestinian dvilians." 
,:,"' <-<.,,' , .,' - - . - "";" .'"' 
Sharon's visit to the third holiest slte'Y" Islam, guarded by-- according to the most conservatlv~r~pOrts -
- 1,000 armed Israeli soldiers, was overtly designed to demonstrate Israel's "sovereignty" over' 
Jerusalem, especially over the AI-Haram Ash-Sharif (which most Israelis call "the Temple Mount") and 
provoke an angry response. It was also Intended to impress the right wing of the Israeli publiC, who later 
castigated Labour Prime Minister Barak for his "restraint" in the face of the Palestinian uprislng,by, 
electing Sharon, who sparked it off. . . 
Sharon holds a degree in Law and Middle Eastern Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
(1962). He has published a book and numerous articles in local and foreign newspapers. 
He is widowed and has two sons. 
[ends] 
A NOTE ON SHARON'S RECORD AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
War crimes and crimes against humanity are particularly heinous crimes. Responding to the atrocities 
committed in the course of the second World War, the international community set itself an objective to 
combat such crimes. This ambition has fOllnd expression In a number of international treaties,Il9fab1y 
under the aegis of the United Nations.?:.::" 
. "'~' 
The 1998 request for the extradition of Augusto Pinochet and the legal battles that ensued demqri~trated 
a heightened interest In bringing persons involved in grave crimes to justice. The Pinochet case,,,J:!« 
reaffirmed the prinCiple that human rights atrocities are subject to "universal jurisdiction" and can be 
prosecuted anywhere in the worid; Two. rulings by the House of .Lords found that Pinochet was not 
immune from prosecution even though he was head of state at the time the crimes were committed. ' 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's personal history is intertwined with war crimes and crimes~a~alnst 
humanity. Cases such as those of Yugoslavian former president Siobodan Milosevic, the- perpetrClto~ of 
the Rwandan genocide, and others, provide compelling precedents for ending the impunity that Ariel . 
Sharon has thus far enjoyed. Sharon should be indicted for the crimes In which he bears responsibility as 
the first step in a process of accountability that will bring justice to his victims and their families;.",;' 
. -.,' . , _ i1>:<i~·~?f;'·· 
Judicial authorities in Israel have never shouldered their legal responsibilities and thoroughly iriv~stigated 
and prosecuted Ariel Sharon for the massacres and other crimes he committed. The failure oftheIsraeli 
legal system to act obligates the InternatIonal community -- in particular the European Union slnc:e all Its 
member states are High Contracting Parties of the Geneva Conventions -- to hold Ariel Sharon . . 
accountable, regardless of whether he is a private citizen ofIsrael, a cabinet minister, or the head ota 
government. ~;/;::: .' 
;.. '~ , 
Article'146 of the Ge'neva Convention relative to the ProteCtio~of Civilian Persons In Time of Wa;~tates 
that each High Contracting Party itshaUbe under the obligation to search for persons alleged.tohiwe 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed" rave breaches ofthe Convention, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationallty,: before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance 
with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting 
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case," 
Article 147 of the Convention states that the grave breaches noted in Article 146 include wilfurkmlngJ . 
torture or inhuman treatment, Including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, 
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected 
person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and 
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
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Annex 815: We're Air Force Pilots, Not Mafia. 
We don't take revenge 
Israel's F-16 and Black Hawk refuseniks say why they could not obey illegal 
orders and kill innocent Palestinians 
Chris McGreal in Tel Aviv 
Wednesday December 3, 2003. The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk 
For two months, a rebel group of Israeli Black Hawk helicopter and F-16 fighter pilots has been 
denounced as traitors for saying they will no longer bomb Palestinian cities. 
Until now they have maintained a resolute silence on their motives, preferring to limit their criticism of 
Ariel Sharon's war to a letter signed by 27 reserve and active duty pilots refusing to carry out what they 
described as illegal orders, and denouncing the occupation as eating at the moral fabric of Israel. 
Now, having been thrown out of the air force, they are talking publicly about what brought members of 
the most revered branch of the Israeli military to make an unprecedented challenge to the handling of 
the conflict with the Palestinians. 
I 
"I served more than seven years as a pilot," said Captain Alon R, who, like all the younger pilots, hopes 
to return to combat flying and so declines to use his full name in order to retain his security clearance. 
"In the beginning, we were pilots who believed our country would do all it could to achieve peace. We 
believed in the purity of our arms and that we did all we could to prevent unnecessary loss of life. 
"Somewhere in the last few years it became harder and harder to believe that is the case." 
The line was crossed for most of the pilots with the dropping of the one-tonne bomb last year on the 
home of a Hamas military leader, Salah Shehade, killing him and 14 of his family, mostly children. 
One captain described the bombing as deliberate killing, murder even. Another called it state terrorism, 
though some colleagues swiftly stomped on that interpretation. But they all agreed that the attack sowed 
the doubts that resulted a year later in the letter that sent shockwaves through the Israeli military. 
"The Shehade incident was a red light for us, a final warning," said Capt Alon R. "With Shehade I began 
to re-evaluate my beliefs. We killed 14 innocent people, nine of them children. After my commander gave 
an interview in which he said he sleeps well at night and his men can do the same. Well, I can't. We 
refused to see it as an innocent mistake." 
Capt Assaf L, who served as a pilot for 15 years until sacked for signing the letter, had similar doubts. 
"You don't have to be a genius to know that the destruction from a one-tonne bomb is massive, so 
someone up there made a decision to drop it knowing it would destroy buildings," he said. "Someone 
took the decision to kill innocent people. This is us being terrorists. This is vengeance." 
Lieutenant-Colonel Avner Raanan is among the most respected pilots to have signed the letter. He served 
for 27 years and was awarded one of Israel's highest military decorations in 1994. "If you look at the 
past three years, you see that, if we had a suicide bombing, the Israeli air force made a big operation in 
which civilians were killed, and that looks to innocent eyes like revenge," he said. 
"You hear it in the streets of Israel; people want revenge. But we should not behave like that. We are not 
a mafia." 
More than 30 pilots have now endorsed the letter refusing to fly bombing raids on Palestinian cities, 
although four retracted, one an EI AI pilot threatened with dismissal, and another a reserve pilot who lost 
his civilian job. 
At its core, the letter questions the legality of the "targeted assassinations" that have claimed the lives of 
more civilian bystanders than their Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade targets. In 
October, 14 civilians were killed when the air force fired missiles at a car in Gaza's Nuseirat refugee 
camp. 
"ls it legitimate to take F-1S's and helicopters designed to destroy enemy tanks, and use them against 
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"Because of the terrorism, we have become blinded by the blood on our own faces. We cannot see that 
on the other side, beside the terrorists, is a whole nation of innocent people. It's important that we 
recognise that, and that, as military people, we say that." 
The pilots' stand shook Israeli society. There is no shortage of critics of the prime minister's militarist 
tactics but those of the peace camp are widely viewed as pacifists and marginal. Doubts raised by the 
army chief of staff, Moshe Ya'alon, and four former heads of the Shin Bet intelligence service alarmed 
many Israelis, but the criticisms were focused solely on whether Mr Sharon's tactics were fuelling 
terrorism. 
The pilots straddle both issues, raising moral and legal questions on the conduct of the war and 
challenging the government's claim its strategy is about defending Israel. 
"Our government's policy is to maintain fear in the public," Capt Assaf L said. "We're not weak. It's not 
1967 or 1973, with the Syrian army on the border waiting to attack us. This is maintaining a war to 
maintain the occupation. 
"We've the strongest nation in the Middle East. The terrorists are bastards, but we must fight to not 
become terrorists ourselves." 
Many who poured scorn on the pilots accused them of wading into politics for going beyond questions 
about the legality of their orders and challenging the occupation. "We cannot separate the two," Capt 
Jonathon S said. "We are not pacifists. We don't think we should sit back and let suicide bombers attack 
us. But all this is a direct result of our being in the [occupied] territories. 
"Our fight to keep the settlements and suppress the Palestinian people is killing us. It is killing our right 
to live safely in the country of Israel. A very small group of radical Israelis is leading the sane majority to 
catastrophe." 
Col Raanan scoffs at the accusation that the pilots have denigrated their uniforms by wading into political 
issues. 
"The air force commander spoke in favour of the [Jewish] settlements while sitting in uniform next to 
Sharon at a Likud party convention," he said. "That is political. This country has a defence minister who, 
as army chief of staff, was the most political ever. It is hypocritical to say lower ranking officers cannot 
express an opinion. What they mean is, we can be political so long as we agree with the government. 
Well that's not democracy." 
The pilots say they have received more than 500 letters of support, including one from a Holocaust 
survivor, and numerous calls from fellow pilots. Several leftwing former cabinet ministers praised the 
pilots' stand, saying it proved the armed forces were moral. 
Concern in the air force prompted its commander, Major-General Dan Halutz, to meet groups of pilots to 
tell them that "targeted assassinations" were not a war crime. 
"Halutz said we were traitors," Capt Assaf L said. "In our eyes, what we did is a very Zionist act. We did it 
to save Israel." 
• Colin Powell said yesterday he had the right to talk to anyone with ideas for peace, dismissing Israeli 
criticism that it would be a mistake for him to meet the authors of the unofficial Geneva accord. "I am the' 
American secretary of state. I have an obligation to listen to individuals who have interesting ideas," he 
said. 
Although he did not say he would meet the accord's Israeli and Palestinian authors, US officials have said 
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Annex 816: Media Activism. HonestReporting 
Become A Media Patroller 
http://www.HonestReportinq.Com 
Many HonestReporting members have expressed the desire for a greater level of involvement than the 
twice-weekly communiques. Additionally, there are many foreign members who need a more localized 
approach to fighting media bias. 
This is the idea behind our brand-new Media Patrol Program. Here's how it works: 
1) From a list of hundreds of newspapers worldwide, choose one newspaper to monitor on a daily basis. 
You can also get involved in organizing a group of local activists. Contact details for hundreds of U.S. 
newspapers is online at: 
http://search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p=Newspapers+U.S.+list 
2) To be registered as an official HonestReporting Media Patroller, send your name and the name of the 
media outlet you are monitoring to action@honestreportinq.com 
By working together, we can make the changes that are very necessary, and ensure that Israel gets the 
fair media coverage that every nation deserves. Welcome to the team! 
The Staff of HonestReporting 
'" '" '" 
THE 10 PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA PATROLLING 
1. Put yourself in the shoes of a reporter or editor. They are more receptive to constructive criticism than 
they are to pressure. Don't just demand that the media be pro-Israel -- but rather, factual, impartial, and 
honest. Always ask yourself: What would make this report better? Show the news agency not only what's 
wrong with their story, but how there is a more balanced alternative. One way to do this is by showing 
how their competitors reported the story more fairly. This is this difference between complaining and 
constructive criticism. 
2. Mobilize a local monitoring group to increase your impact. Build an email list and alert the entire group 
when bias is spotted. This is the principle behind HonestReporting: One person acting alone may not be 
able to make a difference, but hundreds or thousands working together can. Be in touch with others from 
your city, for coordinated patrol activities. 
3. Clearly document any bias you see. Keep a log-book and note the specific article (with URL), or the 
exact date and time of a broadcast. What exactly did the reporter say? Then pinpoint why it is a problem, 
by citing relevant facts, etc. Also note examples of excellent reporting. 
4. You will never be able to convince the media to do things 100% your way. Refrain from nitpicking little 
points. Instead, pick one point that is the key to many others. For example, demanding that suicide 
bombers be labeled "terrorists" frames the conflict in completely different terms. Another example is 
contrasting Palestinian corruption and incitement with Israeli democracy. Choose your main battle and 
hammer away until your point is heard. 
5. Conduct an extensive study of your local media to determine if there is an objective pattern of bias. 
Analyze every article for one month, and systematically tabulate the frequency of photos for each side, 
the frequency of spokespeople quoted, etc. Individual examples intuitively indicate anti-Israel bias, but 
the typical response from media agencies is: "Our reporters are under extreme deadline pressure, and 
occasionally there will be an error in judgment. But it all balances out sometimes skewed toward one 
side, and sometimes toward the other. But overall, our reporting is 100 percent fair and impartial." This 
month-long content analyses will lay rest to that claim. 
6. Arrange a meeting with local writers and editors to express your concerns, to better explain the Israeli 
position, and to hold the newspaper accountable for what it publishes. Formulate a name for your group -
- e.g. the Gotham City Concerned Citizens Coalition; this demonstrates broad-based community support 
for your position. At the meeting, make your case persuasively and with as much documentation as 
possible; present your month-long content analyses. Instead of attacking the newspaper's character, 
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business is based on their perception of being accurate and impartial. If you have evidence to the 
contrary, they will listen. 
7. Meeting: Phase Two. At the end of the meeting, make them a deal: If they will agree to regular 
meetings, you will promise to restrain your rapid-response team and to restrict your complaints to only 
major errors. This takes tremendous pressure off the media, who abhors beings flooded with email 
complaints and all the bad publicity. This also creates an ongoing dialogue, whereby local editors will 
eventually turn to HonestReporting activists as a resource on the Israeli perspective. You can then 
encourage local editors and reporters to visit Israel to see the complex issues first hand. Offer to help 
plan their itinerary and meet former local citizens who now live in Israel. And you can invite local 
reporters to meet with visiting Israeli academics or decision-makers. 
8. If the media agency refuses to meet with you, or if they continue to display a anti-Israel bias, then 
consider a public protest. This may take the form of a rally in front of their building (this must be 
coordinated with the local police department), or it may involve a campaign to cancel subscriptions (even 
for one day). Beware, however, that these methods can have a negative backlash, as it strikes some 
people as an attempt to limit freedom of the press. These tactics must be used wisely, and only when 
other methods have failed to produce results. 
9. Don't limit yourself to print and broadcast media. Make your voice heard as well in Internet chat 
rooms, bulletin boards, and radio call-in shows. Hand out informational flyers at your local community 
center, school, and house of worship. 
10. Expand your horizons. Get your news from a variety of sources in order to get a good sense of how 
different media groups promote different views. Also visit pro-Palestinian websites (e.g. 
ElectronicIntifada.net) to see how the other side is operating, and the arguments they use. You can also 
use this information to encourage your local media to report examples of incitement in the Arab world. 
HOW TO ANALYZE THE MEDIA 
You click on MSNBC.com and notice a hot new development in the Mideast. How should you go about 
analyzing the news report? There are certain questions you can keep in mind that may reveal underlying 
bias. For example: 
Are acts of violence directed against civilians termed "terror"? If not, does this conform to the media's 
policy regarding other areas of conflict around the world? 
In reporting violence, is the sequence of events clear, as to which side was attacked and which side 
retaliated? 
Is sympathy being elicited for one side of the conflict, through the portrayal of its victims in humanizing 
terms (e.g. including personal information like the victim's name, age, familial relationship, or 
profession) ? 
Though both sides blame each other for perpetrating the violence, is one side portrayed as the more 
violent aggressor? 
Are the perpetrators of violence described in passive or active terms? 
Does the media attempt to give justification for an act of violence -- e.g. for reasons of poverty, 
frustration, or national liberation? 
Are suicide bombers and collaborators included in Palestinian casualty counts? Are causality counts 
expressed unqualified, or is a distinction made between combatants and civilians? 
Is "equal time" granted to both sides of the conflict, or is one side given preferential treatment -- hence 
lending more weight and credibility to that side's position? 
When one side makes a claim, is the other side given a chance to refute, or does the claim stand 
unchallenged? Does one side usually "get the last word"? 
Does the media quote dissenting or extremist opinions within each camp, or does the media only quote 
moderate voices that parrot the leadership's line? 
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Photos and captions: Are these pertinent to the story, or do they diverge from the main story and garner 
out-of-context sympathy for one side or the other? 
And finally, look specifically for the "7 Violations of Media Objectivity": 
1. Did the story contain misleading definitions and terminology? 
2. Was the reporting one-sided and imbalanced? 
3. Did the reporter editorialize in what was supposed to be an objective news story? 
4. Did the reporter fail to provide proper background and context? 
5. Was key information missing (selective omission)? 
6. Did the reporter use true facts to draw false conclusions? 
7. Did the reporter distort the facts? 
TIPS FOR WRITING GOOD LETTERS (Tips adapted from Camera.org) 
1. Be quick. Respond while the issue is still fresh. Ideally, try to send your letter within 24 hours of 
publication of the article. 
2. Be clear. If you cannot summarize your message in one or two sentences, it's not clear enough in 
your mind. Pinpoint in stark, unambiguous terms what you want to communicate. 
3. Be specific. Why was the article unfair? Did it show lack of context, imbalanced reporting, or 
omission of key facts? For example: "Your report inappropriately quoted only pro-Palestinian sources, 
leaving the Israeli position unrepresented." 
4. Be concise. Most publications will not print a letter to the editor longer than 250 words. Editors are 
more likely to publish a letter that they don't have to spend time shortening. 
5. Be focused. While an article may contain numerous instances of bias, focus your critique on just one 
or two. It's better to fully explain one point than to inadequately cover five. 
6. Know the goal. You want your letter to inspire the media to change. When possible, ask the media to 
issue a correction based on your pOints. A good way to end your letter is to ask: "Can I expect a 
rethinking of your editorial policy on this point?" 
7. Request a reply. Let the media know there is a consequence to biased reporting -- even if the 
consequence is having to answer hundreds of e-mails! You could end your letter with: "I would 
appreciate a response explaining why you have allowed such a biased article to appear in your fine 
publication. " 
8. Stick to the facts. Preserve the integrity of the HonestReporting campaign by keeping your 
comments clean and respectful. Hostile or overly-emotional language is counter-productive. Accusing the 
media of anti-Semitism will always be met with great resistance (besides being frequently untrue). This is 
not the place to vent your frustration. 
9. Write as a concerned individual. Mentioning that you are part of an organized campaign may lessen 
the impact of your letter. 
10. Use the CC button. Maximize your efforts by sending a copy of your letter not just to the editor, but 
also to the reporter, foreign editor, publisher, and even advertisers and members of Congress. 
11. Include contact info. Before publishing a letter, most papers will call to verify that you wrote it. 
Remember to include your full name, title (if applicable), address, and daytime phone number. 
12. Follow up. When possible, follow up with a phone call to the comments editor to ask if your letter will 
be published. If the editor doesn't remember your letter, offer to read it over the phone. 
13. Keep us in the loop. Whenever you receive a response to your correspondence (other than a simple 
acknowledgement), send a copy of that response along with your original correspondence, to: 











Justijicational Narratives Annex BI7: UN Resolutions Concerning Israei1955-1992 
Annex BI7: UN Resolutions Concerning Israel 1955-1992 
(see http://www,un.org) 
Resolution 106: " ... 'condemns' Israel for Gaza raid." 
Resolution 111: " ... 'condemns' Israel for raid on Syria that killed fifty-six people." 
Resolution 127: " .. .'recommends' Israel suspends it's 'no-man's zone' in Jerusalem." 
Resolution 162: " .. .'urges' Israel to comply with UN decisions." 
Resolution 171: " ... determines flagrant violations' by Israel in its attack on Syria." 
Resolution 228: .... .'censures' Israel for its attack on Samu in the West Bank, then under Jordanian 
controL" 
Resolution 237: " .. .'urges' Israel to allow return of new 1967 Palestinian refugees." 
Resolution 248: " .. .'condemns' Israel for its massive attack on Karameh in Jordan." 
Resolution 250: " .. .'calls' on Israel to refrain from holding military parade in Jerusalem." 
Resolution 251: " .. .'deeply deplores' Israeli military parade in Jerusalem in defiance of Resolution 250." 
Resolution 252: " .. .'declares invalid' Israel's acts to unify Jerusalem as Jewish capitaL" 
Resolution 256: " .. .'condemns' Israeli raids on Jordan as 'flagrant violation," 
Resolution 259: " .. .'deplores' Israel's refusal to accept UN mission to probe occupation," 
Resolution 262: " .. .'condemns' Israel for attack on Beirut airport." 
Resolution 265: " .. .'condemns' Israel for air attacks for Salt in Jordan." 
Resolution 267: " .. .'censures' Israel for administrative acts to change the status of Jerusalem." 
Resolution 270: " .. .'condemns' Israel for air attacks on villages in southern Lebanon." 
Resolution 271: " .. .'condemns' Israel's failure to obey UN resolutions on Jerusalem." 
Resolution 279: " .. .'demands' withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon." 
Resolution 280: " .. .'condemns' Israeli's attacks against Lebanon." 
Resolution 285: " .. .'demands' immediate Israeli withdrawal form Lebanon." 
Resolution 298: " .. .'deplores' Israel's changing of the status of Jerusalem." 
Resolution 313: " .. .'demands' that Israel stop attacks against Lebanon." 
Resolution 316: .... .'condemns' Israel for repeated attacks on Lebanon." 
Resolution 317: " .. .'deplores' Israel's refusal to release Arabs abducted in Lebanon." 
Resolution 332: " .. .'condemns' Israel's repeated attacks against Lebanon." 
Resolution 337: " .. .'condemns' Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty." 
Resolution 347: " .. .'condemns' Israeli attacks on Lebanon." 
Resolution 425: .... .'calls' on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon." 
Resolution 427: " .. .'calls' on Israel to complete its withdrawal from Lebanon. 
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Resolution 446: " .. .'determines' that Israeli settlements are a 'serious obstruction' to peace and calls on 
Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention." 
Resolution 450: " .. .'calls' on Israel to stop attacking Lebanon." 
Resolution 452: " .. .'calls' on Israel to cease building settlements in occupied territories." 
Resolution 465: " ... 'deplores' Israel's settlements and asks all member states not to assist Israel's 
settlements program." 
Resolution 467: " .. .'strongly deplores' Israel's military intervention in Lebanon." 
Resolution 468: " .. .'calls' on Israel to rescind illegal expulsions of two Palestinian mayors and a judge and 
to facilitate their return." 
Resolution 469: " .. .'strongly deplores' Israel's failure to observe the council's order not to deport 
Palestinians ... 
Resolution 471: " .. .'expresses deep concern' at Israel's failure to abide by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. " 
Resolution 476: " .. .'reiterates' that Israel's claim to Jerusalem are 'null and void'." 
Resolution 478: " .. .'censures (Israel) in the strongest terms' for its claim to Jerusalem in its 'Basic Law'." 
I 
Resolution 484: " .. .'declares it imperative' that Israel re-admit two deported Palestinian mayors." 
Resolution 487: " .. .'strongly condemns' Israel for its attack on Iraq's nuclear facility." 
Resolution 497: " .. .'decides' that Israel's annexation of Syria's Golan Heights is 'null and void' and 
demands that Israel rescinds its decision forthwith." 
Resolution 498: " .. .'calls' on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon." 
Resolution 501: " .. .'calls' on Israel to stop attacks against Lebanon and withdraw its troops." 
Resolution 509: " .. .'demands' that Israel withdraw its forces forthwith and unconditionally from Lebanon." 
Resolution 515: " .. .'demands' that Israel lift its siege of Beirut and allow food supplies to be brought in." 
Resolution 517: " .. .'censures' Israel for failing to obey UN resolutions and demands that Israel withdraw 
its forces from Lebanon." 
Resolution 518: " .. .'demands' that Israel co-operate fully with UN forces in Lebanon." 
Resolution 520: " ... 'condemns' Israel's attack into West Beirut." 
Resolution 573: " .. .'condemns' Israel 'vigorously' for bombing Tunisia in attack on PLO headquarters. 
Resolution 587: " .. .'takes note' of previous calls on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and urges 
all parties to withdraw." 
Resolution 592: " .. .'strongly deplores' the killing of Palestinian students at Bir Zeit University by Israeli 
troops." 
Resolution 605: " .. .'strongly deplores' Israel's policies and practices denying the human rights of 
Palestinians. 
Resolution 607: " .. .'calls' on Israel not to deport Palestinians and strongly requests it to abide by the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Resolution 608: " .. .'deeply regrets' that Israel has defied the United Nations and deported Palestinian 
civilians." 
Resolution 636: .... .'deeply regrets' Israeli deportation of Palestinian civilians. 
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Resolution 672: n ••• 'condemns' Israel for violence against Palestinians at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple 
Mount. 
Resolution 673: " .. .'deplores' Israel's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations. 
Resolution 681: " .. .'deplores' Israel's resumption of the deportation of Palestinians. 
Resolution 694: " .. .'deplores' Israel's deportation of Palestinians and calls on it to ensure their safe and 
immediate return. 
Resolution 726: " .. .'strongly condemns' Israel's deportation of Palestinians. 












Justijicational Narratives Annex BIB: In Times of War Crimes - The Banality of Evil 
Annex BI8: In Times of War Crimes - The Banality of Evil 
by Ran HaCohen* April 19, 2002, Ha'aretz 
"The lesson one could draw in Jerusalem was that such a detachment from reality and such 
thoughtlessness could cause more destruction than all the malicious instincts that man might possess." 
(Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, a Report on the Banality of Evil.) 
Even when some of the atrocities in the West Bank are reported in the Israeli press, it is done in a way 
that keeps the readers emotionally detached. It is also a function of the division of labour in the press. A 
tabloid like Yedioth Achronoth, with its cheap melodramatic overplay of every Israeli casualty, gives little 
or nothing on living conditions in the Occupied Territories. The quality paper Ha'aretz, with its excellent 
journalist Amira Hass (the only Israeli journalist living in the Occupied Territories), is confined to a high-
brow, factual, unemotional style. (Ha'aretz journalist Gideon Levy, in a personal weekly column, breaks 
this rule, which is why he is permanently under fire.) 
Last week I was trying to explain this to a friend: a mother of two children, very much pro-peace, anti-
settlements and anti-Sharon. Can you imagine, I asked her, what it means when children are locked day 
after day at home with their grandmother's corpse, that the Israeli army wouldn't let evacuate? 
"Right, I've also read about that," said the friend. "What I can't understand is: why don't they ,bury those 
corpses in the garden?" 
I suggested that there might not be much of a garden in a refugee camp, and if there was one, they 
might not be allowed to go there under curfew. 
"Well what I would do is simply put the corpse in the refrigerator, so that it doesn't stink. Corpses stink 
terribly, you know." 
I reminded her that power supply was cut in most Palestinian towns since the invasion. 
"It doesn't matter. The stink stays inside the fridge, even if it's off." 
I hinted that not all Palestinian refugees possessed an expensive double-door American fridge like in 
North Tel-Aviv. It might be too small for a corpse. 
"Well I'm sure they can somehow fold it." She now tried to demonstrate with her own body how this 
should be done. 
The conversation ended here. Later, I couldn't forgive myself for my own complicity in it, in reducing 
atrocities to technicalities. I also recalled that that friend had once told me the good thing about her dog 
was that it was tamed to get rid of dead cockroaches; she couldn't stand the sight of them. 
The Enemy Within 
I almost stopped following Israeli electronic media and switched to BBC World and AI-Jazeera instead. 
Israeli radio and television news usually open with an elaborate report on all the important events of the 
day: two soldiers scratched, a third one broke a fingernail. Stones thrown at a settlers' car, no injuries, 
the settlers returned fire. Twelve people injured in last week's suicide attack are still in hospital. And so 
on. After all these dramatic developments, if there's some time left, we get some marginal stories, like 
"Palestinian sources claim that 30 of their people were killed today" or "West Bank hospitals may soon 
have water again." 
That's on a quiet day. If there is a Palestinian terror attack, all programmes are immediately suppressed 
in favour of reports and commentary on that, broadcasted for hours in an endless loop. A retired army 
general is interviewed: "Don't you think Israel is showing much too much restraint?" A commercial 
television channel that once stuck to its normal schedule after a suicide attack was punished by the state 
regulator. 
All that is still not enough for the ruling junta. You can never be enough of a mouthpiece for them. 
Therefore Israeli journalists are kept out of the territories. Ha'aretz (4/19/02) reports of a new kind of 
army checkpoints, where soldiers stop journalists, claiming it is "a closed military zone", but let settlers 
go through. An Israeli journalist who had been stopped this way removed his press stickers, pretended 
he was just a settler and was allowed to pass. Listen to what a senior officer in the so-called "only 
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"The majority of the people is with us, not with the media. It's a war and we have no intention to 
facilitate your access. Only those playing by our rules will be allowed to enter. Let's see what you are 
worth without the army's help, And anyway, you should be grateful for what you get. Foreign journalists 
don't even get a fraction of that." 
Like in any other dictatorship, subversiveness becomes the name of the game. Walls in Tel-Aviv are 
covered with a new graffiti: "It is good to die - for the settlements?" When the public television channel 
widely covered Sharon's latest spin - the celebrated "regional peace conference" - the reporters could 
hardly suppress their laughter. 
The Enemy Without 
In the bus, on my way to the university, immediately before and immediately after the top-of-the-hour 
radio news, I heard a new commercial spot: "CNN is biased against Israel. Do not watch it. Do not 
advertise in it. Flood CNN with letters of protest. Call this number for details." Yes, CNN, not some 
European television (everybody knows that all Europeans are anti-Semites). Even CNN isn't Zionist 
enough for some people. 
In the university, the Students' Union was collecting signatures. A couple of days earlier, the same 
Students' Union had announced its objection to demonstrations of Arab students in the campus. Just like 
that, on a purely racist basis, not even disguised. 
"What's that," I asked. 
"A petition against the foreign press, it's biased against Israel," the two students replied. 
"Can I sign here also against war crimes?" 
"No, we don't run such a petition. Maybe others do." 
"I see. Do you find the foreign press more important than war crimes, like letting injured people bleed to 
death in Jenin?" 
They didn't really answer. Maybe they were embarrassed, maybe they thought I was crazy, maybe they 
knew or assumed I was a teacher. 
"We had Holocaust Memorial Day last week, remember?" 
They said they remembered. 
Package for Our Soldiers 
"Listen to this: in school they asked my child to bring a package for the soldiers." I heard this line from 
six or seven different parents. Each of them believed it was only in their school. When I told them it 
seemed to be the same all over the country, they were all fairly astonished: everyone sees his part of the 
picture, but cannot believe it is a grand pattern. 
They all experienced the same problem: on one hand, they didn't want to give any packages to soldiers. 
On the other hand, they didn't want their children to feel isolated in class. 
One father told me his son was boasting at home that he would tell the whole class loudly what he 
thought of that war, but that he knew his son and he would probably shut his mouth when it comes to it. 
One mother said her daughter put an angry letter in the package, telling her dear soldier he had nothing 
to look for in the occupied territories. 
Another father told me his son asked his mother why the package was so heavy: "Are you sure daddy 
didn't put a bomb inside? .. " 
Another mother, divorced, said it took her days to make up her mind about what to say to her child, 
putting the matter off from one day to the next. Why couldn't you tell him the truth, I asked. "What 
truth," she answered. "His father is a reservist. Should I tell him his father is a war criminal?" At last, she 
told the little boy that she had to have a serious talk with him. "Never mind, mum, it's too late now. I've 
already told them you forgot." DV 
*Ran HaCohen teaches in the Tel-Aviv University's Department of Comparative Literature. He also works 
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Annex BI9: Ariel Sharon Interview 05-04-04 
"My plan will force Palestinians to give up dreams for years" 
By Aluf Benn, Ha'aretz Correspondent, Monday April OS, 2004 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon says that his disengagement plan is a blow to the Palestinians, in that it will 
force them to give up on their aspirations for many years to come, until a new leadership emerges on 
their side that is ready to fight terror. Meanwhile, says the prime minister in an interview to Ha'aretz for 
the Pesach holiday, they will not be able to set up a state. 
Q: Don't you think they are correct in viewing an Israeli exit from Gaza as a victory? 
"Let's say we had reached a peace agreement and we had to get out of much larger areas than now. 
Would that not be seen as a victory over Israel? It would be seen in exactly the same way." 
Q: Your critics argue that unilateral withdrawal is a reward for the terrorists. 
"And today, when we are there, is there no terror?" 
Do you think that terror will continue after the withdrawal? 
, 
"I don't see the terror stopping. I hope there will be a decline in terror. The Palestinians understand that 
this plan is, to a great extent, the end of their dreams, a very heavy blow to them, and it could be they 
will take steps. Although, in the past, when the Palestinian Authority claimed it was acting against terror, 
it did so out of fear that Hamas would take over." 
Q: Won't the withdrawal enable Hamas to take control in Gaza? 
"It doesn't have to happen. The Palestinian Authority has large forces in the Strip that have been almost 
unharmed in our operations. They could have established control over Hamas, but they aren't doing this, 
because they don't want to fight terror. They aren't fighting terror, they want terror." 
Predictably, Sharon parries the criticism over the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, 
and backs the threat issued publicly by Chief of Staff Moshe Ya/alon against Palestinian Authority 
Chairman Vasser Arafat and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. 
"I wouldn't suggest that either of them feel immune," he says. "I wouldn't advise any insurance company 
to give them coverage." 
Q: By the way, when will the government deCision to remove Arafat be implemented? 
"No one is safe. Anyone who sends someone to kill Jews is a marked man. Period." 
PM: I believe in polls, but they change according to the times 
Sharon is in the midst of a dual battle - over his plan of disengagement from the Gaza Strip and over his 
innocence in the "Greek Island" corruption affair. In the Pesach holiday interview, he wanted to project a 
message of self-control and calm, even in a situation of distress. Sharon again finds himself alone at the 
front and under attack from all sides - a situation he knows well from his decades in the military and in 
politics. He believes - and is trying to convince his listeners - that this time around, too, he will survive. 
Sharon is aware of his poor public standing. "I do not operate according to opinion polls," he says. "I 
believe in polls, but they change according to the times, the situation and the developments. True, I am 
at a low in the polls, but it is natural that after every low pOint, the tide rises." 
Q: Why has support for you plummeted? 
Sharon: "I'm not sure that there is anyone who would be able to hold up in the face of the fire that I am 
under. My ability to endure pressure Situations, and to work quietly and with self-control, is what enables 
me to stand up to all this. I don't know many people who would be able to endure such a heavy 
onslaught, day after day." 
This year, more than ever, the main question in the prime minister's Pesach interview is "what has 
changed?" In his previous wave of interviews last year on the eve of Rosh Hashanah, Sharon said, "Any 
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So what happened? Why did he reverse his position and decide on a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip and the evacuation of settlements in the West Bank? How could he abandon his long-standing 
commitment to the settlers, who have moved from being his adherents to a place among his most vocal 
adversaries? 
"It's not that in our region everything remains frozen, and only my views change," he says today. "There 
are developments and situations, and as the one who shoulders the responsibility for the fate of this 
nation and its future, I have to weigh all the considerations and choose the thing that contains the least 
danger to Israel." 
According to Sharon, his disengagement plan was born after it became clear to him "that the chance of 
finding a Palestinian partner had disappeared." The prime minister says he supported the road map peace 
plan, and that "today, I would prefer to reach an agreement, if there was a partner." 
It was during his contacts with former Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), that 
Sharon says he began to consider a unilateral move. Then Abbas resigned and his successor, Ahmed 
Qureia (Abu Ala) proved to be a disappointment. "I heard what he had to say and I saw the difficulties in 
trying to set up a meeting with him. It's a fact that until now there has not been a meeting, despite the 
correct relations between us and our meetings in the past. It was clear to me that there was no 
possibility that they would implement [the road map] and reach an agreement." 
Last November, Sharon met with Eliott Abrams, the White House envoy to the Middle East, in Rome. "He 
came to talk to me about other matters in the Middle East. I described the situation to him, [said] that in 
the absence of a partner I foresaw danger to Israel, and so we had to free ourselves from the road map 
and move to another plan." 
Abrams was surprised. "The conversation revolved around principles, and the Americans didn't really 
understand in the beginning," Sharon recalls. 
Q: Did you tell him of your plan to evacuate settlements? 
"I mentioned it among the principles." 
Sharon says he considered four alternatives. The first was the removal of the Palestinian Authority. "I 
hear the voices calling for the dismantling, the destruction [of the Authority], and see it as something 
that must not be done, that would be to Israel's detriment." 
Q: But for a long time you employed force in a bid to topple the Palestinian Authority. 
"Only when it was involved in terror, or did not act against terror. The intention was not to wipe out the 
Palestinian Authority. Wiping it out means having to take back full control over 3.5 million Palestinians, 
and then we will have to deal with their education, health and sewerage." (The international 
organizations, who support 1.8 million Palestinians, have threatened to cease providing aid even under 
cu rrent conditions.) 
The second alternative was to go for an agreement like the Geneva initiative, which Sharon views as 
"something irresponsible, which we have already tried in the past and which did not bring about a 
cessation of terror, but rather pressures on Israel." 
The third option was "to do nothing" - a comfortable choice politically, but threatening from a diplomatic 
standpoint. 
In Sharon's view, "the paralysis is very dangerous" and results in the region being swamped with far-
reaching political plans. "I had to alleviate these pressures on Israel, otherwise we would have been 
forced to accept a dangerous plan," he says. He therefore chose disengagement and sees no other 
alternative. 
He recalls that prior to the 2001 elections, he spoke of "painful concessions" and repeated this phrase on 
the eve of his re-election in 2003. At the time, he spoke of concessions within the framework of an 
agreement. NOW, he says that Israel would have to pay a higher territorial price in the event of an 
agreement. 
Q: Why didn't you offer the withdrawal and evacuation of settlements to Abu Mazen? 
"He never ever asked for the settlements. And even if he had asked, he wouldn't have gotten them, 
because we were operating according to the road map, which included a series of ordered actions, and 
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Q: Maybe he would have remained in power if you had been more generous? 
"I am surprised at how quickly we are ready to blame ourselves. Two things led to Abu Mazen's downfall 
- the first was Yasser Arafat, and the second was that instead of fighting terror, he tried to make deals 
with it. I told him that in the end it would bring him down." 
Sharon was prepared for questions on the difficulties he faces in his decision-making. He rejects as "all 
nonsense" the assertions that he was dragged into accepting the idea of disengagement by his son Gilad 
and the head of his bureau, Dov Weisglass. "No one influences me," he says. "Arik influences Sharon, 
and Sharon influences Arik. This didn't just start today. When it came to key decisions in the army, this is 
also how I acted." 
Sharon says he often conducts consultations, and that as someone who has been exposed to national 
decision-making at least since the Sinai Campaign of 1956, he has "never seen such thorough 
preparations as the ones being undertaken now. I heard that the Americans heard about the matter [of 
disengagement] in an interview in Ha'aretz [with Yoel Marcus]. That's not true. I raised it with them 
already in November, and since then there have been three visits by the Americans, and visits by my 
aides there, telephone calls and consultations with many people in all areas." 
'Wait and see' 
Q: After all the promises and declarations that have not been fulfilled, why should the public believe that 
you are going to implement your disengagement plan? 
"It seems they will have to wait and see the thing being carried out. That's the best answer. I will live up 
to what I promised - both security and the [disengagement] plan." 
Q: Your good friend and close partner in the establishment of the settlements, Ze'ev Hever (Zambish), 
called the evacuation of settlements a "psychiatric illness. II Are his night-time visits continuing despite the 
turn you have made? 
"Zambish is truly a wonderful guy, with phenomenal ability. Zambish and his wife Rivka, a very special 
woman, are both my friends. When this whole thing started, I called him and told him that we have 
conflicting positions, but that we have to draw a line between our friendship and family relations and the 
political and diplomatic issues. I told him that when it comes to his struggles, from my point of view he is 
completely free - even though I think he is wrong - of any obligation that he might feel as a result of the 
long-term relations between our families. The personal relations continue, and I can't recall a Friday 
evening when he and Rivka don't phone, before Shabbat comes in, to say' Shabbat Shalom,' and to tell 
what's been happening in their family." 
His decision to turn his back on the settlers has not forced Sharon to have second thoughts about the 
enormous effort he invested in building the settlements. "Whoever thought that .win the end we would 
reach a peace agreement, knew that we would have to make concessions and that not all the settlements 
could remain. I said this for many years." 
Q: SO, looking back, building the settlements was a mistake? 
"I don't think so. The situation was different. You can't look at a situation that existed 20 years ago or 
more. There have been developments, and we have to make an effort to ensure the price is as low as 
possible." 
Q: Did you ever think you would be the one to dismantle the settlements? 
"Already in 1988 I recommended to Likud ministers that we should bring about the division of the 
territory. At that time a Palestinian state was the pinnacle of the Palestinians' dreams. I said that we had 
to hold on to what was vital for us, and to try to reach an agreement, and I warned that if we did not do 
this, we would have to fight over the 1967 borders." 
Q: And that's what is happening today? 
"Yes. The current arrangement [with the Americans] determines for sure that Israel will not return to 
1967 borders." 
Sharon talks of two alternatives that existed regarding the disengagement plan: withdrawal from Gaza 
alone; and a pullout from Gaza as well as four settlements in the West Bank (Kadim, Ganim, Sa-Nur and 
Homesh). According to him, the Americans were prepared to offer Israel less for a pullout from Gaza 
alone. "The American position was that this directly serves Israel, and that there was no need for any 











Justijicational Narratives Annex BI9: Ariel Sharon Interview 05-04-04 
Sharon says that what Israel gets from the U.S. in exchange for the withdrawal will only be finalized 
when he meets President George W. Bush next week. Even if Israel had Ohly withdrawn from Gaza, he 
says, the U.S. would have pledged to stick to the road map and to block pressure on Israel to accept ~ny 
other plan. "And, of course, backing for Israel over its right to self-defense and actions against terror In 
areas that will be evacuated." 
Q: What about negation of the Palestinian demand for the "right of return" for refugees? 
"The Americans also have problems. Internal ones, as well as problems with the European countries and 
with the Arab world." 
Sharon believes that the current timing is favorable to his plan, because "a situation has been created in 
which it is possible to do the things I want and to get an American commitment." 
Q: Because of the upcoming elections there? 
"Not because of the elections, but because of the fact that the Americans know today that the 
Palestinians ... aren't taking action and don't plan to take action. Today, the Americans are not placing 
blame on Israel." 
Q: Will disengagement help Bush in his bid for re-election? 
"A move that shows that things are happening, that things are developing, that maybe it is an opening to 
another development, certainly can help him. But we don't interfere in elections in other countries, and 
we are very happy that there is no interference in our elections. But when something happens, when 
something moves, it is definitely an achievement. II 
Sharon says he wanted to leave all of Gaza, including the Philadelphi route on the Egyptian border, so 
that Israel would be completely free of any responsibility for the Strip, and to hand it over to the 
international community. 
"During one of the deliberations with defense establishment offiCials, it was clear that they were very 
concerned with handing over the Philadelphi route to the Egyptians. The talks with the Egyptians must 
continue, but I think that in the first phase, until we see what's happening in Gaza, it will remain 
completely sealed off. There will be no passage to Egypt, no port and no airport." 
The building of the separation fence in the West Bank "is continuing and will continue," Sharon says, 
adding that the government "had to make minor changes to the fence" because of the problem that 
emerged of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who found themselves in "enclaves" as a result of the 
original route of the fence. "We had to free them from the enclaves as much as possible." The Americans 
have been satisfied by the changes and no longer have demands regarding the route of the fence. 
Q: What happened to the plan for an "eastern fence" in the Jordan Valley? 
"I don't see a fence being built there today, unless we need to. Here and there we will block access points 
to the Jordan Valley." 
Q: Will the Jordan Valley remain under Israeli control in a final status agreement? 
"Israel will need a security zone." 
Q: Do you think there will be a final status agreement? 
"I believe we have to hope." 
'I would set up another government' 
Sharon says he is not holding negotiations with Labor Party leader Shimon Peres over the creation of a 
national unity government. But, says the prime minister in an interview to Ha'aretz for the Pesach 
holiday, "there are contacts on this matter. II 
Sharon is in touch with Peres, and spoke to him several days ago. Peres was in the U.S. and was about to 
meet the head of the World Bank, and Sharon asked him to promote the idea of international aid for the 
rehabilitation of Gaza and the development of the Negev. 
Q: Do you miss Peres in the government? 
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Q: Isn't it more comfortable for you to have him as head of the opposition? 
"The best for me would be to continue with the current coalition. All those who disagree with me today 
knew exactly what type of government they were getting into. I think that one of them was even given 
freedom to vote as they see fit on the diplomatic issue, or something like that, so there is no surprise. 
[The coalition agreement with the National Religious Party includes a clarification saying that the party is 
opposed to a Palestinian state and will fight against its creation - A.B.] But if there are parties that want 
to leave the coalition, I will not leave the country without a government, and I will not take the people to 
elections. I will set up another government." 
The prime minister is convinced that he will successfully navigate the referendum on his disengagement 
plan among Likud voters. 
"My estimation is based mainly on the fact that I don't see any other possibility," he said. 
"Everyone has already tried, previous prime ministers tried, and nothing came of it. Maybe something 
can come only from this, if it has support. In the Likud as well, people understand the importance of 
quiet and of the possibility of initiating a diplomatic process of some kind." 
Sharon says he would have preferred a referendum among the general population, but that because of 
the legislative changes that would have been required, the whole matter would have been drawn out over 
"six months to a year, and in my eyes time is the main factor." 
Q: Why don't you fire ministers and deputy ministers who attack you? 
"In this sensitive situation as well, one has to consider things carefully and act patiently, and not operate 
out of feelings of anger." 
Q: If you reSign, do you think that another prime minister from the Ukud will carry out the 
disengagement plan? 
"I don't like hypothetical questions. I hope that I can continue in my job and carry out this plan, as well 
as steps in other areas that Israel has to take." 
'My hands are clean' 
In the interviews that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon gave on the eve of Pesach last year, after winning a 
second term, he said he believed that the reports of investigations against him were a passing phase that 
would subside after the elections. But he was wrong, and the investigations continue to cast a shadow 
over his political future. 
As is his way, Sharon does not relate to details of the investigations, saying only that "my hands are 
clean, I believe in my complete innocence, and I also believe that no indictment will be filed." 
Q: Do you have full faith in the attorney general? 
"Absolutely." 
Sharon also rejects claims by his critics that the disengagement plan and the talk of evacuation of 
settlements were meant to extract him from his legal woes. 
"There is no link, not even the slightest, between some other problems I have and the diplomatic plan. 
My positions on national matters are in no way influenced by the problems I am facing. I am able to 
distinguish between these matters, and these assertions are baseless. 
"Not long ago, Yossi Sarid asked me if this thing [the investigations] doesn't interfere with my ability to 
do my job. It doesn't. I have already proved over the years that my ability to function in situations of 











Justijicationai Narratives Annex BllO: Palestine Chronology March 2002 
Annex Bll0: Palestine Chronology March 2002 
PASSIA: http://www.passia.org/index_pfacts.htm 
March 2002 
March 2: After 24 hours of Israeli military assaults on Palestinian RCs, in which 24 Palestinians are killed, 
Palestinians suspend security and political talks with the Israeli leadership. 
March 3: Seven soldiers and three settlers are killed by a lone Palestinian sniper shooting at an Israeli 
roadblock near Ofra settlement before escaping unharmed. AI-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claim responsibility. 
- The Israeli security cabinet approves an IDF-recommended operation to put constant military pressure 
on the PA and Palestinian 'terrorist' groups. DM Ben-Eliezer praises the actions in Balata and Jenin RCs, 
saying "Psychologically, we broke the taboo of the refugee camps and the feeling the terrorists had that 
they have immunity there." 
March 4: In Ramallah near AI-'Amari RC, an Israeli tank shell hits the car of Hamas member Hussein Abu 
Kweik, driven at the time by his wife Bushra, killing her and their three children, 17, 14 and 8 years old. 
In the car behind them, two other children, Arafat and Haima AI-Masri, 16 and 4, are also killed. 
- Israeli planes bomb AI-Muqata'a compound, totally destroying the headquarters of Palestinian General 
Intelligence chief Tawfik Tirawi. 
March 5: Israeli F16 jets destroy the PA intelligence headquarters in Bethlehem. 
- In Ramallah three senior Tanzim and Force 17 members - Muhannad Abu Halaweh, Omar Qa'dan, and 
Fawzi Murrar - are killed in a helicopter attack in Beitunia. 
March 6: In an overnight incursion into Gaza seven Palestinians are killed, several others injured and 
arrested. Two Israeli soldiers are also killed. Near Khan Younis four Palestinian homes are demolished 
and in Gaza City the home of Vasser Arafat as well as a UN school for the blind. 
- Israeli right-wing Min. of Infrastructure, Avigdor Lieberman, urges PM Sharon to order the army to 
begin a systematic bombing of Palestinian population centers saying, as quoted in Yediot Ahranot, "At 8 
o'clock, we bomb all commercial centers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At 12 o'clock, we bomb all fuel 
stations. And at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, we bomb all the banks." 
March 7: IDF begins wide-ranging operation overnight in Tulkarem and its RCs, killing at least 15 
Palestinians, among them two PRCS ambulance mediCS, and leaving behind much destruction. 
March 8: In two Israeli attacks overnight on Khuza'a village next to Khan Younis and Beit Hanoun and 
Jabalia RC, 27 Palestinians are killed, incl. Maj.-Gen. Ahmed Mufrej (Abu Hmeid), a high-ranking 
Palestinian officer. 
- Israeli forces kill 11 Palestinians in assaults in the northern West Bank, mainly in Tulkarem, where also 
over 100 Palestinians are arrested. At the end of the day, the death toll has reached at least 44. 
March 10: Israel helicopters fire at least 35 missiles at PA Chairman Arafat's seaside office building in 
Gaza City, destroying it and wounding over 20 people. 
March 11: The Knesset approves a new legislation in its first reading with 23 to 12 to outlaw Israeli 
citizens and residents from joining the PA security apparatus or militant organizations operating in the 
PA. 
March 11-12: Israeli military forces enter Jabalia RC and impose a military closure on areas in northern 
Gaza. At least 18 Palestinians are killed, many more wounded and several buildings destroyed. 
March 12: Israeli forces invade Ramallah and AI-Bireh, imposing curfews on many areas, occupying 
several building, and kill at least five Palestinians. In AI-Amari RC, troops demolish three homes, incl. 
that of suicide bomber Wafa Idris. 
- UN Sec.-Gen. Annan condemns Israel's use of heavy weaponry against Palestinians and demands that 
Israel "stop the bombing of civilian areas, the assassinations, the unnecessary use of lethal force, the 
demolitions, and the daily humiliation of ordinary Palestinians" as well as "end the illegal occupation." 
The UNSC passes a US-drafted resolution referring for the first time to a Palestinian state existing side 
by side with Israel by 14-0, with Syria abstaining. 
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March 15: DM Ben-Eliezer orders the gradual pullback from Ramallah, which is left in severe damage. 
March 16: EU leaders call on Israel and Palestinians to rein in violence, saying there "is no military 
solution to this conflict." They urge Israel to withdraw its forces from PA areas, lift restrictions on Arafat's 
movements, freeze settlement building, relieve the closures, and allow international observers to monitor 
a cease-fire. They condemn Israel's "use of excessive force" against Palestinians as unjustifiable, 
especially "actions against medical and humanitarian institutions and personnel," and its "executions 
without trial" of Palestinians. They calion the PA to fight terrorism. 
March 19: An aerial survey conducted by Peace Now has revealed that since the election of Sharon in 
Feb. 2001 34 new settlement sites have been established in the West Bank. 
March 22: The US announces that it is adding the AI-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades to the State Dept.'s list of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Israel applauds the decision. 
March 25: A delegation of renowned intellectuals from the International Parliament of Writers (IPW) 
meets with Arafat in Ramallah. Among them Portuguese Nobel Prize laureate Jose Saramago (Literature, 
1998) compares Israeli policy in the territories to "Nazi" tactics and equates the Palestinians to 
concentration camp victims, saying the situation in the Ramallah resembled "the spirit of Auschwitz" and 
"What must be done is to ring all bells of the world, to say that what's happening in Palestine is a crime 
that we can stop." Juan Goytisolo of Spain says that Israel is employing state terrorism and that the 
group had come to show solidarity with the Palestinians living in ghettos, and Breyten Breytenbach, who 
spent eight years in jail for opposing apartheid in South Africa, asked if he did not fear he would be 
termed anti-Semitic, says "We have to reject this kind of cultural terrorism that sees every criticism of 
Israeli crimes against the Palestinians as an expression of anti-Semitism." 
March 26: After meeting with Palestinian officials, who presented their response to his compromise 
proposals, asking for further clarifications as the text departed too far from the original Tenet text, US 
envoy Zinni says that the gaps between the two sides are too wide. The next meeting of the joint security 
committee is postponed indefinitely. 
March 27: 29 people are killed and over 100 wounded, when a Palestinian suicide bomber Abdel-
Basset Odeh from Tulkarem blows himself up in the Park Hotel in Netanya. Hamas claims responsibility. 
Pres. Arafat gives a speech from his office in Ramallah, saying he was ready to immediately implement 
an unconditional cease-fire. 
March 27-28: The Arab summit in Beirut opens without King Abdullah and Pres. Mubarak, who do not 
attend because of security reasons. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah reiterates his proposal of "normal 
relations" with Israel for recognition of a Palestinian state and the refugees' right to return. The 
Palestinian delegation walks out after a speech by Chairman Arafat is not aired. On the second day, Arab 
states approve final draft of Saudi peace initiative. 
March 29: After Sharon declares Arafat "an enemy" and the Israeli cabinet decides to isolate him, IDF 
troops launch "Operation Defensive Wall", invade Ramallah and surround Arafat's headquarters. Israeli 
troops seize most of the buildings, confining Arafat to a few rooms. Five Palestinians are killed and 50 
wounded; one Israeli soldier is also killed. Israeli troops prevent ambulances and paramedics from 
evacuating the wounded and destroy electricity networks and other infrastructure. Various buildings are 
turned into military outposts. 
March 30: In the night, Israeli tanks enter and re-occupy Bethlehem and Beit Jala. 
- UN Gen.-Sec. Annan calls upon Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territory and not to harm Arafat. 
- The UNSC holds a meeting over Mideast situation behind closed doors and passes Res. 1402 calling for 
Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities with 14:0, with Syria boycotting the vote because of the text's 
soft tone. 
March 31: The Israeli army declares Ramallah a closed military area, banning journalists from the city; 
soldiers also seize local TV channels and replace normal programming with pornographic films. 
- A suicide bomber - Shadi Tobassi, 18, from Jenin - blows himself up near the Matza restaurant in the 
Grand Canyon Mall in Haifa's Romema district, killing 14, and wounding dozens others. Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad take responsibility. 
- PM Sharon addresses the nation, saying "We are at war, and it is a war for our home" ... "This terror is 
being directed, put into practice and initiated by a single individual - Palestinian Authority Chairman 
Vasser Arafat. He is the enemy of Israel and the entire free world, an obstacle to peace in the Middle East 
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Annex BIll: 30 Years Of U.S. UN Vetoes. 
How the U.S. has Vetoed 1972-2002 
Source: http://www.un.org 
Year Resolution Vetoed by the USA 
1972 Condemns Israel for killing hundreds of people in Syria and Lebanon in air raids. 
1973 Affirms the rights of the Palestinians and calls on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. 
1976 Condemns Israel for attacking Lebanese civilians. 
1976 Condemns Israel for building settlements in the occupied territories. 
1976 Calls for self determination for the Palestinians. 
1976 Affirms the rights of the Palestinians. 
1978 Urges the permanent members (USA, USSR, UK, France, China) to insure United Nations decisions 
on the maintenance of international peace and security. 
1978 Criticises the living conditions of the Palestinians. 
1978 Condemns the Israeli human rights record in occupied territories. 
1978 Calls for developed countries to increase the quantity and quality of development assistance to 
underdeveloped countries. 
1979 Calls for an end to all military and nuclear collaboration with the apartheid South Africa. 
1979 Strengthens the arms embargo against South Africa. 
1979 Offers assistance to all the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movement. 
1979 Concerns negotiations on disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race. 
1979 Calls for the return of all inhabitants expelled by Israel. 
1979 Demands that Israel desist from human rights violations. 
1979 Requests a report on the living conditions of Palestinians in occupied Arab countries. 
1979 Offers assistance to the Palestinian people. 
1979 Discusses sovereignty over national resources in occupied Arab territories. 
1979 Calls for protection of developing counties' exports. 
1979 Calls for alternative approaches within the United Nations system for improving the enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
1979 Opposes support for intervention in the internal or external affairs of states. 
1979 For a United Nations Conference on Women. 
1979 To include Palestinian women in the United Nations Conference on Women. 
1979 Safeguards rights of developing countries in multinational trade negotiations. 
1980 Requests Israel to return displaced persons. 
1980 Condemns Israeli policy regarding the living conditions of the Palestinian people. 
1980 Condemns Israeli human rights practices in occupied territories. 3 resolutions. 
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1980 Offers assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement. 
1980 Attempts to establish a New International Economic Order to promote the growth of 
underdeveloped countries and international economic co-operation. 
1980 Endorses the Program of Action for Second Half of United Nations Decade for Women. 
1980 Declaration of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. 
1980 Emphasises that the development of nations and individuals is a human right. 
1980 Calls for the cessation of all nuclear test explosions. 
1980 Calls for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. 
1981 Promotes co-operative movements in developing countries. 
1981 Affirms the right of every state to choose its economic and social system in accord with the will of 
its people, without outside interference in whatever form it takes. 
1981 Condemns activities of foreign economic interests in colonial territories. 
1981 Calls for the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. 
1981 Calls for action in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, curb the arms race and promote 
disarmament. 
1981 Urges negotiations on prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. 
1981 Declares that education, work, health care, proper nourishment, national development, etc are 
human rights. 
1981 Condemns South Africa for attacks on neighbouring states, condemns apartheid and attempts to 
strengthen sanctions. 7 resolutions. 
1981 Condemns an attempted coup by South Africa on the Seychelles. 
1981 Condemns Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, human rights policies, and the bombing of Iraq. 
18 resolutions. 
1982 Condemns the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 6 resolutions (1982 to 1983). 
1982 Condemns the shooting of 11 Muslims at a shrine in Jerusalem by an Israeli soldier. 
1982 Calls on Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights occupied in 1967. 
1982 Condemns apartheid and calls for the cessation of economic aid to South Africa. 4 resolutions. 
1982 Calls for the setting up of a World Charter for the protection of the ecology. 
1982 Sets up a United Nations conference on succession of states in respect to state property, archives 
and debts. 
1982 Nuclear test bans and negotiations and nuclear free outer space. 3 resolutions. 
1982 Supports a new world information and communications order. 
1982 Development of international law. 
1982 Protects against products harmful to health and the environment. 
1982 Declares that education, work, health care, proper nourishment, national development are human 
rights. 
1982 Protects against products harmful to health and the environment. 
1982 Development of the energy resources of developing countries. 
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1984 Condemns support of South Africa in its Namibian anq other policies. 
1984 International action to eliminate apartheid. 
1984 Condemns Israel for occupying and attacking southern Lebanon. 
1984 Resolutions about apartheid, nuclear arms, economics, and international law. 18 resolutions. 
1985 Condemns Israel for occupying and attacking southern Lebanon. 
1985 Condemns Israel for using excessive force in the occupied territories. 
1985 Resolutions about cooperation, human rights, trade and development. 3 resolutions. 
1985 Measures to be taken against Nazi, FaSCist and neo-Fascist activities. 
1986 Calls on all governments (including the USA) to observe international law. 
1986 Imposes economic and military sanctions against South Africa. 
1986 Condemns Israel for its actions against Lebanese civilians. 
1986 Calls on Israel to respect Muslim holy places. 
1986 Condemns Israel for sky-jacking a Libyan airliner. 
1986 Resolutions about co-operation, security, human rights, trade, media bias, the environment and 
development. 8 resolutions. 
1987 Calls on Israel to abide by the Geneva Conventions in its treatment of the Palestinians. 
1987 Calls on Israel to stop deporting Palestinians. 
1987 Condemns Israel for its actions in Lebanon. 2 resolutions. 
1987 Calls on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. 
1987 Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States. 
1987 Calls for compliance in the International Court of Justice concerning military and paramilitary 
activities against Nicaragua and a call to end the trade embargo against Nicaragua. 2 resolutions. 
1987 Measures to prevent international terrorism, study the underlying political and economic causes of 
terrorism, convene a conference to define terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle of people 
from national liberation. 
1987 Resolutions concerning journalism, international debt and trade. 3 resolutions. 
1987 Opposition to the build up of weapons in space. 
1987 OPPOSition to the development of new weapons of mass destruction. 
1987 Opposition to nuclear testing. 2 resolutions. 
1988 Condemns Israeli practices against Palestinians in the occupied territories. 5 resolutions (1988 and 
1989). 
1989 Condemns USA invasion of Panama. 
1989 Condemns USA troops for ransacking the residence of the Nicaraguan ambassador in Panama. 
1989 Condemns USA support for the Contra army in Nicaragua. 
1989 Condemns illegal USA embargo of Nicaragua. 
1989 Opposing the acquisition of territory by force. 
1989 Calling for a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on earlier UN resolutions. 
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1995 Affirms that land in East Jerusalem annexed by Israel is occupied territory. 
1997 Calls on Israel to cease building settlements in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories. 2 
resolutions. 
1999 Calls on the USA to end its trade embargo on Cuba. 8 resolutions (1992 to 1999). 
2001 To send unarmed monitors to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
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Annex BI12: Eyewitness Report From Ramallah 
By Tzaporah Ryter, Tuesday, April 2/ 2002 
Ramallah, Occupied Palestine -- My name is Tzaporah Ryter. I am an American student from the 
University of Minnesota. I currently am in Ramallah. We are under a terrible siege and people are being 
massacred by both the Israeli army and armed militia groups of Israeli settlers. They are shooting outside 
at anything that moves. 
I am urgently pleading for as much outside help as possible to help save lives here. 
I arrived in Ramallah last Thursday. I had come back for a visit to the Palestinian city where I had been 
previously living and studying. On Thursday afternoon, the Israeli army began sealing off each entrance 
to Ramallah and there were rumors that they planned to invade. 
People were rushing back home from across checkpoints and also people were trying to flee. People were 
not allowed to go out and many working people -- with homes and children to return to -- were not 
allowed in, everyone was trying to take cover. Those traveling in began desperately searching for 
alternative ways and traveling in groups/ but the Israelis were firing upon them and everyone was 
running and screaming. 
Women carrying their children were trying desperately to flee from Ramallah, carrying infants and 
toddlers, and their young children were running along in the rain through the fields, slipping aDd falling 
on the rocks, trying to reach safety. Israeli jeeps were speeding across the terrain pulling up from every 
direction and shooting at the women and children, and also at me, as we ran in opposite directions. They 
were chasing down people, hunting them like that in the fields. 
When I reached Ramallah, people were panicking and trying to buy bread, rice and milk from corner 
stores, but most supplies were already gone. We bought what we could and went inside to wait for what 
was coming. 
When night fell, Israeli tanks began to invade and also we saw Israeli troops coming on foot from the 
valley, and surrounding our house. I could hear them calling to each other in Hebrew. They were against 
our door and all around. They were firing everywhere a barrage of bullets and there was tank fire. We 
had to lay on the floor and keep silent. We stayed there, on the floor, for nearly four days in the 
darkness. 
We knew that our circumstances were better than others because old people or infants or people with 
medical emergency needs had no help. It was very cold, with most families packed all in one room. Some 
people are without life sustaining medicines like insulin, and they are altering their doses dangerously if 
they have any medicine left to take. People are becoming dangerously sick from lack of food and water 
and heat. The fear and terror only makes things worse, but it cannot be avoided. 
In the daytime, we heard them shooting people in the streets, and could hear them screaming and 
screaming. No ambulance was allowed through. Then their screams stopped and there was just silence. 
We had a telephone and would receive calls from all over telling us what was happening. Everyone is in 
grave danger and Israeli soldiers were killing people everywhere. They are arresting medics and 
ambulance drivers, including foreign volunteer medical workers. 
They keep taking doctors and mediCS, just now another call. Again, this time the wife of a doctor telling 
us her husband has been taken from the ambulance. 
Large groups of people have been found in rooms, shot dead, there are blood marks where they have 
lined people up on their knees and shot them, with their ID cards laying on top of them. They are taking 
people from their homes, blindfolding them, removing their clothes, taking them away or lining them up 
and shooting them against the wall. 
People are making phone calls and saying that these soldiers and militia have come in and are shooting 
people and then the line cuts off. 
The numbers of these killings I fear are much greater than the numbers confirmed in the press, because 
the human rights offices and the media centers have been stormed, and everything is shut down. No one 











Justificational Narratives Annex B112: Eyewitness Report From Ramallah 
The Israelis are demanding that all journalists leave Ramallah and today another foreign journalist was 
shot. They do not want any more internationals here and are deporting people. It seems quite clear that 
they do not want eyewitnesses which is only heightening my own fears. 
The hospitals have also been surrounded and invaded and Israeli troops are taking the injured people and 
interrogating them. Today a woman, a patient, tried to walk out from hospital. The Israelis shot her in 
the neck and killed her. 
The Palestinian Ministry of Health is saying that they fear the spread of diseases because of the number 
of unburied corpses. 
The numbers are only growing in reports of the mass killings here and Israeli troops continue to round up 
people. People are calling frantically, missing a relative and we do not know where they have been taken, 
including children. 
The numbers we have now exceed 600, and we are estimating between 700 and 800. All human rights 
groups and legal advocates are being denied any information of where the detained are being held. From 
what we know confirmed is that 10% of those taken so far have been children under age 18. 
On the fourth day I decided to try to move. People were running out of supplies and I also was so worried 
about people, and had to check to see if they were okay. If I didn't, I feared panic would overtake me so 
badly that I really had no other choice but to try and go. 
It was not safe where I was in any case and at least if I left I would still have my sanity. It was really 
terrifying as there are some internationals here, usually traveling in groups, and the Israelis are saying 
on the radio that they will arrest or shoot the internationals. They did shoot some yesterday and 
regardless, it's not as if snipers differentiate and they are everywhere. 
My friends told me not to go, and were really scared for me, but I had to go. When I went outside, there 
were cars all shot up and hit by multiple bullets and shells in the middle of the road, unparked. There 
must have been people in them but I don't know where their bodies are. There are no reports of them, 
but they must exist. 
I got to the corner trying to go to the bakery for bread and food for people. Some people were calling and 
calling with only one cup of rice left. I made it to the corner but they opened fire on my first try, and shot 
at me, so I had to turn back. 
After that I tried again and it took me one day to make it a block because I had to start over again and 
again. I had to climb through the valley, and as I passed house by house, people were warning me and 
pointing out what path seemed safest for these two minutes. In the next two minutes, it would be 
something different. They really helped to keep my path safe. 
Today is Day Five and they are still rounding up people like this and we hear them shooting all day long. 
This afternoon the Israelis suddenly lifted the curfew, suddenly announcing that everyone had two hours 
to go out to get food. However, the Israeli soldiers also took food from many of the stores, looted, and 
there is no bread or things. People went to get whatever they COUld. 
Even though the Israeli army said it had lifted the closure for two hours -- in which we still were not able 
to transfer medical supplies and still was not long enough to everything that was badly needed -- the 
Israelis continued shooting people in the streets indiscriminately on their way, so people were running 
around trying to make it to the store or find a safe route only to have to run back home again. It was an 
added cruelty and terror tactic in this macabre situation, a sick joke: starve people and then shoot them 
when they try to find food with your permission. 
In an apartment building in Beitunia neighborhood where I used to live, they took 60 people who were 
my neighbors, including several families, and pushed them into one room since last night. The Israelis 
told them that they are to be used as "human shields", as the apartment building is across from a 
building that they were invading. 
One child needs to go to the hospital since last night and, initially, the families were able to call outside. 
Now, the Israelis have taken their phones. 
There are reports that they are rounding up men between the ages of 14 and 45 in that neighborhood, 
and these civilians, from these same Palestinian families trapped in that building, were just used to walk 
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Reports also have alleged that the Israelis were saying that some could leave but shot them when they 
attempted to leave. The buildings there are burning, and people are trapped inside. 
We keep calling to try to find people but there has been no electricity and most people's phones are dead 
now. I do not know what is happening to many people. The only solution to this is to try to brave the 
deadly streets in order to check, but its almost impossible and terrifying to leave the house at all. 
Each place I come to, I am afraid to leave not only for myself but for everyone else in this horrifying 
position. Israeli death squads have been yanking people into the street. I also hear only shooting and 
shooting, with no return fire. This suggest that unarmed Civilians are being gunned down mercilessly 
everywhere and I am so scared for everyone. I feel like maybe if I leave one place, one area or 
neighborhood I will never see the people again alive. 
There are more explosions outside now and more shooting. Another explosion. More firing, it just doesn't 
stop. 
This is a massacre. The foreign delegations tried to get in but were turned back, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross is trying to help but they are being ignored. Please help. 
I am not only scared for myself and for people here, but if this cannot be stopped, I am truly scared for 
all of humanity, for a world in which we send men to the moon but cannot stop ethnic cleansing. 
There do not seem to be any reports of what is happening. In truth, it's got to stop. Please go out to the 
streets, please demand a response from your representatives. Be loud, march up to the capitals, refuse 
to leave until the Israelis withdraw. Act now! Tell them the Israelis are murdering innocent people whose 
only crime is being born in their own homeland, a Palestinian under a military occupation. 
Demand international protection for the Palestinian people, scream that this is an affront to humanity and 
that it is time that the US not only stop supporting Israel, but that the US stop its abuse of human rights 
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Annex BI13: Operation Defensive Shield Overview 
UNRWA Overview of Operation Defensive Shield (www.unrwa.org) 





22 per cent of Palestinian children are suffering from acute or chronic malnutrition. Four out of five 
children in Gaza and the West Bank have inadequate iron and zinc intake, deficiencies that cause 
anemia and weaken the immune system. 
Unemployment has risen to over 50 per cent in the occupied territory as a consequence of the 
closures and is the root cause of Palestinian poverty and malnutrition. 
In the West Bank, UNRWA has received donor funding to rebuild 400 shelters destroyed in Jenin 
camp. However, in Gaza and the rest of the West Bank another 5,500 refugees have had their homes 
destroyed during Israeli military operations. Thousands more have had their shelters damaged in the 
fighting. 
Demand for the Agency's medical services has leapt since the start of the intifada. There has been a 
60 per cent increase in consultations and a 30 per cent growth in physiotherapy cases. 
• Curfews and closures have crippled Palestinian education. UNRWA lost on average one mO!1th's 
schooling per pupil in the West Bank in the 2001-2002 academic year because students or staff could 
not reach their classes. Test scores have collapsed. 
• Poverty rates among Palestinians have reached 60 per cent of the population. 
UNSCO report (www.unsco.org) 
UN: New economic figures for West Bank and Gaza show rapid deterioration leading to human 
catastrophe 
29 August 2002 
The Palestinian economy is mired in a deep crisis, with unemployment levels rising significantly over the 
first half of 2002, according to preliminary figures released today by the Office of the United Nations 
Special Co-ordinator (UNSCO). These figures, part of a report due out next month, are the first 
international economic statistics on the Palestinian economy since Israel reoccupied West Bank urban 
areas last spring. 
Particularly hard hit are the West Bank cities and towns, which the Israeli military has placed under 
lengthy curfews in response to a wave of terror attacks earlier this year. On days with curfew, the 
estimated unemployment rate reached 63.3 percent. Income losses now total US$3.3 billion since 
October 2000. Poverty levels continue to increase at alarming rates, reaching 70 percent in the Gaza 
Strip. 
"I am deeply disturbed by the figures. But I am not surprised -- given the iron grip that Israel has applied 
on the West Bank," said Mr. Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN Special Co-ordinator. "Aid cannot fill the gap, but 
without it the economy would collapse. Against this backdrop, and before the eyes of the world, the 
Palestinian civilian population is scrambling to survive." 
Mr. Larsen unequivocally condemned the terror attacks by Palestinian groups that prompted the Israeli 
action, and emphasized Israel's legitimate right to self defense. But in the face of the growing human 
catastrophe, Mr. Roed-Larsen asked Israeli officials to review their severe restrictions on the movement 
of Palestinian people and goods. 
"In light of the hardships facing Palestinian civilians, within the next few days I will meet with senior 
Israeli officials and urge them to re-examine the application of their security measures. While I welcome 
Israeli statements that it will take steps to ease the situation, I would argue that some of its measures, in 
fact, are not reinforcing security," he said. "Indeed, there is a gray area where legitimate defense of 
Israeli civilians has the de facto consequence of collective punishment for Palestinian civilians." 
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UNseo has been providing economic data and analysis on a regular basis for several years. These figures 
are widely recognized as useful for governments and major organizations. They provide credible 
estimates of the development - or in this case, the rapid deterioration - of the Palestinian economy, a 
linchpin in the pursuit of peace. 
The numbers reveal an economy in dire straits, one that has deteriorated steadily since the beginning of 
a closure regime in October 2000. There are three main preliminary findings -- unemployment, poverty 
levels and income losses - which are part of a 30-page report to be released next month on the 
performance of the Palestinian economy in the first half of 2002. 
Unemployment 
UNSeO estimates that the overall adjusted unemployment rate for the West Bank and Gaza Strip during 
the second quarter of 2002 increased from roughly 36 percent to approximately 50 percent. 
Unemployment fluctuates greatly according to the extent of curfews. UNSeO estimates that on curfew 
days involving approximately 600,000 people, the non-Jerusalem West Bank unemployment rises as high 
as 63.3 percent. Unemployment in the Gaza Strip has remained steady at nearly 50 per cent. 
Income Losses 
Income losses stand at $7.6 million per day, for a total of almost $3.3 billion dollars since October 2000. 
This includes income from jobs in Israel as well as from domestic productive activities. Loss of income as 
a result of closures and restrictions far exceeds anything that the international aid community can 
provide. ' 
Poverty Levels 
UNseo estimates put poverty - based on two dollars or less consumption per day -- at 70 percent in 
Gaza and 55 percent in the West Bank. 
A Devastating Impact on the Civilian Population 
Throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians have run out of money and are unable to work to 
earn it. They increasingly must rely on handouts, selling personal items, credit - anything simply to 
survive. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the period from just before Operation 
Defensive Shield to the weeks that followed, more than 56% of households lost at least half their income, 
and nearly 20% lost their income altogether. 
The World Food Programme says that it will soon deliver food assistance to more than half a million 
beneficiaries. In addition, UNRWA has provided ongoing food aid to nearly a million refugees since 
October 2000. Aid money has largely shifted from projects intended to build a prosperous Palestinian 
state. Now it goes to short-term relief for the Palestinian people intended to reduce such things as 
malnutrition and epidemics. 
For more information, and a copy of Mr. Larsen's statement, please contact Mark Dennis, Senior Media 
Adviser, UNSeO, +972-67-651-189, +972-2-568-7289, dennism@un.orq 
Children 
The effects of Operation Defensive Shield on Palestinian children living in the West Bank 
Samia Halileh, Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University, 29 June 2002 
http://electronicintifada.netlv2/article636.shtml 
The Israeli Operation Defensive Shield began on 29 March 2002 with the reoccupation of the city of 
Ramallah followed soon after by the rest of the Palestinian cities. The reoccupation lasted variable lengths 
of time, with the longest in Bethlehem for 45 consecutive days. 
For Palestinian children, this meant the interruption of normal life including education, social interactions, 
accessibility to health care, and loss of income for their familles. In addition, there was psychological 
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Objectives 
This report summarizes some specific violations of children's rights that occurred between 29 March and 
31 May 2002 as a result of Operation Defensive Shield - the rights to life, physical and psychological well 
being, healthcare, education, and protection from torture. 
Methodology 
This report focuses on children under the age of 18. Information was obtained from local and 
international organizations that deal with children - Defense of Children International (DCI) - Palestinian 
Sector, National Plan of Action (NPA), UNICEF, the Red Crescent Society (RCS), Ministry of Health (MoH) 
and Human Development and Information project (HDIP). In addition, the local papers and the Internet 
were screened for reports on events affecting Palestinian children during that period. 
Results 
Deaths 
During the reported time period, 55 children were killed. Thirty-eight percent (21) were under 12 years of 
age and 85 percent (47) were males. Forty-four percent (24) died from live bullets including rubber-
coated metal bullets, 13 percent (7) from shelling, bombing or explosions, 9 percent (5) from delays in 
receiving healthcare, 19 percent (10) from acts of violence such as beatings or being struck by army 
vehicles, and 11 percent (6) were buried under the rubble by a bulldozer. Of those who died, 34.5 
percent were from l'Jablus and 25.5 percent from Jenin. 14.5 percent and 12.7 percent were frbm 
Bethlehem and Hebron respectively. 
During the third day of the incursion into Nablus, the Shu'bi family home was demolished by an Israeli 
bulldozer; the mother, seven-months pregnant, and, three brothers, Abdullah, 8, Azzam, 6, and Anas, 4, 
were buried under the rubble, along with their grandfather and two aunts. 
Another family, from Qabatia near Jenin, was similarly devastated when an Israeli tank fired at the 
family, as they were cultivating their land, killing the mother and her two children, Abeer, 3, and Basil, 4. 
The father was detained for a couple of hours and ambulances were prevented from transporting the 
children and the mother for several hours, by which time they were all dead. 
On 23 April, Ameen Ziad Thawabte, 14, from the village of Beit Fajjar near Hebron, was returning from 
school with a small group of children his age at approximately 1: 00 p. m. An Israeli jeep passed nearby 
and fired a single shot that killed Ameen. There were no clashes or confrontations with soldiers in the 
area at the time and there was no curfew on the village. The Israeli army claimed that the children were 
close to a settlement. However, the nearest settlement, Mijdal Oz, is located three kilometers from the 
place where Ameen was shot. 
Five deaths were due to delay in receiving health care, three of which were babies delivered at 
checkpoints who died soon after birth. The other two were sick children who either died at checkpoints or 
later due to delays in getting healthcare. Dr Ali Sha'ar's newborn from Nablus, became unwell soon after 
home delivery. The Israeli occupation force prevented his transport to a hospital and he died a couple of 
hours later. Haleema al-Atrash, a woman in labor from Walajeh village near Bethlehem, was prevented 
from reaching an ambulance located only 10 meters away from her. As a result, she delivered at the 
checkpoint, but the baby died soon after. 
The Israeli occupation force regularly left mines in commonly used Palestinian areas before their 
withdrawal and 11 children were affected, seven of them have died. On 23 April, Asad Orsan lost four 
limbs, Saed al-Wahshi, 12, suffered severe burns and shrapnel over his entire body, and on 17 May, 
Ameer Nashrati, 12, was injured while playing in the rubble. 
Injuries 
The data on injury is by no mean complete as not all the injuries were reported. Overall, 342 injuries 
were documented. Forty percent were from Nablus, 33.6 percent from Hebron, and 13 percent were from 
Tulkarim, the rest were from the other cities. Of these injuries, live bullets, including rubber-coated metal 
bullets caused 24 percent, and beatings, collisions with an army vehicle, and shock injury caused 51 
percent, the rest were due to other causes. Forty-seven percent of the children were from the city while 
the rest were split equally between villages and refugee camps. Again, as in death, 37 percent were 
under 12 years of age and most of the injured were males (82.5 percent). 
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On 3 April, during a three-hour break in the curfew in Ramallah, Israeli troops fired randomly at 
Palestinian civilians who were attempting to buy food, water, and essential goods. A 14-year old boy, 
Kindi Qutteineh, who lives in the center of the city, was shot in his leg by live ammunition fired from an 
Israeli tank. An eyewitness to the shooting told DCI, If I was walking up the street to buy some food when 
Israeli soldiers shot randomly at people. Kindi was near his house. It took around one hour before an 
ambulance could reach him and take him to hospital." 
On 5 April, 9-year old, Mohammed Amin Abdul Rahman al-Zougheir of Hebron was seriously injured 
during an assassination attempt on the life of a Palestinian activist. Mohammed and his father were next 
to their car when an air-to-surface missile slammed into the vehicle. The attack caused third-degree 
burns to 80 percent of Mohammed's body. 
On 10 April, 16-year old Abdul Rahman Ismail Mohammed Abu Hadwan from Hebron sustained injuries to 
his lower leg and ankle when Israeli soldiers shot him with a fragmenting bullet. 
On 16 April, 16-year old Shadi Issa Mohammed Yunis Jaradat of Hebron sustained injuries after being 
shot in the chest with live ammunition during an Israeli army invasion into Hebron. 
Detention 
Defense of Children International revealed that as of 22 May around 40 50 children are being detained 
in Ofrah prison near the city of Ramallah. When the DCI lawyer attempted to visit the children, he was 
allowed to see seven of them, but only after much difficulty. The prison is composed of nine 
compartments separated by metal wire, with four tents in each section, housing 25 to 35 prisoners. The 
tents are erected on a concrete floor and prisoners sleep on wooden benches with only a thin mattress 
and dirty, smelly blankets. There is no electricity in the tents and the prisoners are completely cut off 
from the outside world. There are no cleaning facilities and two of the compartments have flooded 
sewage. Food is prepared and eaten from large containers, shared by eight prisoners. 
One of the children said he was arrested on 23 April, interrogated and the next day he was taken to 
Ofrah and beaten on the way. On arrival, he was interrogated again for an entire day and one of the 
soldiers kept banging his head against a table.5 
On 7 June, the Israeli Minister of Prisoner Affairs announced that there are 7,500 prisoners detained in 12 
prisons (two of which were recently opened); 170 are children and 20 female.6 
Family visits have been made difficult and if allowed, the mothers are humiliated through requests such 
as removing their clothes in order to be searched. 
Psychological trauma 
Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, Palestinian children have been exposed to 
harassment, displacement, shooting, and destruction of their homes and schools. These measures were 
drastically increased during the recent occupation, accentuating the psychological effects on children. 
Prior to the incursion, in April - May 2001, which is 7 to 8 months after the intifada began; the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) began to document the shooting, bombing and harassment of 
children.7 The results showed that even at that time, 27331 (1.3 percent) of the Palestinians in the West 
Bank had changed their residence due to the situation - 22.3 percent permanently and 54 percent 
temporarily. Of 483,460 school children interviewed at that time, 3 percent had been stopped at 
checkpoints, 1.2 percent shot at, 1.4 percent humiliated, 0.8 percent beaten, and equal number 
harassed. 
At least half of the school children showed psychological symptoms such as crying and fear from 
loneliness, the dark, and loud noises. About a third showed symptoms of sleep disorder, nervousness, 
decrease in eating and weight, feelings of hopelessness and frustration, and abnormal thoughts of death. 
About half of the children showed deterioration in their schoolwork and one-third were unable to 
concentrate. In the same report, around 7 percent of families had experienced shooting at their houses, 
3.5 percent raids into their homes by Israeli soldiers or settlers, and 6 percent were exposed to tear gas. 
Five percent of families reported damage to their land, 3 percent to their homes, and 4 percent to their 
cars. 
Recently, at the end of the recent incursion, May 2002, the Institute of Community and Public Health 
(ICPH), Birzeit University prepared a brief statistical report on the daily life, health and environmental 
conditions of families living under curfew.8 The report sampled five cities and showed that 23 to 37 
percent of families housed other families because of life-threatening danger, houses being demolished or 












percent of families reported considerable destruction to their neighborhoods and 28 to 59 percent 
reported exposure to shooting and lor destruction of their own home. 
The Israeli occupying forces searched between 30 to 50 percent of homes; 12 to 36 percent of 
households reported the arrest of at least one family member. As a result, between 70 and 93 percent of 
interviewees reported mental health problems in at least one family member. Symptoms included great 
fear among children - shivering, crying, loss of appetite, and lack of sleep. Methods for coping included 
prayer, sleeping with the children, and intensification of normal activities, explaining to the children what 
is happening, and sometimes seeking help from a counselor by telephone. 
Now, after the third incursion, June 2002, psychologists expect that all the children to have been 
traumatized, as shooting, damage to properties, bombing and house demolition has become a regular 
event in all areas of the West Bank. 
Examples of events causing psychological trauma to children include the main incursion of the Jenin 
refugee camp with 600 houses completely destroyed by bombs and bulldozers and 200 houses unfit for 
habitation, leaving 1,250 families homeless. 
One personal tale began on 5 April. The Abu Ramaileh family had hidden in the kitchen for a couple of 
days to avoid shelling and shooting at the Jenin refugee camp. At a quiet moment, the father decided to 
check damage in the sitting room. A shot was heard and when the mother went to check on her husband, 
she found that he had been shot dead. The ambulance could not reach the house for seven days and she 
convinced her children, Muhammed, 7, Hazar, 6, and Rami, 4, that their father was tired and asleep.9 , 
In Nablus, 250 houses were destroyed, the families housed in schools, mosques, and temporary 
apartments before their houses were repaired or a permanent residence was available.l0 
Health 
Child health in general is dependent on preventive and curative services. In the Palestinian territories, 
these services are provided free of charge during the first three years of life. After this age, curative 
services are covered by private or government insurance policies or direct payment for the service. 
The PCBS studied health-seeking behavior for curative services on the West Bank during April and May 
2001, a year ago. Results showed that 28.6 percent of families who needed curative services did not 
obtain medical care because medication was not available, 32.9 percent said they had no money, 26.6 
percent could not reach a health center, and 16.8 percent reported that the doctor could not reach the 
health center. 11 A month prior to the study, March 2001/ PCBS found 10.7 percent of households in the 
Palestinian territories12 had lost their income and 64.2 percent were living below the poverty line. Since 
then, poverty and inaccessibility of drugs and healthcare has become increasingly worse, especially after 
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Annex B114: IDF Response to Amnesty Report on lenin 
The full text of this report can be found at http://www.idf.il/newsite/enqlish/amnesty0407-2.htm 
The Battle in Jenin - The Israel Defence Force's Response to the Report by 
Amnesty International 
Introduction 
On November 4, 2002, Amnesty International published a report titled "Immunity from Criticism: 
Violation of Human Rights by the IDF in Jenin and Nablus" (Amnesty report). This report presented a 
one-sided, biased and baseless picture of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) activities during Operation 
"Defensive Shield." 
This response will address the allegations found in the report (some of which have appeared in reports 
published by other agencies), with a special focus on the assertions concerning the battle that took place 
in Jenin. The response will present the background to the IDF operation in Jenin which was designed to 
deliver a blow to the extensive terrorist infrastructure located there; will detail the conditions surrounding 
the battle in Jenin and its results; will address the allegations raised against the IDF operation; will 
present the Palestinian crimes, which were not appropriately documented in the report; and will refute 
the web of lies weaved by the Palestinians regarding the battle. The response will conclude with a 
reference to the manner in which the report was written. ' 
Following is a summary of some of the central points elaborated upon in the main part of the response: 
* The IDF operation in Jenin was part of the response, forced upon the State of Israel, to a wave of 
Palestinian terror attacks. These attacks, including suicide attacks, reached their peak in March 2002, 
necessitating the lOF to move into Palestinian civil population centers, from where terrorist activities 
were conducted unhindered. Jenin was the "capital of suicide bombers", in which a terror infrastructure -
unprecedented in scope - perpetrated a large number of terror attacks. 
* The lOF operation in the Jenin Refugee Camp encountered harsh resistance from terrorist activists, who 
planted thousands of booby traps and explosive charges, used different kinds of fighting tactics, operated 
from houses belonging to civilians and exploited the civilian population, including women and Children, for 
cover, and used ambulances for the execution of terrorist activities. 
* The lOFts mode of operation was tempered, first and foremost, by the dictate to minimize the danger of 
causing harm to the civilian population. Consequently, modes of military action that could have 
accomplished the mission expediently and with minimal risk for to the lives of the soldiers -such as the 
use of planes and artillery - were rejected. 
* The lOF operation in Jenin accomplished significant achievements in the fight against terrorism which 
undoubtedly saved many Israeli lives, including the uncovering of extensive terrorist infrastructures, the 
apprehension of terrorist activists and the uncovering of huge stores of weapons. 
* There was no massacre in Jenin. The Palestinian leadership tried to promote a false charge that a 
massacre had been carried out in the camp. As a result of these allegations, the possibility of sending an 
international fact-finding commission to the region was considered. In actuality, these allegations were 
subsequently refuted and found to be groundless, and the international community dissociated itself from 
them. 
* The vast majority of the Palestinian fatalities in the camp were armed terrorists. The responsibility for 
the civilians killed lies at the door of the Palestinian terrorist organizations that operated from within the 
civilian population. There are numerous statements given by Palestinian terrorists, glorifying the use they 
made of children and women for the perpetration of terror. 
* The charges that the lOF prevented the provision of medical and humanitarian aid are groundless. They 
ignore the aid provided by the lOF, in coordination with Palestinian and international agencies; the 
complex fighting conditions; and the fact that the Palestinians themselves used ambulances in order to 
carry out terrorist activities. 
* lOF activities are continually subject to control and supervision - including inquiry procedures, military 
police investigations; trials, procedures by commanders and overall supervision by the Supreme Court 
and so forth. In contrast, on the Palestinian side - there is no accountability, no supervision and no taking 
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* The Palestinian side has committed severe crimes, which constitute grave violations of international 
humanitarian law, including acts of terrorism and violence that fall under the category of "crimes against 
humanity." These include: the booby trapping of civilian residences; the use of children in terrorist 
activities; the use of civilians as suicide terrorists; the use of the civilian population as "human shields" 
and as hostages; the use of medical facilities and holy places for terrorist activities. These crimes are 
hardly mentioned in the Amnesty report. 
* The Palestinians tried to weave a net of lies regarding Jenin - including allegations of a massacre and 
the prevention of humanitarian aid, and even went so far as to stage fictional funerals. 
* The story of the battle in Jenin epitomizes the struggle of Israel against terror that derives from her 
right of self-defense and is part of the international campaign against terrorism. 
* The Amnesty report presents a tendentious, biased and groundless image. The report adopts the 
Palestinian viewpoint and fails to explore the events that led to the Israeli operation. The report includes 












Justificational Narratives Annex BIlS: Israel v. The World 
Annex 8115: Israel v. The World 
Sharon may need to offer Arabs new deal if Bush is to fend off UN 
By Bradley Burston, Ha'aretz Correspondent 
Ha'aretz, Israel; May 01, 02 
Nearing a dangerous precipice with the United Nations Security Council, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon may 
need to make an overture the Arabs can't refuse if he is to win White House support in diplomatic warfare 
over the disputed bloodshed in Jenin. 
Sharon is to visit the White House next week. Bush administration officials had hoped that by the time 
the prime minister reached Washington, the hydra-headed negotiations regarding IDF-Palestinian 
standoffs at Vasser Arafat's besieged Ramallah headquarters, Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity, and the 
Jenin investigation impasse, would have been resolved by the time President George W. Bush welcomed 
Sharon to Washington. 
True to form, however, the Middle East has little patience for quick solutions. In a cascade of policy 
reversals over the past two weeks, Sharon has twice agreed to and twice rejected Israeli co-operation 
with the UN fact-finding mission charged with the on-site sifting of evidence over the IDF offensive in 
Jenin refugee camp. 
Israel maintained its insistence that it had nothing to hide in the face of Palestinian allegations - now 
largely in doubt - of wholesale massacres and summary executions of Palestinian civilians in the camp. 
However, the Sharon government has balked at the possibility that the evidence gathered by commission 
members could someday be used to fuel war-crimes proceedings against soldiers, commanders, and even 
the leaders who ordered the operation. 
The resultant diplomatic limbo has left the UN team stranded in Geneva, pending a late Wednesday 
Security Council debate over the impasse, and a subsequent decision by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 
whether to disband the mission. 
Furiously pulling diplomatic levers of his own was Arafat, the focus of Sharon's High I\loon war of nerves, 
whom the prime minister has kept sequestered in a corner of a dingy, largely destroyed Ramallah 
compound in an explicit bid to isolate the Palestinian leader from the world. 
But as Bush administration intervention increased in recent weeks, Arafat has been bathed in the 
spotlight of a range of international diplomatic efforts. Arafat's repeated past declarations that he wished 
for nothing more than martyrdom in his Ramallah confinement have now given way to fresh negotiations 
and a steady stream of American and European mediators. 
If Israelis had harbored hopes that the issue would disappear along with the UN mission, their optimism 
was quickly dispelled by widespread fears that Israel's international diplomatic plight could dramatically 
worsen - and soon. 
Former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami said that an enraged Security Council determined to show a 
defiant Israel who was boss, could raise the stakes of an investigation, appointing a full-blown 
commission of inquiry into the events of Jenin as well as other elements of the broad IDF West Bank 
offensive ordered in response to an unprecedented series of suicide bombings. UN sanctions could follow. 
A UN inquiry would likely pose a much more profound problem for Israel, Ben-Ami said. Moreover, if the 
government rejected such a commission, the step could lead to a "frontal confrontation with serious 
operative decisions regarding Israel, which would in turn put additional pressure on the United States, 
with respect to its ability to stand alongside Israel." 
At the same time, pressure on Sharon has increased at home. On Sunday, Sharon dismayed rightists by 
persuading the Cabinet to accept a Bush administration plan aimed at securing Arafat's release. In the 
past, Sharon had declared that Arafat would stay put until he handed over the killers of slain cabinet 
minister Rehavam Ze'evi. Under the U.S. plan, the suspected assassins, who have been Arafat's guests in 
the Ramallah compound, are to be transferred to a Jericho prison under American and British supervision, 
with Arafat's freedom to follow. 
According to Ha'aretz commentator Akiva Eldar, Israeli leaders had agreed to the proposal under the 
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Now, after having caved in on the Arafat issue without the hoped-for diplomatic compensation, Sharon 
will likely be forced to come up with another quid pro quo to offer when he visits Washington. "This will 
then allow Bush to then say 'I have received something from Sharon that is worth the cost of a UN veto,'" 
Eldar says. 
"Sharon must come with an offer that the Arabs cannot refuse, an offer good enough to compensate 
them for forgoing pressure over Jenin," Eldar continues. "For instance, Sharon could go to the White 
House on Monday and say 'Okay, I'm willing to discuss and give my blessing to the new version of the 
Saudi plan, let's have an international conference.' 
"Sharon needs something big, just to shift the emphasis from Jenin to something new. He needs to make 
it possible for Bush to be able to tell the Arabs 'Listen, I've got something even bigger for you, and (if 
you reject it, then) I will have to impose the veto.'" 
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